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ABSTRACT
The study suggests a relationship which exists between 
Martin Buber's philosophy of mutuality and a humanistic educational 
mainstreaming. Mandated by parent-initiated legislation, mainstream­
ing is intended to reduce the isolation of the handicapped by in­
cluding them as nearly as possible within the larger group in the 
regular class, and by giving them greater access to educational re­
sources. This becomes problematic even for those handicapped chil­
dren in nearest physical proximity. Among the obstacles are society's 
frequent exclusionist response to the different reflected in the 
school's preference for homogeneity, and the ideas of competition which 
dominate education.
The literature indicates that mainstreaming in its present 
stage is largely a one-sided effort to change the handicapped through 
individual remedial instruction. There is less evidence suggest­
ing a substantial coinciding effort to make the structure of the 
regular class conducive to their inclusion.
In the introductory chapter, a need is proposed to develop 
such a structure, to clarify how any child, not only the handicapped, 
may be educated as an individual by strengthening the bonds of human 
contact. Once the essential human relational element is defined, 
special methods and techniques can be brought to serve it. Buber's 
thought is relevant to this problem, since his concern was for the 
humanization of the modern institution by means of the growth of
ix
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mutuality between its members. Therefore, the various aspects of 
mutuality as indicated in his writings are researched and applied to 
mainstreaming.
Biographical information reveals Buber’s attentiveness to the 
phenomena of human difference and communication between the different. 
Chapter III states that there is a potentiality in all human beings 
which can be actualized through mutual relation. The components of 
mutuality, namely, uniqueness, awareness, responsibility, and others 
are studied. A bond of mutuality exists between two persons engaged 
in spontaneous communication when they have become "presences," each 
for the other. It is only when each becomes aware of the other's 
presence as a whole, and as a unique person of equal worth, and 
responds as a whole person on that basis, that mutuality can be 
established. Based on a Jewish w^rld affirming tradition and his 
philosophical anthropology, Buber attributes to all people the 
capacity to enter into mutuality. The second basic human relation 
is the partial and detached perception of the other as an object 
which can be categorized, used, and even changed.
In the remaining chapters, Buber's evolutionary view of edu­
cation is presented as a conscious experiment toward equity and humane­
ness. The greatness of the "genuine teacher" is seen in an Impartial, 
yet personal involvement with pupils which imbues them with courage 
and enables a confirming relation to their world. Hence, Buber advo­
cates strong participatory roles for the teacher and child. Kis 
goal of character education Is fostered in the "community of achieve­
ment" founded on mutuality between children in their common learning
x
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pursuit. Community provides a sense of belonging, educates to respon­
sibility, and it is the essential bearer of knowledge. The teacher 
helps pupils to experience their world of people subjectively, and 
helps them to see the unity behind the diversity of aspects. This pre­
supposes an objectivity which sets limits to biases, an openness to the 
facts and how they interrelate by which prejudice is replaced with a 
realistic value judgment. Individual experience is not weakened, rather 
it is enriched by differing experience. This epistemology links to an 
openness to humanity, an integrative perception of the world, and an 
independent "world view."
The conclusions emphasize quality education as generalizable to 
all students; education as inclusive; education as conscious and willed; 
education for community; and education for uniqueness defined by aware­
ness and responsible service.
xi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem
This will be a study of a philosophy of mutuality in Martin 
Buber's writings, and its significance for educational mainstreaming.
Mainstreaming is a movement toward the education of handicapped 
children with the general population of children attending the regular 
class. As viewed in this study, its aim is to enable learners to over­
come or live with their handicaps and to develop their potentialities 
through authentic participation within the regular educational setting. 
Such participation involves children in personal relations with their 
teacher, and with other class members. The second participation is seen 
to be concentrated around the common work of learning, and not only in 
occasional secondary contacts between class members who accept one 
another. This implies for the educator a conscious effort to provide 
the conditions which foster mutual recognition and help between chil­
dren in their pursuit of learning.
The mainstreaming impetus comes from the law. State and federal 
legislation mandating mainstreaming has followed court decisions favoring 
those parents who have protested the total exclusion of many children 
from school, and the isolation of other children in segregated environ­
ments where children are often subject to stigma and neglect, as are
1
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2other populations so isolated. Mainstreaming as a movement, as "progres­
sive inclusion," brings a greater degree of integration than has existed 
in recent decades. Not every child can be included in the regular class­
room within schooling as it exists, but the federal Handicapped Children 
Act requires that all of the handicapped be educated and that each one 
be educated in the "least restrictive" setting. This is meant to reduce 
the isolation of children by including them as nearly as possible within 
the larger group, and to give them better access to our educational 
resources.^
Least restrictive alternative is a term used interchangeably with
mainstreaming, and is preferred by some educators, since mainstreaming
has often been misinterpreted to mean that all special classrooms must
2close and that all children must be educated in regular settings. Least 
restrictive alternative assumes that there are a variety of alternative 
settings for the child, ranging from the regular classroom to more 
restrictive environments such as special classes on a full or part-time 
basis, special schools, and residential institutions which are the most 
restrictive. From a legal point of view, it means that removal of a per­
son "from a normal situation as a matter of public policy into one which
2is restrictive is a limitation of that person's liberty."
-^Alan Abeson and Jeffrey Zettel, "The Quiet Revolution: Handi­
capped Children Act of 1975," Exceptional Children 44 (.October 1977): 
114-28; Alan Abeson, Nancy Bollck, and Jayne Hass, A Primer on Due 
Process— Education Decisions for Handicapped Children (Reston, Virginia: 
The Council for Exceptional Children, 1975), p. 29; Edward Martin, "Inte­
gration of the Handicapped Child into Regular Schools," Minnesota Educa­
tion 2 (Spring 1976): 5-6.
2See Josephine Hayes and Scottie Torres Higgins, "Issues Regard­
ing the IEF," Exceptional Children 45 (January 1979): 268.
3Abeson, Bolick, and Hass, A Primer on Due Process, p. 29.
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The concept of a continuum of services was substantially formu­
lated in 1962 by Maynard Reynolds and later revised as a conceptualiza­
tion of preferred practices for the future. Before moving a child to a 
more restrictive setting, effort is made to adapt the present setting 
to the needs of the child. As explained by Maynard Reynolds and Jack 
Birch, regular schools and classes would have, for example, diversified 
staffing and offer many forms of individualized programs to accommodate 
a greater variety of pupils. There would be a variety of learning cen­
ters, equipment, facilities, and materials to serve pupils with special 
noo»js and prsfsrsncss » Amplification dsvicss for pupils with, hssring 
impairments is an example of special equipment.*^
Regular teachers would be challenged to become broadly resource­
ful in managing the diverse environment and serving the broad 
range of needs of a diverse student population. Special educa­
tors and other professionals with highly specialized knowledge 
and skills would be employed in collaborative teaching and sup­
porting roles with regular teachers.^
While this is a practical organizational and technical conceptual­
ization, Reynolds and Birch conclude that changes represent, at root, 
moral issues. "What do we think of human differences? How closely will 
we link our lives to people who may be different? How much investment 
will we -make in schools for literally all children?"**
Given the present state of schools, least restrictive alternative 
implies that special classes must be maintained, improved, and in certain 
circumstances even created. Such classes would include children whose
^Maynard C. Reynolds and Jack W. Birch, Teaching Exceptional Chil­
dren in All America's Schools (Reston, Virginia; Council for Exceptional 
Children, 1977), pp. 31-39.
5Ibid., p. 35.
6Ibid., p. 700.
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4handicaps are more severe in nature, and some would include even the 
mildly handicapped where the regular environment is yet unprepared to 
minister to their needs. The point has been emphasized by James Smith 
and Joan Arkans that existing regular classes are particularly unadap- 
tive to retarded children with severe multiple handicaps. They point 
to a specific minority population of children "who have all too often 
been ignored in special education." Schooling for them requires highly 
specialized personnel and physical facilities. The increasing numbers 
of moderately to profoundly handicapped in the local schools include 
net only those children who live at home and have been denied an edu— 
cation, but also the former residents of institutions who have in recent
years returned in increasing numbers to the community and who are now
■7living in foster homes, in hostels, and in community group homes.
Still, the overriding assumption is that
no educational "place" is impervious to change and development 
and that through good efforts many of the varieties of spe­
cialized and intensive forms of education can be moved into a 
developing mainstream . . . that students should be removed 
from the mainstream only for limited periods and for compelling 
reasons, that when in specialized and limited environments their 
progress should be monitored carefully and regularly, and that 
they should be returned to the mainstream as soon as feasible.®
Children who do not require extraordinary facilities and services 
of the kind referred to by Smith and Arkans are by far the greater propor­
tion of children who have been considered, in the typical school, as 
likely candidates for segregated placement. While the prevalence of 
"educationally handicapped" among the school age population totals
7James 0. Smith and Joan R. Arkans, "Now More Than Ever: A Case 
for the Special Class," Exceptional Children 40 (April 1974): 497-502.
^Reynolds and Birch, Teaching Exceptional Children in All 
America's Schools, p. 36.
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5roughly ten percent (a figure projected by the United States Office of 
Education for 1971-1972, derived from estimates provided by school dis­
tricts), Dunn estimated that only 1% percent of the school-age population 
are severely disabled. Dunn arrived at this 1% percent estimate by total­
ing the reported numbers of children who are blind, deaf, severely emo­
tionally disturbed and socially maladjusted, moderately and severely 
retarded, severely cerebral palsied and pupils with other severe condi­
tions usually associated with multiple disabilities.^ But even among 
these children, ways can and have been found to provide at least partial 
contact with the normal environment.
Educational mainstreaming is part of a more comprehensive commu­
nity mainstreaming trend. Increasingly, the foster home and the small 
hostel are replacing institutional residence. Some workers in the help­
ing professions have begun to function away from their professional cen­
ters and within the life of the community, fostering a variety of support 
systems among family, neighbors, employers, and teachers to maintain the 
handicapped in ordinary surroundings. State regulated architectural 
change to accommodate the physically disabled is a way of facilitating 
community mainstreaming. Many changes come about through "self emancipa­
tion," the organized effort of the adult handicapped, themselves. As for 
education, every state in the nation is now making efforts to admit han­
dicapped children into regular settings, and this is reflected in the 
efforts of a large number of school districts."^
^Lloyd M. Dunn, ed., Exceptional Children in the Schools:
Special Education in Transition, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973), pp. 13-16.
^See Reynolds and Birch, Teaching Exceptional Children in All 
America's Schools, pp. 22, 37-38, 40-41.
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6But much of this change has been accomplished through contrac­
tual arrangement; mere physical presence of the handicapped by no means 
implies real participation in the sense that mutuality exists between 
one person and another around a given common task or living situation.
The state of readiness in the typical school for mainstreaming 
depends on prevalent attitudes toward the handicapped, educational 
priorities as they now exist, and how these may interact. How do regu­
lar class teachers and their pupils respond to the presence of handi­
capped children? To what extent are their attitudes affected by the 
educational priorities established in the classroom? Do these prior­
ities help or obstruct the inclusion of handicapped pupils? Research 
conducted by Orville Johnsou and Samuel Kirk on the social position of 
"educable mentally handicapped" or "educable mentally retarded" children 
in regular classes (of the kind called progressive as well as the tradi­
tional) suggests that it was their very isolation therein which con­
tributed to the initial growth of segregated special classes.11 * (This 
group has by far comprised the largest population of children segregated 
from the regular classroom.) And a sample of recent surveys indicate 
that regular class teachers for the most part reject changes associated 
with mainstreaming.1^
11G. Orville Johnson and Samuel A. Kirk, "Are Mentally Handi­
capped Children Segregated in the Regular Grades," Exceptional Children 
17 (December 1950): 65-68, 87-8S. Refer also to Willie K. Baldwin,
"The Social Position of the Educable Mentally Retarded in the Regular 
Grades in the Public Schools," Exceptional Children 25 (November 1958): 
106-108; J. E. Wallace Wallin, "Trends and Needs in the Training of 
Teachers for Special Classes for Handicapped Children," Journal of 
Educational Research 31 (March 1938): 525.
1^Maynard C. Reynolds, "Addendum," Minnesota Education 2 (Spring 
1976): 69; Jay R. Shotel, Richard P. Iano, and James F. McGettigan,
sduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
Much of the literature about mainstreaming has focused on the 
individual and individualized instruction. Attention is given to the 
question of the individual rights of average and gifted pupils versus 
the rights of the handicapped to educational resources.^ Particular 
importance is attached to the need for teaching to individual differ­
ences, since over-emphasis on uniformity and conformity has proved to 
be incompatible with the differences which exist among all children.
It conspicuously excludes the "very different" child. Since individual­
ization means more than varying the level and pace of learning tasks, 
the task itself is called into question, its purpose, and whether or 
not it has meaning for the individual learner.^ Is the child a genuine 
participant in learning?
The question of interpersonal relations between the handicapped 
and their teacher and classmates has received far less attention in the 
literature about mainstreaming. Such contact is an important problem to 
be faced whenever children are brought together in their education, par­
ticularly when the regular class includes minority children— the ethni­
cally different, the poor, the handicapped, and the intellectually gifted 
as well, any children whose experience or capacity differs markedly from 
the larger group. Isolation, then, is not overcome merely by putting *14
"Teacher Attitudes Associated with the Integration of Handicapped Chil­
dren," Exceptional Children 38 (May 1972): 677-683; Nicholas A. Vacc and 
Nancy Kirst, "Emotionally Disturbed Children and Regular Classroom 
Teachers," The Elementary School Journal 4 (March 1977): 309-17.
^•%ichael Scriven, "Some Issues in the Logic and Ethics of Main- 
Streaming," Minnesota Education 2 (Spring 1976): 66-67.
14See John I. Goodlad, Facing the Future: Issues in Education and 
Schooling (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 126-27. Goodlad does not 
speak specifically to the mainstreaming issue. He theorizes a model non- 
graded school based on a recognition of individual differences among all 
learners.
Dduced with permission of the copyright owner, Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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children side-by-side working at Individual activities of individual 
import. Does the child participate as a person in relation with other 
class members? With the teacher? Jeanne Frein, centering on the ques­
tion of "what schools are for," has noted that the tension between indi­
vidual development and communal cooperation is germane to the mainstream­
ing movement, and "unless both poles of the tension are dealt with in a 
reasoned manner, the movement is in for disaster."*-’
With or without the advance of mainstreaming, the difficulties 
faced by the teacher are enormous. As Seymour Sarason observed during 
his long and intensive service relationship to teachers and children in 
their schools, the teacher’s role is one of "constant giving" and "con­
stant vigilance required by the presence of many children."* 16 17 He empha­
sizes the teacher’s serious need for help and advice. Yet he criticizes 
the lack of teacher involvement in some important decisions which affect 
their work. Sarason notes, for example, that the hardship inherent in 
the coverage of educational material in fixed time periods increases 
with the number and diversity of pupils, but rather than segregate the 
different child, he would have teachers question that the time criterion 
is necessary.1'7 The tendency to segregate children is influenced also by 
a felt pressure stemming from the need to meet narrow criteria of academic 
progress, and by overconcern with technical matters. Mainstreaming is, 
however, facilitated by providing an atmosphere of community involving
*5Jeanne B. Frein, "Changing Public Policies: Discussion," 
Minnesota Education 2 (Spring 1976): 19.
16Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem 
of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 167.
17Ibid., pp. 38; 152-56.
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everyone, teachers and pupils, in problem solving around such issues as 
resources, values, and learning. One consequence of the failure to do 
so is that as children grow older "the classroom becomes an increasingly 
uninteresting place in which the sense of personal growth and a satis­
fying interpersonal mutuality is absent.
Mainstreaming is contractual. How can it be humanized? This is 
the main problem to be here addressed. What appears needed in develop­
ing a theory and practice of mainstreaming is to clarify the ways in 
which any child, not only the handicapped, may be educated as an indi- 
vidua! by strengthening the bonds of human content \ once the essential 
human element is defined, it will become clearer how special methods and 
techniques can be brought to serve it.
Martin Buber was deeply concerned with the humanization of the 
impersonal modern institution by means of a growing mutuality, a more 
genuine form of living and working together in which individuality and 
group cohesion are complementary. According to Buber, mutuality is 
always a "pluralistic form of association."^® Mutuality in Buber’s 
thought by no means implies a constant togetherness; it does imply, in 
Buber's words, a "steady potential presence of the one to the other."* 20 
His philosophy accommodates people with handicaps because it makes room 
for difference, and centers on the reality of those differences which
■^Seymour B. Sarason, The Psychological Sense of Community (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 1974), pp. 171-72.
*®Martin Buber, Knowledge of Man, ed. Maurice Friedman; trans. 
Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith: "Distance and Relation" (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1965; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 67.
20Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith: 
"Education" (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 98.
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exist in every group. His approach is relevant also to educational main- 
streaming. He shows that the give and take among individual needs and 
involvements results in a sharing of knowledge impossible in contacts 
limited largely to material things.
It is believed that the environment characterized by an atmos­
phere of mutuality is a necessary condition of true mainstreaming. There­
fore the purpose of this study is to examine a philosophy of mutuality in 
Martin Buber’s writings, and then to consider its significance for educa­
tion, in particular, educational mainstreaming. A basic concern will be 
the interaction between peers, yet this is part of a larger matrix of 
relations and it will be examined as such.
Delimitations and Limitations" . . . '■■■ -  . ' ■ ~  ■■ ■" v
The study excludes certain information relevant to the advance­
ment of mainstreaming, such as information about learning problems and 
their alleviation specific to a given disability, and the social-political 
complexities surrounding the mainstreaming issue. The study is limited 
largely to the essentials of mutuality and its implications within the 
educational setting conducive to mainstreaming.
Need for the Study
The responsibility of educational mainstreaming rests ultimately 
with educators, which implies that educators must try to clarify the 
values underlying mainstreaming as a guide to practice. Law as it 
accommodates civil rights has directly influenced the mainstreaming 
movement, acting on an emergency basis in response to student and
iduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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parent complaint; and medical classification systems and treatments have 
had a profound influence on education of the handicapped. While the 
cooperative effort of education, the various other professions, and the 
public is imperative, the position taken in this study is that the ini­
tiative rests with educators to seek to define the value premises of 
their own work. It is proposed that unless this is done, mainstreaming 
will signify, for the most part, only a perfunctory reaction to external 
pressures.
A second related need is a perception of handicapped children 
primarily in reference to what is common to all children. Only when 
children are known in their wholeness can it be understood what a han­
dicap implies for their education.
Organization of the Study
The remainder of this chapter contains a biographical sketch of 
Martin Buber and a glossary of terms.
A selection of descriptive and critical literature on Buber's 
writings will be reviewed in Chapter II. In Chapter III an interpreta­
tion of mutuality is developed by way of answering certain questions 
arising out of Buber’s writings. The questions are:
1. What is meant by "setting at a distance" and why is setting 
at a distance a presupposition of mutuality?
2. What is meant by uniqueness as Buber defines it?
3. According to Buber, mutuality begins with the self. What 
direction is taken to actualize the unique self?
aduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4. Buber contrasts awareness with objectification. What is 
implied by "becoming aware" of the unique partner in relation?
5. How does Buber define responsibility?
Chapter IV applies mutuality to Buber's philosophy of education. 
Here follow the main questions to be addressed:
1. What educational priorities are established by Buber?
2. What in Buber's view is the nature of the child?
3. How does Buber define character, and how can the teacher 
influence the growth of character?
4. What is the nature of community? By what means can the 
teacher create an atmosphere of mutuality in the learning community?
5. What is implied in Buber’s idea, the "reciprocal sharing of 
knowledge"?
Chapter V makes direct application of the foregoing to mainstream­
ing. It attempts to answer the central question, How can mainstreaming 
be humanized?
Martin Buber as a Person 
(1878 - 1965)
Buber's biographical statements reflect a life-long attentiveness 
to the phenomena of human difference and communication between the differ­
ent, for example: "Born in Vienna, I came in my early childhood to Lvov 
(Lemberg), the capital city of the Galician province in which an unusual 
multiplicity of languages stamped upon me indelibly the fact of very dif­
ferent people living next to one another."21 Grete Schaeder, Buber's
21Martia Buber, A Believing Humanism, ed. Ruth Nanda Anschen, 
trans. Maurice Friedman: "Reminiscence" CNew York: Simon and Schuseter, 
1967), p. 29.
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friend and scholarly interpreter, writes:
Even as a child Buber experienced abstract, intellectual 
phenomena with a sense of physical participation. When he 
reflected on the misunderstandings that arise among people 
attempting to communicate with one another in different lan­
guages, his heart began to pound within him. He felt as if 
he were probing the secret of the meeting of the two lan­
guages at the point of their intersection. And does not 
something of that same tension remain, he was to ask later, 
when people of different temperament and character speak the 
same language? Has a word ever precisely the same meaning 
for any two people? The basic problem here is whether seri­
ous dialogue is at all possible without grave misunderstand­
ings. Is it the philosopher or the poet who raises this 
question? The problem is beyond the competency of both.
These questions, which concern man as a whole but find no 
place in any philosophical system, are precisely the ques­
tions that are characteristic of Buber's thinking.^2
Buber's early life is a mixture of Polish, Austrian, and Jewish
influence. He inherited a restlessness from his Slavic background as
well as the intellectual tensions of his Jewish heritage. In 1957 he
wrote: "I am a Polish Jew." His acceptance of human difference was
apparently influenced by several factors:
Tolerance, as a form of social convenience and an enlightened 
human attitude, was a basic element of the Austrian character.
In Buber it was combined with the ancient Jewish striving for 
the supranational and the universally human, and constituted 
a counterpoise or antidote to his passionate Zionism. His 
rediscovery of Hasidism as a popular religious movement was 
also facilitated by the social relations that existed natu­
rally in Austria between the upper classes and the common 
people; the attitude of his father to his subordinates exem­
plified this for Buber.23
Schaeder characterizes Buber's early and maturing attitude in the 
following passage; she emphasizes his "vital interest in human fellowship" *29
22Grete Schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber, trans. 
Noah J. Jacobs (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), pp. 28-
29.
23ibid., p. 40.
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The convictions that there is a divine spark in all human beings 
that can be redeemed and that man's native goodness can find 
expression in an atmosphere of tolerance were among Buber's 
basic beliefs. The hardships of his early years awakened in 
his deeply religious nature a restlessness which, according to 
St. Augustine, "finds its rest only in God." To the outside 
world his restlessness was expressed as an "out-going soul ele­
ment," as a vital spiritual force which imparted to every 
"meeting" a specific color and illumination. In the "Auto­
biographical Fragments" this vital interest in human fellow­
ship speaks to us in clear tones and illuminates Buber’s 
early years as he considered them in retrospect. Again and 
again the merely conceptual and the sensuously opaque are 
transformed in the pure flame of this life into the same soul- 
element of a warmer and yet not too intimate humanity. . . .
The personalities and events of his youth, pass before us as 
the spoken and heard elemental words of his existence, bound 
to the fleeting moment and preserved by memory and imagina- ^  
tion in an ultimate harmony as lived and irrevocable decision.
At the age of three following the separation of his parents,
Buber was brought to the home of his paternal grandparents in Lvov. A
year later an older girl of the neighborhood told him the harsh truth
that his mother would never return to him.
It remained fixed in me; from year to year it cleaved even more 
to my heart, but after more than ten years, I had begun to per­
ceive something that concerned not only me, but all men. Later 
I once made up the word . . . "mismeeting," or "miscounter,"
. . .  to designate the failure of a real meeting.
Schaeder describes the atmosphere in which Buber grew up as char­
acterized by "a deep respect for tradition and for the dignity of labor, 
by an appreciation of poetry and a candid acknowledgment of responsibil- 
ity, by an atmosphere of enlightened sincere p i e t y . T h e  grandfather 
Salomon Buber was a prosperous merchant, an outstanding Hebraic scholar, *2
24Ibid., p. 40.
2%artin Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Vol. 12, Library of Living Philos­
ophers (LaSalle, 111,: Open Court, 1967), p. 4.
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, Ibid., p. 25.
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and an editor of Hebrew books of biblical interpretation, Midrashim.
Buber says that his grandfather manifested "the childlikeness of a pure
human nature and an elementary Jewish being. The grandfather left
his business in general to his wife Adel who, typical of the Jewish
women of the period, managed the business of their husbands in order
to create for them the leisure to study. Self-taught, she occupied
herself as well in the study of German classics. Buber writes that
she reared in her sons and in him "a respect for the authentic word
that cannot be paraphrased." He relates further:
Tnhen she looked at the street, she had at times the profile of 
someone meditating on a problem, and when 1 found her all alone 
in meditation, it seemed to me at times as if she listened. To 
the glance of the child, however, it was already unmistakable 
that when she addressed someone she really addressed him.
My grandfather was a true philologist, a "lover of the 
word," but my grandmother’s love for the genuine word affected 
me even more strongly than his; because this love was so direct 
and so devoted.28
Buber spent several summers at his father's estate and returned 
there to live at the age of fourteen. His father was a landowner with 
scientific knowledge of agriculture which increased the productivity of 
his land. Buber describes his father as an unromantic man from whom he 
learned a concern about genuine human contact with nature, something he 
had not learned from any of the many authors he had read. This relation­
ship with nature was connected with his relationship to the workers 
attached to his estate, an active responsible contact. He was also a 
gifted story teller; the stories were always about the simple occurrence 2
27Martin Buber, Hasidism and Modem Man, ed. and trans. Maurice 
Friedman (New York: Horizon Press, 1958; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 56.
2®Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in the Philosophy of 
of Martin Buber, p. 5.
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"without any embroidery," nothing more than the existence of people and 
what took place between them.
At the age of twenty-one Buber married Paula Winkler, a woman of 
strength and independence. Words directed to her in the preface of his 
essay "Dialogue" indicate the importance he attached to this life partner­
ship: "Dialogue it is and was with thee." She was a poet who in 1912 
published her first work under the pseudonym Georg Munk, a volume of
30mythical stories, and she influenced Buber's own poetical aspirations.
From his early childhood Buber's active imagination exposed him
to terrors and confusion. Schaeder points to the loss of his mother at
an early age which, in a sensitive child, could not fail to have serious
effects. His sense of insecurity
expressed itself with terrifying vehemence when the child felt 
the force of powers that were beyond his understanding. Thus,
Buber recounted how he was overwhelmed by intense emotion when 
the principal of the school asked him to describe the rude 
behavior of some of his classmates and how, a few years later, 
at the age of fourteen, he was almost driven to the verge of 
madness brooding over philosophical antinomies, and again the 
death of one close to him when he was seventeen affected him 
as an almost self-destructive experience.33
He was sent to a secluded place in the mountains; surrounded 
there by nature and the elements "as by an active divine power," 
he one day envisaged chaos and cruel destruction as the deadly 
struggle of the primordial powers in a mythical world.32
As a child Buber had mastered Hebrew and had become attached to 
Jewish life and prayer. His Jewish roots were firm, despite many doubts. 
He became alienated from Judaism when exposed to European culture after *312
2®Ibid., pp. 6-7.
30schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 84.
31Ibid,, p. 27.
32Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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leaving his home to study at a secular secondary school in Lvov and
later at the Universities of Vienna and Berlin. "The whirl of the age
took me in. . . . Until my twentieth year, and in small measure even
beyond then . . .  I lived— in versatile fulness of spirit, but without
33Judaism, without humanity, and without the presence of the divine."
The first impetus toward a renewed connection with his Judaic roots 
came from Zionism, a movement he joined in 1898. Zionism also gave 
him a sense of reality by presenting him with concrete tasks "which 
demanded action and at the same time saved him from too great a pas­
sion for abstract truth and disembodied ideals that characterized the 
impersonal and generalizing mode of thought of many of the German 
poets and writers of his time."3^ Buber later recalls:
That Zionism seized me and that I was newly vowed to Judaism 
was . . . only the first step. . . .  I professed Judaism 
before I really knew it. So this became, after some blind 
groping, my second step: wanting to know it. To know— by 
this I do not mean a storing up of anthropological, his­
torical, sociological knowledge, as important as these are;
I mean the immediate knowing, the eye-to-eye knowing of the 
people in its creative primal hours.33
In this way Buber came to value Hasidism. As a child he had 
occasionally gone with his father to visit a Hasidic community. In 
this "dirty village," the showy palace of the rabbi repelled him and 
the prayer house with its enraptured worshippers seemed strange to 
him. But as he watched the rabbi, he felt "leader," and when he saw 
the Hasidim dance with the Torah, he felt "community."3** Now the
33Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 57.
3^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 70.
33Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 58.
3&Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 20.
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image out of his childhood was recalled, and a lifetime of writings on 
Hasidism was begun. "Along with his 'I-Thou' philosophy and in fruit­
ful interrelation with it, Buber is best known for his recreation of 
Hasidism."3^
Schaeder points to a number of events which influenced the change 
and growth of Buber's concept of human creativity. After he had joined 
the Zionist movement Buber was for a short period of time a follower of 
Nietzsche. Buber's concern was to "instill into the atrophied life of 
the ghetto a new sense of nationhood, to infuse it with a new vital 
spirit and restore its 'creative cultural force' that had been moribund 
for centuries."33 When Buber refers to the "self-redemption, resurrec­
tion and salvation" of the nation in his early Zionist essays, Schaeder 
discerns the pseudo-religious prophetic tone of Nietzsche.
At the time of Buber's youth prophecy meant one of the forms in 
which human genius is expressed, similar to poetic expression. Buber 
linked his own zeal for participation in the creation of things to the 
prophetic literary task, which he understood to be his calling. But in 
later years he associated "prophet" with a "distinct, clearly defined 
period" and held that other uses of this term are uncalled for. "When 
we first began our service for Israel, our slogan was culture. We 
yearned, actively, to see the Jewish people give valid expression to 
its 'reborn* nature in a world of its own making."* 39
-^Maurice Friedman, "Editor's Introduction," in Hasidism and
Modern Man, pp. 10-11.
33Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 76-77.
39Ibid., p. 77.
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Another influence on Buber's concept of creativity was his con­
frontation with the thinking of Christian mystics, the subject of inves­
tigation in his doctoral dissertation, "The History of the Problem of 
Individuation— Nicholas of Cusa and Jacob Boehne." (1904) Buber demon­
strated that all beings participate with God, that the manifold emanates 
from the one divine world ground, that gradations of participation exist 
but are not indicated, and that "the assigned degrees of participation 
are at first only inchoate in the individual and only gradually develop 
from potentiality to actuality." He writes, "It is not the depersonal­
izing, but rather the personalizing, process that leads things to Gcd."4^
Of the mystics, Buber links Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), more 
than any other, with the certainty of human partnership with God in the 
work of creation— Eckhart's conviction was that people are "of divine 
race and of God’s kin." Buber concurred with Eckhart’s teaching of the 
personal God, God’s revelation to the individual, and the unity of God 
and man. Some of his early poems and essays were influenced by Eckhart's 
vivid imagery. The union with God, Buber believed, can be expressed only 
in imagery because it escapes "categories of thought." Thus, "language 
of sincere deep emotion which borders on the ineffable, where personal 
feelings vanish and meet into a nameless unity, was called by Buber, 
'brotherly speech’." Buber’s experience of an all-encompassing unity 
is captured in the words: "This is my body; this is my blood."41
Eckhart also taught that one must be in harmony with oneself in 
order to find God. He believed that the way to God is that of separa­
tion, renunciation, unbecoming. People must leave themselves and all 40
40Ibid., pp. 55-56. 41Ibid., p. 74.
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creaturely concerns if they would meet God. "Only in complete poverty of 
spirit can God's work be accomplished in the world." Buber could not 
accept this idea; one explanation is that the notion of immanence and 
the modern consciousness of personality had by the beginning of the 
twentieth century been too far removed from the thought of the medieval 
person. Thus individuation as something problematic had not yet been 
confronted in Eckhart's era.42
In 1904 Buber's rediscovery of Hasidism began to influence his 
idea of creativity. The Hasidic orientation is that not through "un­
becoming" or by "turning one's back on the world" does one prove one­
self worthy of being God's co-worker, "but rather through sanctifica­
tion of the world by actively participating in its work and by assuming 
responsibility for the fate of creation.1,43 It is this understanding 
of creativity which for Buber took on a goal of deeply religious sig­
nificance.
In the figure of the Hasidic zaddik Irabbi], as well as in his 
own guilty feelings of having failed, he recognized that holi­
ness must not only be represented in poetical form but must 
also be lived as responsible and sanctifying service. From 
that time on the spirit of the zaddick as teacher, helper, and 
leader served to light up the path before him and to guide his 
steps. In the upheavals of World War I he had a revelation 
which scattered the mists of self-glorifying creativity and 
clarified his innate knowledge concerning man's relation to 
God.44
The ideal of European humanism had become in the twentieth cen­
tury the "caricature" of the alienated intellectual. 3y contrast, Buber's 
interpretation of true humanism sees the person "in relation," as an 
"open person" in confrontation with other human beings. "And in addition
42Ibid., p. 75. 43Ibid.
44Ibid., p. 385.
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to this the people are summoned to become the ’open’ community to human-
i t y#"45
Maurice Friedman, a foremost translator and interpreter of Buber's 
works, provides the following account of Buber's active career: In his 
twenties Buber was the leader of Zionists who advocated a Jewish cultural 
renaissance, rather than a purely political or nationalistic Zionism. In 
1902 he helped establish a German-Jewish publishing house, and in 1916 he 
founded Per Jude, the leading periodical of German-speaking Jewry. From 
1926 to 1930 he published jointly with a Catholic and a Protestant the 
periodical Die Kreatur. concerned with social and pedagogical problems 
related to religion. Buber taught Jewish philosophy of religion and 
later the history of religion at the University of Frankfurt from 1923 
until 1933 when he was dismissed from this post by the Nazis. He then 
became director of the Central Office for Jewish Adult Education in Ger­
many, where he trained teachers for the new schools which had to be 
established after the exclusion of Jewish students from all German edu­
cational institutions. He also helped guide the training activities of 
numerous Jewish youth organizations, and he directed a free college for 
Jewish adult education. From these positions, Buber led a large number 
of Jews to a deeper understanding and acceptance of their Jewishness, 
and he was thus able to save many from spiritual despair.
In 1938, after he was completely silenced by the Nazis, Buber 
left Germany to live in Palestine. Until 1951 he was a professor of 
social philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. When he became 
emeritus, the Israeli government asked him to expand the size of the
*5ibid., p. 384.
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Institute for Adult Education which he founded in 1949 and directed until 
1953. This institute educated teachers to go out to the immigration 
camps to help Integrate into the community the mass influx of immigrants.
According to Friedman, those who met Buber disco ired the "pro­
phetic force of his personality and the tremendous strength and sincerity 
of his religious conviction." He has shown what it means to "walk on the 
narrow ridge" (accept the contraries inherent in dialogue):
He has . . . been the leader of those Jews who have worked for 
Jewish-Arab co-operation and friendship. Pioneer and still the 
foremost interpreter of Hasidism, he has preserved in his think­
ing the most positive aspects of the Jewish enlightenment,
Hasidism's traditional enemy. Translator and interpreter of 
the Hebrew Bible and spokesman for Judaism before the world, 
he has been deeply concerned since his youth with Jesus and 
the New Testament and has carried on a highly significant 
dialogue with many prominent Christian theologians. . . .4°
Perhaps the most striking example of how Buber has followed 
the narrow ridge in his life is his attitude toward the German 
people after the war. He was the leader of the German Jews in 
their spiritual battle against Nazism, and he counts himself 
among "those who have not got over what happened and will not 
get over It." Yet on September 27, 1953, in historic Paul- 
skirche, Frankfurt, Germany, he accepted the award of the 
Peace Prize of the German Book Trade.* 47
Buber justified his attitude in his speech of acceptance:
Manifestations such as the bestowal of the Hansian Goethe 
Prize and the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade on a sur­
viving arch-Jew . . . are moments in the struggle of the human 
spirit against the demonry of the subhuman and the anti-human.
. . , The solidarity of all separate groups in the flaming 
battle for the becoming of one humanity is, in the present 
hour, the highest duty on earth.48
Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, so 
influenced by Buber's writings on "the age of distrust" and his phi­
losophy of unity created "out of the manifold," proposed Buber for the
4%aurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 8-9.
47Ibid., p. 9. 48Ibid.
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Nobel Peace Prize (1959). He had planned to translate some of Buber’s
works into Swedish, and had already begun his translation of I and Thou
before he was killed in a plane crash during a peace mission. Buber was
a friend of Albert Schweitzer; they cooperated several times on appeals
49against the spread of nuclear weapons.
The immediacy of Buber's democratic way of thinking is apparent
in a number of biographical anecdotes. When Aubrey Hodes consulted with
Buber about his work with a group involved in establishing a reformed
synagogue in Israel, Buber asked, Are
women prominent in roles other than seeing to the decorations?
. . . From what you have told me your members are wealthy and 
living in a middle-class suburb. . . . You must be careful not 
to become narrow and exclusive. Try to bring in people from 
other sections of society, even if they cannot pay membership 
fees. They have other things to contribute.^0
Malcolm Diamond remarked to Buber that Freud is reported to have 
answered a question concerning the meaning of life by saying that it was 
work and love. Buber laughed and said that this was good, but not com­
plete. He would say, work, love, faith, and humor. On a visit to Buber 
after his eighty-seventh birthday when his health was failing, Hodes 
brougnt up that conversation. Buber confirmed what he had said to 
Diamond. He then added, "The real philosopher has to have a sense of 
humor, an awareness of the comic, not only about the world we live in 
but also about himself." He will look at his own suffering "a small 
distance away," even if "there is a danger to his own life."-’* *501
^Aubrey Hodes, Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait (New York: 
Viking Press, 1971), pp. 136-152.
50Ibid., pp. 77-78.
51Ibid., pp. 134-35.
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Definition of Terms
AWARENESS: An action of the mind in perceiving and confirming 
the reality of the self or outer reality.
BETWEEN: A "primal human category," the "mysterious" interven­
ing dimension in which dialogue takes place. When two human beings meet, 
there is a reality between them which transcends both; thus the between 
is distinguished from that which is localized to one or the other partner.
CENTER: God; or the meaning of existence which transcends a rela­
tive, utilitarian meaning.
COLLECTIVISM: When Buber contrasts collectivism with community, 
he refers to the group existence characterized by centralized control. 
Inherent in this system is a loss of individuality and personal respon­
sibility. Buber observed a progressive increase of collectivism as a 
way of life, and considered this a great danger to the modern world.
COMMUNITY: Mutuality in group life. Community is organized 
around a common Center and a common task or goal.
CREATIVITY: The capacity given to each individual to realize 
through dialogue a potentiality in that which meets him, and to give form 
to it. The product joins what is original in the emerging form with the 
originality of the producer. The creative process is found in the social 
sphere of interhuman relations, and in the sense world of the artist who 
relates to his art form. Scientific discovery may also be considered 
creative. The creation is not necessarily the "monumental"; it happens 
more typically in the everyday form-giving encounter.
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DISTANCE: The fact or condition of existing as different, apart, 
and independent. When a reality is so recognized as distant, it is "set 
at a distance," the presupposition of all relation.
EDUCATION: (1) The process of learning to choose and act on the 
basis of values revealed by participating in one's world. (2) The influ­
ence of the educator who selects the effective world, manifests it in him­
self, and guides the learner in the process of valuing its content.
EGOISM: A tendency to put the self ahead of communal interests. 
"Collective egoism" is a thoughtless loyalty to one's group and may be 
chauvinistic, i.e., in prejudicial regard of outside individuals or 
groups as inferior.
ETERNAL THOU: God, the Absolute; in each Thou addressed, the 
eternal Thou is addressed.
EVIL: A lack of purposeful direction. Failure to decide in 
service to creation is evil.
EXISTENTIAL: Existential pertains to authentic existence as such, 
experienced in a concrete situation preceding any abstraction, idealiza­
tion, or distortion of it.
EXISTENTIALISM: To Buber, a position which places human existence
itself in the center of rational contemplation. Auththentic existence as 
defined by Maurice Friedman is a tension between the freedom to decide and
the responsibility which means both address from without and free response 
from within.
HANDICAP: A highly elusive term used interchangeably in the 
literature with "exceptionality" (excluding giftedness), "disability," 
"impairment," "disorder," "deviance," etc. Handicap may be viewed in at 
least two ways: (1) As a real functional impairment, such as mental 
retardation, emotional/social disorder, orthopedic impairment, blindness,
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and deafness. (2) As an inability to meet the criteria of competence and 
worth established by one's culture, regardless of whether or not objective 
impairment exists. An example of the second meaning of handicap is the 
young non-reader who in the school may be perceived as handicapped solely 
on the basis of inability to read, owing to the importance attached by 
that child's culture to reading competence. As a corollary to this per­
ception, the child may experience a label and a stigma which in turn may 
induce a real social/emotional disorder, as well as life-long reading 
incompetence or aversion to reading.
Xc5?CX»USXQNj X1rt£ XsiXXsir stisits oX sti s s s  occx22rirXri§ tfhsn £t common
situation is experienced from the standpoint of the other, not with imag­
ination but with the entire self. The reality of the self is not excluded 
for the sake of the other but is extended by it. Inclusive awareness 
deepens in proportion to the degree of the self's involvement in the per­
son and life of the other.
INDIVIDUALISM: The belief that the interests of the individual 
should take precedence over those of the social group or the state. Like 
collectivism, the practice of individualism precludes individuality and 
responsibility.
INDIVIDUALITY: The state or quality of being unique.
INDIVIDUATION: Becoming that which one is born to become; a 
completion of uniqueness.
INDIVIDUALIZATION: A teaching method which joins the teacher's 
valuation of learning content with the child's freely expressed valuation. 
Individualization can be achieved in dialogue with a group of learners, 
not only in contacts circumscribed by the teacher and a single learner.
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KNOWLEDGE; (1) I-Thou, or personal awareness of an object through 
direct dialogical relation with it. (2) I-It knowledge attained in a 
relation of monologue, in which the object is reduced to attributes men­
tally represented by a general concept.
I-It knowledge provides the symbol (categories, words) necessary 
for dialogue. But the symbol is a product of the concrete I-Thou know­
ing which takes place in dialogue. It Is an expression of what has been 
mentally derived from dialogue and stored for future use.
MAINSTREAM CLASS; The regular class in which handicapped chil­
dren are willingly included; mainstream community. Mainstreaming is a 
movement toward this point of inclusion.
MEETING: The immediate encounter of relation in which each part­
ner confirms the other as the unique person he is.
MUTUALITY; A spiritual stance "between" the different I and Thou 
having the same relationship each to the other; a being there for the 
other in constant potential presence.
MUTUAL RELATION: The unfolding of mutuality in the immediate meet­
ing of two people; dialogue, I-Thou relation, reciprocity, essential rela­
tion, etc.
OBJECTIFICATION: Characteristic of I-It relation, objectifica­
tion is a partial and detached perception of anything stemming from an 
"orienting" attitude, as contrasted with a "realizing" attitude.
ONTOLOGISM: The unending dynamic structure of immediate communi­
cation which arises from mutuality In creation. (Ontic is the adjective 
pertaining to ontologism.)
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: Philosophical anthropology, as dis­
tinguished from scientific anthropology, is the study of human nature
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in relation to being.
POTENTIALITY: The "possibility" of becoming; the value of any­
thing uncovered in dialogue.
PRESENTNESS: In the interhuman relation, the spiritual fullness 
of "being there" as a person which becomes explicit to each partner. 
(Present is the here and now in which relation takes place.)
RELIGION: A bond with everything that is lived in its possibil­
ity of dialogue.
RESPONSIBILITY: Response to the unreduced claim of a Thou- 
address and commitment to the Thou of that response.
REVELATION: The everyday meeting with God which strengthens one's 
humanity. "At times it is like a light breath, at times like a wrestling 
bout." Revelation does not impose a law, but exposes universal values to 
human scrutiny. Revelation means also the "mighty" disclosure of meaning 
found in religious tradition.
SPIRIT: In accordance with the Hebrew tradition, Buber defines 
spirit in its human manifestation not as the isolated intellect, but as 
the totality which comprises all of one's capacities, powers, and urges. 
This totality, the spirit, is the response of the human being to his 
Thou. Buber defines spirit also as the human power to give order to 
the world, which happens only through bodily participation in it.
SPIRITUAL FORCE: "The practice of the religion of communal liv­
ing." It does not mean "intellectual standards or cultural achievements."
STRUCTURE: The configuration of anything. The diverse parts and 
processes which, in complementation of one another, comprise and enhance 
the purposeful whole.
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UNIQUENESS: The unrepeatable reality of an existent as a uni­
fied whole.
VALUE: Value as defined by Maurice Friedman is the intrinsic 
good or worth of anything. According to Friedman, VALUING is deciding 
what is good and what is evil, and the subsequent attitude toward the 
possibility of avoiding evil or changing it into good.
WHOLENESS: A person becomes whole when his individual impulse 
unites with the single, absolute direction which renders it capable of 
love and service. (In the meeting between two people, perception of 
wholeness refers to becoming aware of the other as a presence.)
WILL: A power of the mind which chooses to relate, or the 
exercise of that power. (Arbitrary self-will is not true will and 
choice.)
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CHAPTER I I
DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL LITERATURE 
Literature Related to Mutuality
In a commentary on the work of Martin Buber, the Roman Catholic
philosopher Gabriel Marcel writes:
Buber . . . has shown with the greatest possibly cogency that 
only what he calls a philosophy des Zwischen [the mutuality of 
the between]— I would say, for my part, a philosophy of inter­
subjectivity— can rescue us from either the impasse of an indi­
vidualism which considers man solely in reference to himself or 
the other impasse of a collectivism which has eyes only for 
society. These are, indeed, but complementary expressions of 
a single state of affairs, a humanity uprooted that no longer 
feels at home in the cosmos, and that has, moreover, seen the 
circumscribed communities such as the family, of which everyone 
used to feel himself a member, collapse one after another. . . .
It is only when the individual recognizes the other in his very 
otherness, as a human being other than himself, and when on this 
basis he effects a penetration to the other, that he can break 
the circle of his solitude in a specific, transforming encoun­
ter.1
By a remarkable coincidence, Marcel discovered the "particular 
reality of the Thou" at approximately the same time Buber was writing 
his book I and Thou.
His name was quite unknown to me, moreover, as were the names of 
Ferdinand Ebner and Friedrich Rosenzweig, who appear to have 
preceded us on this path. Thus, we are faced with one of those 
cases of spiritual convergence which always merit attention. . . . 
At a time when a philosophy which concentrated more and more 
exclusively upon the world of the It . . . was leading into 
technocratic developments increasingly perilous for the inte­
grity of man and even for his physical existence— the current
Gabriel Marcel, "I and Thou," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber,
p. 42.
30
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atomic threat representing merely the paroxysm of this trend—  
it was surely inevitable that here and there men were moved 
to bring clearly and methodically to consciousness a counter­
poise, that is, a consideration of the Thou.
Having underscored this convergence of the thought of 
Buber and my own investigations as these appeared in my 
Journal Mdtaphysique, I feel bound to stress the fact that 
the Jewish thinker went much further than I in elucidating 
this structural aspect of the fundamental human situation.2
As Buber has said, Marcel continues, it was a remark by Feuerbach
which contributed initially to Buber's realization: Feuerbach writes,
The individual person does not contain in himself the essence 
of man either in so far as he is a moral being or in so far as 
he is a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only 
in the community, in the unity of man and man— a unity which 
rests upon the reality of the difference between 'T' and 
’Thou’."
Feuerbach himself did not succeed in exploring or drawing the consequences 
of this discovery, which Buber terms Copernican.
In Buber's own development of the I and Thou, the starting point 
is his philosophical anthropology, the problem of man in relation to his 
world. Maurice Friedman has succeeded in condensing this philosophy,
stated in Buber's classic I and Thou, into the single page of an essay 
(Buber himself edited the essay), which serves as an introduction to
those who are unacquainted with Buber's thought:
Man's two primary attitudes and relations, according to I and 
Thou, are "I-Thou" and "I-It." The I of man comes into being 
in the act of speaking one or the other of these primary words. 
But the two I's are not the same: "The primary word I-Thou can 
only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word I-It can 
never be spoken with the whole being." The real determinant of 
the primary word in which a man takes his stand is not the 
object over against him, but the way in which he relates him­
self to that object. I-Thou is the primary word of relation­
ship.^
2Ibid., p. 41. 2 3 *Ibid., p. 42.
^Maurice Friedman, "Introductory Essay," in Knowledge of Man,
p. 12.
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I-Thou is mutual, and it is characterized by directness, present- 
ness, intensity, and ineffability. Although it is only within this rela­
tion that personality and the personal exist, the Thou of I-Thou is not 
limited to people, but may include animals, trees, objects of nature, and 
God •
I-It is the primary word of experiencing and using. It takes 
place within a man and not between him and the world. Hence 
it is entirely subjective and lacking in mutuality. Whether 
in knowing, feeling, or acting, it is the typical subject- 
object relationship. It is always mediate and indirect, deal­
ing with objects in terms of the categories and connections, 
and hence is comprehensible and orderable. It is significant 
only in connection and not in itself. The It of I-It may 
equally well be a he, a she, an animal, a thing, a spirit, 
or even a god, without a change in the primary word. Thus 
I-Thou and I-It cut across the lines of our ordinary dis­
tinctions to focus our attention not upon individual objects 
and their causal connections, but upon the relations between 
things. . . .5
What at one moment was the Thou of an I-Thou relationship can 
become the next instant an It and indeed must continually do so. The 
It may again become a Thou but will not be able to remain one, and need 
not become a Thou at all. People can live continuously and securely in 
the world of It, but if they live only in this world they are not real 
persons.u
Although Buber refers to the meeting with human beings as the
main sphere of worldly relation, he insists that mutuality is possible
in the sphere outside the human. Of this Malcolm Diamond says:
Whatever encounters Buber may have experienced, his talk of 
mutuality in man's relation with beings that lack conscious­
ness introduces more confusion than illumination. Our mode 56
5Ibid.
6Ibid., pp. 12-13.
jduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
of apprehending any and all beings does vary radically as 
between the It and the Thou postures, but mutuality is not 
one of the factors that constitutes the difference.?
It would have been better, Diamond suggests, if Buber had given 
up the notion that mutuality is also applicable to a general description 
of the I-Thou encounter as are the categories of exclusiveness, present­
ness, engagement, concreteness, and the rest.®
Friedman admits a difficulty in understanding Buber's meaning when
he writes in his essay "Dialogue" that all things "say" something to us.
What is mutual is the fact of "otherness" and active being:
We cannot help suspecting Buber of "animism" or mystical 
"projection" when he speaks of an I-Thou relation with non­
human existing beings: we can only imagine such a relation 
as possible with things that have minds and bodies similar 
to ours and In addition possess the consciousness of being 
an I.
In the presentness of meeting, however, are Included all 
those things which we see in their uniqueness and for their 
own selves, and not as already filtered through our mental 
categories for purposes of knowledge or use.
Though natural things may "say" something to us and in 
that sense have "personal" relations with us, they do not 
have the continuity, the independence, or the living con­
sciousness of self which make up the person. A tree can 
"say" something to me and become my Thou, but I cannot be 
a Thou for it. This same impossibility of reciprocity is 
found in the work of literature and art which becomes Thou 
for us, and this suggests by analogy that as the poem is the 
"word” of the poet, so the tree may be the "word" of Being 
over against us, Being which is more than human yet not less 
than personal. This does not mean, however, any monistic or 
mystical presupposition of unity between subject and object.
Quite to the contrary, this view alone allows to non-human 
existing beings their true "otherness" as something more than 
the passive objects of our thought categories and the passive 
tools of our will to use.** *8
^Malcolm L. Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist (New 
York: Oxford Press, I960), p. 31.
8Ibid., p. 32.
9Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, pp. 170-171.
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The meeting on a Thou-to-Thou basis, Schaeder emphasizes, was 
for Buber a single, undivided act felt as both a sensuous and a spirit­
ual experience.
And this conjunction of sensuous and spiritual spontaneity as 
an inseparable unity in the depths of the soul was character­
istic of Buber’s personality and is the key to the understand­
ing of his philosophy. . . . Poets will readily understand this, 
although it would be an error to underestimate Buber as a phi­
losopher simply because of his undeniable poetical gifts. We 
are dealing here with a dimension of existence that not only 
goes back to the common root of poetical and religious- 
philosophical experience but also transcends the purely 
poetical.10
Of the book I and Thou, Schaeder comments that the extension of
reality from which Buber proceeded made it impossible for him to develop
a systematic philosophy. He could only illuminate partial areas of being
out of the fullness of his basic insight, so that his teaching developed
naturally and unsystematically and not as a coherent theory. After
describing the nature and function of the primary attitudes in I and
Thou, he attempted, by means of a series of separate questions and by
referring to fragmentary though exemplary life situations, to contribute
to the basis of mutuality or the "ontic" basis of the I-Thou relation.
It is not basic concepts but rather basic attitudes which 
Buber took for examples; the I-Thou relation is for him above 
all a way into life and not a philosophical principle. . , .
He was now not so much interested in elaborating a life phi­
losophy as in finding a life teaching that would serve as an 
antidote to the crisis of the age. Although Buber had always 
inquired into the unchanging basic conditions of human exis­
tence, from the very outset he deliberately directed his word 
to the needs of his own age.H
Buber’s main concern was to show that the I-Thou relation is not 
a problematic mysticism, but a reality that leads to the depths of being
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 28. 
i;LIbid., p. 177.
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and which can be tested in daily life. What is required is a "complete 
acceptance of the present" in the context of a meeting. Not only must 
the partner be accepted but the fact that the moment of meeting is not 
permanent must also be accepted, the fact of "discontinuity" in the 
I-Thou relation. Buber points out that there is something in things 
of the nature of a gift, a value that reveals itself only to the one 
who loves and who embraces them with his whole being. In I and Thou 
the "effective" presentness of things, the knowledge of the cosmic 
love-unity inherent in things and in beings which is to be realized 
"between" them, signifies "mutuality.
It is required that the other be known as an "independent oppo­
site," not as an extension of the self and not as an object of appropri­
ation for one’s own use. The sphere in which mutuality takes place is 
called by Buber the "between," to Marcel a "creative middle."12 3 Buber 
and Marcel acknowledge this between to be a "mysterious" concept. It 
cannot be defined in an arithmetical or geometric language. Yet it 
seems mysterious "only because one has not up till now been concerned 
about it."1^ The between is defined by Schaeder as a field of energy, 
as it were, which actualizes man's personal aspects: to the extent 
that man says ’Thou,' he becomes I. The between of the interhuman is 
the sphere "that must be strengthened if modem man's fast disappearing 
personal life is still to be saved so that genuine community, beyond 
individualism and collectivism, might be restored."15
12Ibid., p. 162. 13Ibid., pp. 185-186.
1%artin Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 707.
15Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 186.
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In Schaeder's view, "the language of I and Thou reflects Buber's
character and spiritual quality more perfectly than any other of his
works, since it was at the same time a panegyric and a religious tract,
a philosophical treatise and a modern myth in one." The Thou which is
directly addressed is the human and God the eternal Thou within the same
life movement. Man transcends his I through the "embrace" of the Thou.
The uniqueness of this work, which was composed in a spirit of 
"irresistable enthusiasm" and which ranges from mysticism to 
the speech usages of primitive peoples, thus anticipating an 
anthropological basis of a highly personal experience of faith, 
was apparent from the very outset. . . . The work Dialogue, 
which was written many years later, is calmer in tone, but it 
is characterized by the same . . . indifference to philosophi­
cal conceptual language. In it the author is concerned with 
illustrating dialogic life by giving examples of concrete 
situations in which it appears in the daily life of individ­
uals and society. . . . The presentation of Dialogue makes no 
claim to completeness, but it adheres as closely as possible 
to lived life.
Over time, however, Buber sought to find a "generally understood 
conceptual language for a non-conceptual unique experience." The change 
which occurred in his language between the works I and Thou and "Elements 
of the Interhuman" is a clear indication of his efforts to find a suitable 
language and a philosophic method stemming from his urge to communicate.
In "Elements of the Interhuman" Buber took pains to keep in the back­
ground the basic religious experience and the knowledge of mutual ontic 
participation within creation. "He did not speak of it but out of it, 
and confined himself to the limited sphere of the problem he was dis­
cussing."!^
Diamond helps to clarify the meaning of the It, and how it con­
trasts with the Thou in Buber's formulation. Since the I-Thou posture 16
16Ibid., p. 428. 17Ibid., p. 187.
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is the one to which the deeper meaning of existence is revealed, Buber's 
readers are sometimes misled into thinking that the I-It is meant to 
imply a negative, or even an evil category. This is not at all accurate. 
It is true that the "I" of the I-It differs from the "I" of the I-Thou.
In the I-It posture the "I" holds back, measuring, using, and even seek­
ing to control the object of its attention, and never, as in the I-Thou 
relation, affirming the other just as it is in itself. But the I-It 
relation is necessary and appropriate to many activities.
Through knowledge acquired in detachment, man is able to achieve 
a reliable perspective on the world and a considerable degree 
of control over nature. It is in the It perspective that phys­
icists all over the world can communicate by means of mathemati­
cal symbols that are free of the cultural nuances that haunt 
words such as "democracy" and "freedom" and make them susceptible 
to so many radically conflicting interpretations. 8
The I-It posture is not evil any more than power or any other 
basic element of existence is in itself evil. Power becomes evil 
when it is abused. . . .  In the realm of thought, the It posture 
becomes evil when it oversteps its limits and claims to encompass 
the totality of truth, thereby choking off the possibility of 
response to the deeper levels of meaning that may energe from 
I-Thou encounters.
The I-It attitude becomes a source of evil whenever the 
individual becomes so addicted to it that he remains absorbed 
in his own purposes and concerns when he should be responding 
in a fresh way to the beings he meets.
As a philosopher, Buber does not fit into any category, unless 
it is that of his own dialogical approach to philosophical anthropology. 
Nevertheless, he is often referred to as an existentialist. Buber agrees 
he can be so categorized, if existentialism means the transposing of 
"human existence itself into the center of rational contemplation." He 
adds that the genuine existentialist must himself "exist," must not
*8Diamond, Martin Buber; Jewish Existentialist, p. 22. 
19Ibid.
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content himself with theory a l o n e . F r i e d m a n  gives Buber an important
place among existentialists, but points out that existentialism is not
a single philosophy but a mood uniting a number of philosophies more
divergent than they are similar.
Existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich, 
and Berdyaev tend to see existence as centered in the self and 
to see man's relations to other men and to the non-human world 
as dimensions of this self. In contrast to them, existential­
ists like Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Franz Rosenzweig, and 
Ferdinand Ebner see existence as inseparable from communication, 
dialogue, or the I-Thou relationship. But it is Martin Buber 
alone who has placed at the center of a monumental corpus the 
task of pointing to the essential difference between the direct, 
mutual meeting, into which one enters with one's whole being and 
in full presentnessj and the indirect, non-mutual relationship 
of subject and object, the "I-It."21
Friedman points to i.ue importance of this teaching for drama, 
literature, theory of knowledge, theology, psychotherapy, and education. 
"Precisely through this concrete application, indeed, some readers may 
come to understand the life of dialogue for the first time from within."
In Diamond's critique, the mutual meeting takes into account 
these factors— multiplicity in existence, the primacy of actual experi­
ence over intellectual speculation, and resolute decision. The last two 
emphases cut across all the various existentialisms. "The central task 
for the individual is to achieve authentic selfhood by means of resolute 
decision. This summons to free and responsible decision is the stuff of 
existence and the focus of existentialism." Concrete experience has been 
emphasized also by empiricists.
^^Martin Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, eds. 
Sydney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964),
p. 18.
23-Maurice Friedman, "Introduction," in Pointing the Way, by 
Martin Buber (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957; Harper Torchbooks, 
1963), pp. ix-x.
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But the empirical tradition has taken all the data of experi­
ence— of willing and thinking, sensing and feeling— and analyzed 
them in an attitude of detachment. This tradition, no less than 
the rational one it opposed, attempted to strip human judgments 
of subjective involvement and passion. By contrast, the existen­
tialists have consciously adopted the posture of passionate 
engagement as an integral part of their philosophizing.22
Most existentialists summon the person to authentic life, but 
they stress the obstacles to its realization, the anxieties and anguish 
of the decisions involved in authentic, free expression. Although Buber’s 
affinities with existentialism are apparent, his thought has also inter­
acted with "the world-affirming tradition of Judaism, which has always 
cautioned its adherents against overanxious preoccupation with sin.
Friedman points to a fundamental difference between Buber and 
Jean-Paul-Sartre. Sartre defines value as the meaning of life which the 
individual chooses; this implies an "invention" of value and a self- 
created morality.
Such a self-created morality means freedom without genuine 
responding and responsibility, just as a "moral duty" imposed 
from without means "responsibility" 'without either freedom or 
genuine responding. The narrow ridge between the two is a 
freedom that means freedom tc> respond, and a responsibility 
that means both address from without and free response from 
within. Sartre's definition of value as the meaning of life 
which the individual chooses. Buber points out, destroys all 
meaningful notion of value.2^
Friedman quotes directly from Buber’s statement:
One can believe in and accept a meaning or value . . .  if one 
has discovered it, not if one has invented it. It can be for 
me an illuminating meaning, a direction-giving value, only if 
it has been revealed to me in my meeting with being, not if I
22Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, p. 17. 
23lbid., p. 19.
2^Maurice Friedman, "The Bases of Buber's Ethics," in The 
Philosophy of Martin Buber, p. 177.
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have freely chosen it for myself from among the existing pos­
sibilities and perhaps have in addition decided with a few 
fellow creatures: This shall be valid from now on.25
To Ernst Simon (Buber's close colleague and co-worker for inter­
national peace), Buber's ethic most resembles a "believer's occasional­
ism." He compares it with other ethical views. The ethical for Buber 
cannot be identified, for instance, with pragmatism, relativism, or for­
malism: "It surely is not a pragmatic or utilitarian one, nor a psy­
chologically relativizing or sociologically relativizing one. Nor is 
it a formalism in the Kantian sense, because it does not recognize a law- 
giving categorical imperative, which stands rigorously in every situation. 
It most resembles a believer's occasionalism (but one which is not limited 
to a belief that the mind and body cannot interact). It "refers to the 
'occasions,' or in Buber's language, to the situations, which are sent by 
God to man so that he may live up to their demands," and each of these 
requires individual choice and action. At the same time, the universal 
values of revelation are also essential. Buber negates "the possibility 
of a 'moratorium of the Decalogue,' as if 'killing would become a good 
deed if it is done in the interest of one's own society' and false wit­
ness, on behalf of one's own nation."26
Buber is also referred to as humanist. Schaeder shows that Buber' 
humanism is in contradistinction to Western humanism. The latter is con­
cerned more with the individual in his release of creative powers, whereas 
Buber's humanism has to do mainly with the "open person." This person is 
"directed to the community and as such is not concerned with noble form
25Ibid.
^ E m s t  Simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy 
of Martin Buber, pp. 570-71.
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but with relation. . . . Meaning is not to be found in structure and form 
but in confirmation from moment to m o m e n t . W e s t e r n  humanism derives 
from the Greeks. "In the Crito and The Republic," Friedman says, "the 
good is Intrinsic to a person's being but not to relations between man 
and man themselves. . . .  In the Psalms, in contrast, man's very exis­
tence is set in relationship with reality that confronts him." So to 
Buber what is meant by happiness has its home in a sphere other than 
self satisfaction, transcends the realm of ethics as well as that of 
self-consciousness.^8
Again, Buber describes his thought as proceeding along a "narrow 
rocky ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible 
knowledge." This implies an acceptance of uncertainty and insecurity 
but one which is, Buber says, a "holy insecurity." Friedman sees Buber's 
position as a genuine third alternative to the Insistent either-or's of 
our age. Thus Buber does not ignore the reality of "paradox and contra­
diction" which produce "suffering.
E. la B. Cherbonnier asks, How might Buber's philosophy be cor­
rected should it contain any errors?
Specifically, how does one determine which paradoxes are true 
and which are not? Unless these questions can be answered, 
would not the "narrow ridge" of "holy insecurity" broaden, in 
practice, into a boundless plain with unlimited room for 
maneuver? Would not I-Thou statements then begin to resemble 
statements ex cathedra?30
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 433-34.
2®Friedmau, "The Bases of Buber's Ethics," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 199.
^Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 3.
la B. Cherbonnier, "Interrogation," in Philosophical Inter­
rogations , pp. 50-51.
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Diamond points out that Buber’s philosophical accounting is based
on experience, but also on reason and consistency:
Buber is not an irrationalist; he does not set some non- 
rational faculty, such as intuition, above reason and use it 
as the path to truth. He regards reason as relevant to all 
human concerns, and he uses reason to explore the I-It pos­
ture to social, moral, and religious issues.31
Buber employs criteria frequently, and his thought has 
more content than that of almost any other contemporary 
thinker, but neither the criteria nor the content are
objective.32
Buber seeks an understanding between himself and his readers by 
pointing them to their own experiences: "I know no criterion for the 
’objective existence’ of what becomes present to me in the I-Thou rela­
tion. . . .  He who wishes to live securely would do better to stay far 
from the way which I have indicated."33 Ultimately for Buber's readers, 
Diamond believes, "his illustrations provide the only reliable guide to 
his meaning."3^
Literature Related to Education
Before his acceptance of the chair of Social Philosophy at the 
Hebrew University, Buber was offered the Chair of Pedogogy but declined 
it on the grounds that the field had always interested him practically 
rather than theoretically. To Simon, this assertion has been vastly 
contradicted but becomes comprehensible in the light of Buber's
31-Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, p. 35.
32ibid., p. 33.
33suber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 54.
3^Diamond, Martin Buber: Jewish Existentialist, p. 20.
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characterization of a Hasidic master who was a teacher, though evidently 
not "by profession." Buber’s yearning "is for a 'master,' but his 
insight into the essence of the epoch and of his own nature drives him 
to teaching, and even beyond that, to an almost unwillingly adopted 
pedagogical theory," one which is without system.-*5 Haim Gordon observes 
that during the half century Buber wrote on such topics as the essence of 
education, the education of character, and national education, he always 
linked the topic to contemporary need, spoke as a participant in a spe­
cific "historical situation," and directed himself to fellow educators 
who sight benefit from his insights.55
The consistent main goal of education for Buber is the education 
of character. Schaeder describes the background of Buber's addresses 
having to do with character education; the content of the addresses have 
broad application to modem Western society.
Schaeder writes that during the rise of Naziism Buber's addresses 
to German Jews conveyed that after all external assurance had failed,
"the Jews needed a new, personal, existential hierarchy of values, and 
that they must rediscover the sources and goals of their Jewish destiny." 
German Jewry at that time of crisis was not in consensus, but was divided 
into groups with different world views, religious and non-religious. In 
an address of 1933, "Education and the World View-," Buber insisted that 
education confront all the different groups having different world views 
with the common reality of humankind. The groups within a community are
35simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 544.
3%aim Gordon, "An Approach to Martin Buber's Educational Writ­
ings," Journal of Jewish Studies 29 (Spring 1978): 85.
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united not by bustling activity directed toward different ends but by 
"the common unfolding of the common reality."
A further educational consideration is the need to help implant 
a world view in the soil of one's own world, to train one's "world view 
conscience," the individual existential responsibility for a world view. 
Education must be a constructive "inner-forming power" and not "the dis­
mal uniform step of marching columns" prevalent in nationalistic- 
oriented modern societies. Buber says, "In the uniform marching line 
of the group today there is no distinguishing any more between one per­
son's step which is the expression of his direction-moved existence and 
another person’s step which is nothing else than an eloquent gesture." 
Buber’s teaching had both Immediate and universal application. She 
observes, "To the German reader of today it appears as a mene tekel 
[writing on the wall] that proved true ten years later."3?
Schaeder points to the theme which can be read between the lines
of "The Education of Character": Buber here asks that Jews also stand
the test and prove themselves. Before coming to Palestine he had
appealed to the Zionist community to realize a model society founded
on peace and national justice, a society founded on the "common memory"
preserved in history, the tradition of Jewish spiritual strength. This
was the goal of spiritual Zionism to which Buber for decades had been
calling the youth. But when he came to Palestine in 1938, he found
t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  t u r m o i l ,  w i t h  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  J e w s  a n d  A r a b s .
Under the pressure of historical events the youth in the 
country had succumbed to rabid nationalism, rejected reli­
gious calling, and In a desire to be like all the other
37schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 197-98.
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nations, were prepared like them to suspend the Ten Command­
ments if the existence of the people was at stake. Much of 
this can be read between the lines of "The Education of 
Character"— an impressive testimony to Buber's incorruptible 
sense of justice and love of truth. . . .
Thus enormous difficulties attended character training at the 
time, yet it was under just these difficulties that Buber's pedagogical 
genius fully came to light:
Despite the fact that he was deeply rooted in the tradition 
of his forefathers, he could "accept" the young generation 
wholeheartedly and "comprehend" it. . . . Buber's point of 
departure was his trust in creation, in "its being permeated 
throughout by vital dialogue," in the common participation 
of its creatures and their need of one another. If direct 
contact is restored between man and man, the eternal Thou 
will by that same token also be the object of personal 
address, and we shall have entered the sphere of reconcil­
iation.
The capacity was given to Buber, as to few people of the 
older generation, to "accept" the young generation and to 
confirm it in its refusal to have fixed values imposed upon 
it. It is in such a situation that the educational ideal 
can be realized, the ideal that Buber regarded as the high­
est, even though it appeared so seldom: a person of great 
character, one who in every situation acts with his entire 
substance, who realizes that every situation is a unique 
portion of life . . . and demands the entire person.3°
To Buber, the teacher's power of influence rests in the fact that 
the trusting pupil will ask for his advice in his moral dilemmas. "Hugo 
Gaudig," Simon writes, "had once defined the school ironically as that 
remarkable institution in which questions are asked by those who know, 
while the answers are attempted by the ignorant"; thus he "unmasked most 
of the questions of teachers as open and undisguised examinations, and he 
had wished to replace them from centrality by the genuine unrhetorical
OQquestions of students who really wished to learn."-"  In character
38Ibid., pp. 199-201.
33Simon,
Martin Buber, p.
"Martin Buber, 
566.
the Educator," in The Philosophy of
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education Buber wants a similar reversal from the catechized teaching of 
morals to the spontaneous questions of pupils, who examine their own con­
science as well as that of the teacher. The teacher might be faced with 
a moment of surprise, an ethical difficulty.
In mere instruction an unanswered question can only lead to a 
transitory embarrassment, and not even that, if the teacher 
had not assumed the false nimbus of omniscience. Should it 
occur, he ought to have the courage to say: "I don't know it 
at the moment, and I shall give you the answer tomorrow," or 
better still, "We could find that out together in the follow­
ing way: . . . "  Therefore, here the delay of an answer is 
only of an accidental nature. But it is different in charac­
ter education. The inability to answer is there existential 
and belongs to the substance of the value crisis of our time.4®
Buber believes in eternal values but would not have the teacher 
dictate them to his pupils. Buber's solution is to refer the child to 
his disturbed relation with his own self. The first step to recovery 
is the consciousness of illness which, in Simon's interpretation, is 
"carefully awakened and never drugged by the understanding educator who 
knows the secret remedy."41 In order to achieve trust, in Buber's view, 
the teacher needs not moral perfection, but needs to be really there for 
the pupil.
The democratic-elitist dichotomy in Buber's educational philosophy 
is explored in depth by Simon, and here summarized: Buber opposes every 
detachment of the intellectual from life, and in particular, against every 
"bourgeois privilege of education," which threatens culture with collapse 
everywhere. He sees the solution of the division between the exemplary 
lives of the few, and the dull vegetation of the many, between the "elite" 
and the "masses," to lie mainly in the future. But this is a future which 
one can anticipate and for which one must prepare now by means of 40
40Ibid., p. 567. 41Ibid.
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education for leadership. Simon cites Buber's conviction, "It is not 
the aim that there should be only leaders and no followers any more.
. . . The aim is that the leaders should remain leaders and not become 
dominating rulers. More precisely stated, they should assume only those 
elements of dominion which are necessarily demanded by the circumstances." 
Buber knows very well, Simon relates, how prolonged control in every 
society works toward class formation, "estranges the leaders from their 
original legitimate task and makes them to be mere representatives of 
vested or even imperialistically expanding interests." But a legitimate, 
"serving" elite can maintain itself through education, by influencing 
youth to continue their work of service. Here Simons points to a 
paradox:
Decisive assignments fall to the educators— parents and teachers—  
and again a vicious circle is generated, which Buber does not 
discuss in this form. Namely, to select and educate the elite, 
the educator himself should belong to it. This is not and can­
not be the case, since they, as teachers, constitute a mass
profession.^2
Relevance to the contemporary situation is also central to Buber's
address "Education," which contains what he calls the general "groundwork"
of educating: The nature of the teacher-pupil relation in our time of the
"crumbling" of values is a major part of the address. As observed by
F. H. Hilliard, it was presented during the period following the First
World War, when freedom and creativity in Germany were the watchwords of
a form which aimed to develop a progressive education in contrast to the
authoritarian education of an earlier era.
Buber recognizes that at a time when traditional values were 
still widely accepted it was all too easy for a teacher of the 42
42Ibid., p. 553.
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"old" school to use his position in an authoritarian manner.
But so, indeed, is it all too easy in a time when the old 
traditional values and beliefs have been shattered for a 
teacher of the "new" education to project himself and his 
own values into his teaching in a manner which distorts the 
true educational process.^3
Hilliard points out that Buber was very much alive to the danger 
of indoctrination which he described as "interference" or "arbitrariness." 
At the same time, Buber viewed education as a process which required the 
educator not merely to assist but also positively to influence growth and 
development. As Hilliard writes, "For schools and teachers to provide 
merely . . . exploratory experience . . . was not enough. It was their 
task to select the sort of experience which would lead to the kind of 
education which was judged to be desirable.”* 44 Like Dewey, Buber was 
aware of the influence which progressive education was exerting and was 
likely to continue to exert on educational thought and practice. That 
he clearly perceived its limitations as a theory of education, is in 
itself some indication of his abilities as a student and a teacher of 
the pedagogy from which he deliberately turned away.4-*
But, Hilliard asks, "how are influence and arbitrariness to be 
distinguished, and how and in what circumstances does a teacher cross the 
ill-defined boundary which separates the exercise of educationally desir­
able from undesirable influence? Buber attempts more than once to find a 
satisfactory answer but . . .  he fails to do so."^
Haim Gordon comprehends from Buber's address that influence ("con­
veying the spirit") relates to the whole person by involving oneself as
4^F. H. Hilliard, "A Re-Examination of Buber's Address on Educa- 
tion," British Journal of Educational Studies 21 (February 1973): 45.
44Ibid., p. 46. 45Ibid., p. 45. 46Ibid., p. 48.
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a whole person. He suggests the need for inquiry into the possibility 
of a curriculum which facilitates openness toward nature and human 
beings. "Most curriculum thought stresses individual achievement or 
teamwork, but not knowledge acquired through relating on a personal 
level." No model can assist the teacher in this, since a model con­
fines education too narrowly to behavior, skills, and intellect. ^
The personal relation in education, called by Buber the dialogi­
cal "inclusion" of the other side, is that which enables the teacher to 
experience the standpoint of the pupil as well as his own, and to thereby 
avoid arbitrariness. Ernst Simon considers inclusion, along with Buber's 
concept of the "line of demarcation," to be Buber's most original con­
tribution to pedagogy.^® Hilliard makes no mention of inclusion, nor 
does he discuss Buber's point that the experience of the pupil’s side is 
often necessarily "uncertain," and must be constantly renewed, hence 
Buber offers no security. Nevertheless, one gains from Hilliard's article 
a helpful insight into the historical context in which Buber's address 
"Education" was stated. In addition, he underscores the dangers of 
indoctrination, while showing that the line between it and educational 
influence is a recurring question for the sensitive practitioner, one 
which cannot be dismissed lightly by the theorist.
That education is an art more than a science is stressed in Zvi 
Kurzweil's commentary. The outstanding features of the address "Educa­
tion" are its focus on the teacher-pupil relationship, the "most simple 
and essential factor of the educational process," and its emphasis on a
^Gordon, "An Approach to Martin Buber's Educational Writings," 
pp. 222-23.
^Simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 571.
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profound religious element. "God, the teacher, and the pupil are the 
three focal points around which the fabric of his educational thought 
is woven. . . . The Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo also based his edu­
cational thought on these three points." Buber’s thought is an important 
balancing factor in the current trend in education:
The modern trend emphasizes in a most one-sided manner the mul­
tifarious aids, techniques, and other "scientific" devices, 
sometimes of a very trivial nature, which are associated with 
the practice of teaching, such as audio-visual aids, statis­
tical surveys, intelligence and aptitude tests, etc., while 
quite failing to recognize the essential purpose of education 
as opposed to mere instruction. The enormous flow of American 
magazine-literature on the minutest technicalities of instruc­
tion is witness to the alarming proportions that the new trend 
is assuming. This educational literature presents a distorted 
picture of educational values. . . .  In our materialistic civil­
ization the exact sciences and technology are preferred to phi­
losophy and the arts. . . .  An ever-increasing number of educa­
tionists like to see themselves as educational technologists 
. . . thus emulating their colleagues in the exact sciences.
A g a i n s t  t h i s  t e n d e n c y  t h e  v o i c e  o f  B u b e r  i s  r a i s e d  i n  l o u d  
a n d  l o n e l y ^  p r o t e s t . ^
Kurzweil cites Herbert Read who, in his interpretation of Buber's 
pedagogy, stresses the importance of the creation of an atmosphere of 
"spontaneity, of happy childish industry," the main secret of successful 
teaching; this atmosphere is the creation of the teacher and can exist in 
"a village school, or in a dingy barracks in some industrial city." To 
Buber, Kurzweil points out, education cannot "teach" to belief in God nor 
inculcate religion. Yet the I-Thou relationship to God and to the human 
being are two facets of the same universal principle, and belief in God 
can arise spontaneously out of the experience of meeting human beings. 
According to Buber, Kurzweil reports, education can lead the pupil a step 
further towards a spiritual perception of the universe, first, by
^®Zvi E. Kurzweil, "Buber on Education," Judaism 11 (Winter 
1962): 54.
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fostering in him a critical attitude free of prejudices propagated by 
political parties or other organizations through the various media of 
mass propaganda, and then by helping him to become an independent "per­
son" who is sensitive to spiritual influences.-*®
Howard Rosenblatt, who has written extensively on education and 
minority youth, comments that within Buber’s frame of reference, "tech­
niques are not discarded; rather they seem to be included as important 
tools leading to professional competence. Teaching techniques are 
learned to enhance opportunities for person-to-person dialogue, but 
they are not seen as ultimate goals in and of themselves.
Buber's emphasis on education of the "whole person" stands in 
opposition to materialism; as noted by Simon, it also opposes intellec- 
tualism as the sole purpose of the educational endeavor. Robert Hutchins 
concurs, he is against a one-sided intellectualism. Nevertheless, he 
expresses the following concern;
No doctrine has promoted the disintegration of American education 
as much as that of the "whole man"; it has been used to justify 
the inclusion of the most frivolous trivialities in the course 
of study.
There is grave danger in too literal and immediate an inter­
pretation of Buber's insistence on "our present situation" and 
"our hour". . . . The whole view of American education that we 
must adjust the student to his environment . . . can be justi­
fied by an interpretation of Buber's language, of which he would 
be the last to approve.52
A great teacher, like Socrates or Buber, can start with any­
thing and move by ordered stages to the most tremendous issues.
The ordinary teacher who begins with triviality is almost
50Ibid., p. 53.
5lRoward Rosenblatt, "Martin Buber's Concepts Applied to Educa­
tion," The Educational Forum 35 (January 1971); 217.
^Robert M. Hutchins, "Interrogation," in Philosophical Inter­
rogations , p. 64.
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certain to end there. The virtue of great hooks is that they 
are the thoughts of great men about great issues, most of which 
are so fundamental that they are issues of our present situa­
tion and our hour in any definition of these terms. We must 
bring our own concrete reality to our reading, of course.53
Buber, too, sees a great danger in a too literal interpretation of 
his view of the educational task. ’’Every all-too-literal interpretation 
of a truth is dangerous. What is important is not formally to fix the 
true, but to preserve it in its living context." He also opposes the view 
of adjusting the student to his environment. "We must not adjust our­
selves to the changing situations, but we have to take our stand toward 
them and master them." As to Socrates, his method is at odds with that 
of Buber:
I know of very few men in history to whom I stand in such a rela­
tion of both trust and veneration as Socrates. But . . . Socrates 
overvalued the significance of abstract general concepts in com­
parison with concrete individual experiences. General concepts 
are the most important stays and supports, but Socrates treated 
them as if they were more important than bones. . . . Stronger, 
however, than this basic objection is my criticism of a peda­
gogical application of the Socratic method. Socrates conducted 
his dialogue by posing questions and proving the answers that he 
received untenable; these are not real questions; they are moves 
in a sublime dialectical game that has a goal, the goal of reveal­
ing a not-knowing. But when the teacher whom I mean . . . enters 
into a dialogue with his pupil and in this connection directs a 
question to him, he asks . . . because he wants to know something.^
Like Socrates, Buber believes that the teacher must strive to 
awaken in the pupil the need to communicate of himself and thereby bring 
him to a greater clarity of existence. But he also learns, himself, con­
cretely the becoming of the human being which takes place in experiences. 
Although this is not full partnership, it is still a real dialogue.
53Ibid., p. 65.
S^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 67-68.
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CHAPTER I I I
MUTUALITY
When Buber speaks of mutuality between two people, he refers to 
the continuing potential presence of one for the other, an attitude and 
a willingness in each to enter into dialogue and a trust that the other 
will reciprocate.1
Buber ascribes several terms to dialogue, the unfolding of mutual 
ity, such as mutual relation, I-Thou relation, essential relation, and 
reciprocity. In this relation persons become presences for one another 
in the context of a concrete and transforming meeting. Each confronts 
and responds to the other not as an object, as happens in the relation 
of monologue or I-It, but as a partner in a shared event. Mutuality and 
its unfolding are necessary to the inmost growth of the partners of rela­
tion: "I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say 
Thou."2
But Buber understands the relation not only as a psychological 
phenomenon or something which occurs within each self. It refers to 
the ontology of meeting, to both the within and the without, to the 
intersubjective. What happens takes place between the two in the most 
precise sense. "Each considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction.
1Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 98.
2Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2d ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith 
(New York: Charles Scribner's, 1958), p. 11.
53
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The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into rela­
tion with other individuals."3
Distance and Relation
The presupposition of all relation is distance and the act of 
setting at a distance. Distance is just the state of being, that is, 
each partner exists as unique, and within this uniqueness has the qual­
ity of wholeness and unity. Setting at a distance the unique other 
being means granting it an independence and allowing it to exist for 
itself as a separate identity, as different from oneself.
Distance and setting at a distance create a contradiction and a 
tension— an "over-againstness"— to which the self reacts in one of two 
ways: Either it wills to enter into mutual relation or it wills to with 
hold itself from this relation. In the first instance the overcoming 
gives rise to unity, the polar tension of distance and relation together 
This means that the primary uniqueness of each partner is not changed 
but enhanced or completed through the relation. The second choice con­
stitutes a "thickening" of the distance corresponding to the I-It rela­
tion, by which the self persists in a detached manner of perceiving.
The self may then begin to make the other its object, that is, by 
observing and using the other, it is made a part of the objective 
world and no longer an independent subject with whom the self has 
to deal as another self.^
^Buber, Between Man and Man: "What is Man?", p. 203.
^Buber, Knowledge of Man; "Distance and Relation," pp. 59-71.
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There are gradations of both the I-Thou and I-It relations. And 
people vary in the extent to which they relate to the other as a Thou or 
an It. People must live in the impersonal, more secure world of It in 
order to survive, but to exist as human being3 they must step out of it 
repeatedly and meet the Thou in ever changing form, in new and unpre­
dictable situations.^ At times the tension of difference seems unsur- 
mountable, but to Buber it is also true that the humane mutual relation, 
which includes the other, serves it, and learns from it, is made possible 
only by the fact of difference and the confirmation of difference.
Buber explains the principle of distance and relation by con­
trasting human reality with the existence of animals. It is only for 
people that an independent opposite exists; an animal does not know the 
state of relation because it cannot perceive anything as contrasting 
and existing for itself, and as whole and unified. He therefore sug­
gests that human beings have moved into a special category; they have 
moved into "reality," have a world. One cannot view individual beings 
as independent and whole, repeat this again and again, without viewing 
the world that way, both temporally and spatially. "An animal's actions 
are concerned with its future and the future of its young, but only man 
imagines the future." An animal has no world but is limited to a realm. 
Its "image" of its realm and its activity have only to do with a "selec­
tion of elements" which meet the necessities of its life and the functions 
of its life which are to be performed. "Wherever swallows or tunny wander 
their bodily being (Leiblichkeit) carries out this selection from 'nature, 
which as such is completely unknown to them, and on which they in turn
^Buber, I and Thou, p. 34.
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have an effect, again as on something which they neither know nor can 
know."6
Given distance, the fulfillment of mutual relation requires the 
inner and outer actions, awareness and responsibility. Awareness implies 
more than just acknowledging the other as different. Being aware means 
to accept the different and to confirm it in its wholeness and uniqueness 
as a "being made in this particular way." By contrast, an insect state 
excludes every variation and reward. In responsibility the partner is 
helped to unfold through one's presence and one's influence, but the
{ J o e i r o  "Kg tC C dO 0S THS2.H s- fcirt
to change the essential being of the other, to inject one's own right­
ness into the partner in relation. Rather it means "the effort to let 
that which is recognized as right, as just, as true . . , through one's 
own influence take seed and grow into the form of individuation."7
Such influence is the heart of education, contrasted by Buber 
with propaganda.
There man learns not merely that he is limited by man, cast upon 
his own finitude, partialness, need of completion, but his own 
relation to the truth is heightened by the other's different 
relation to the same truth— different in accordance with his 
individuation and destined to take seed and grow differently.6
One finds it difficult to understand Buber's meaning of mutual 
relation with non-human beings which "say" something to the self. Since 
the non-human lacks consciousness, it cannot, of course, respond to the 
self as the self responds to it. Buber describes the character of the 
relation by pointing to an element common to all mutual relation, the
6Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Distance and Relation," p. 61.
7Buber, Ibid., p. 69.
6Buber, Ibid.
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active reciprocity of being. On the question of mutuality with nature, 
Buber writes:
That living wholeness and unity of the tree, which denies 
itself to the sharpest glance of the mere investigator and 
discloses itself to the glance of one who says Thou, is there 
when he, the sayer of Thou, is there: It is he who vouchsafes 
to the tree that it manifest this unity and wholeness; and now 
the tree which is in being manifests them. Our habits of 
thought make it difficult for us to see that here, awakened 
by our attitude, something lights up and approaches us from 
the course of being. In the sphere we are talking of we have 
to do justice, in complete candor, to the reality which dis­
closes itself to us.®
This, Buber adds, is not a meeting of Platonic ideas, but a meet 
ing with the on-going course of being.^
Setting at a distance, awareness, and responsibility are not 
viewed by Buber as firmly separate entities, nor are they understood 
strictly as sequential steps in the relational process. Rather, aware­
ness of the Thou makes possible an attitude of responsibility, and 
awareness deepens with the act of responding. The integrity of the 
difference between the I and the Thou, distance and independence, is 
maintained throughout. "The Thou is not another I."
The remainder of this chapter will examine more fully Buber's 
concept of mutuality, with particular emphasis on the human sphere.
This calls for further description of the concepts uniqueness, aware­
ness, and responsibility, each of which will be treated in terms of 
its constituent components. *10
®Buber, I and Thou, p. 126.
10Ibid., p. 129.
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The Unique Person
Wholeness
Uniqueness is often associated with an observable attribute or a 
loose aggregate of attributes. There is a tendency to compare the 
attributes of one person with those of another, which says nothing of 
the whole existence of that person. Buber, however, speaks of the unre­
peatable "wholeness of the person defined by spirit," and of the "dynamic 
center" which stamps one’s "every utterance, action, and attitude with 
the recognizable sign of uniqueness."^
Uniqueness is "not analysable into any elements and not compound- 
able out of any."^ The Thou response is directed to the other in his 
unified entirety, not to single attributes or allegiances abstracted and 
generalized to the whole. Similarly, the self confronts itself as irre­
ducible to attributes:
Just as the melody is not made up of notes nor the verse of 
words nor the statue of lines, but they must be tugged and 
dragged till their unity has been scattered into these many 
pieces, so with the man to whom I say Thou. I can take out 
from him the color of his hair, or of his speech, or of his 
goodness. I must continually do this. But each time I do 
it he ceases to be Thou.-^
Consistent with Buber's idea of wholeness and unity is his denial 
that the distinguishing feature of humanity is only reason, as has been 
so often claimed, especially since Descartes. Nor does emotion consti­
tute the whole of the person. "Man is not a centaur, he is man through
^•Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Elements of the Interhuman," p. 80.
^Martin Buber, Good and Evil, 2d ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith 
(New York: Charles Scribner's, 1953), p. 141.
l^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 8-9.
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and through," thinks with "his whole body to the very fingertips."^
The Thou is perceived as whole when relation takes place in the 
present and becomes exclusive to the partners in relation. The one to 
whom I relate has "no neighbor," but occupies my fullest attention.
"This does not mean that nothing exists except himself. But all else 
lives in his l i g h t . R e l a t i o n  to the It is removed from the present, 
compares and categorizes. Here Buber illustrates how categorizing pre­
vents a tree from becoming a unique Thou:
I can classify [a tree] in a species and study it as a type in 
its structure and mode of life. . . .  I can dissipate it and 
perpetuate it in number, in pure numerical relation. In all 
this the tree remains my object, occupies space and time, and 
has its nature and constitution.^
Attributes must, in fact, be acknowledged and dealt with, but in 
real relation they are seen as they are in actuality, in their relativ­
ity:
To become bound up in relation it is not necessary for me to 
give up any of the ways in which I consider the tree. There 
is nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in 
order to see, and no knowledge that I would have to forget.
Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and type, 
law and number, indivisibly united in this event.
Everything belonging to the tree is in this: its form 
and structure, its colors and chemical composition, its inter­
course with the elements and with the stars, are all present 
in a single whole.17
Wholeness comprises also the actual and the potential. Buber 
repeatedly characterizes the Thou not as a static entity, but as the 
dynamic being before you with all of its possibilities.
■^Buber, Between Man and Man: "What is Han?", p. 198. 
l^Buber, I and Thou, p. 8. 
l6Ibid., p.7.
^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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Equality of Worth
The wholistic view of uniqueness confers on each partner an 
equality of worth. The uniqueness and irreplaceability of every per­
son, Buber points out, is a basic teaching of Hasidism. He refers to 
the teaching of Rabbi Pinhas: "In everyone is something precious that 
is in no other," and each has "an importance in which none other can 
c o m p e t e . T h e  essential uniqueness, that which one is and can become 
in one's whole being is, after all, immeasurable. It is not one's 
relative position on a hierarchy of physical attributes, nor skills 
and knowledge attainments, nor attitudes of faith and ethics, even 
though such differences are recognized as actual.
Certainly, there are great and small, those rich in teaching 
and those poor in teaching, those adorned with virtue and 
those seemingly bare of virtue, those devoted to God and 
those who have crept away into themselves, but God does not 
deny Himself even to those decried as foolish and as wicked.
. . .  So every man who wishes to walk in God's way must 
avoid making absolute differences out of relative ones.
The capacity for uniqueness and genuine relation exists in all 
people. It is not a privilege of intellectual skill like dialectic, 
nor of "spiritual luxuriousness. . . It begins no higher than where 
humanity begins. There are no gifted and ungifted here." Thus Buber 
includes the factory, mine, and office worker, and the "yoked," the 
"turbid," and the "repressed."^ He includes the "evil" as well;
"only their evil deeds shall one hate."^l *19
l^Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 251.
19Ibid.
^^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," pp. 35-36.
^Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 247.
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Hasidism taught Buber to value people who take responsible direc­
tion, who turn toward existence with the whole self without being able to
grasp conceptually this turning. For them "1 have saved my love," he
22writes.
Here a paradox presents itself: For Buber, the unique potential­
ity of each person is immeasurable and incomparable. Yet, as Ernst Simon 
states (see Chapter II), the point can be made that some of his ideas are 
suggestive of elitism. For instance, Buber defines the "Great Character" 
in his essay "Education." Simon infers that a "serving elite" is in fact 
established in Buber's way of chinking. Buber answers that "serving" and 
"organizationless" elites are necessary to the growth of the spirit on 
earth. But he firmly discounts the notion of norms or standards for them, 
since each Ihou responds to its world in its own particular way. "The 
distinction to be made here is not between norm and norm, but between 
way and way."* 23
Further insight is gained into Euber’s perspective of the diffi­
cult concept equality by knowing he considers the devotion to all things 
an expression of welthaftes Wirken— a cosmic love, a world-permeating 
action and influence. To Buber love is an attitude, not a feeling. 
Feelings accompany love, but are of greatly differing kinds. The lasting
attitude of responsible love contained in one's posture toward the world
. 24is actualized in exclusive encounter with a single Incomparable Thou.
^Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, p. 724.
23Ibid.
2^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 14-15.
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Creativity, Individuation, and Power
Uniqueness, for Buber, has an obvious positive connotation, and 
this is bora out further in his view of its origin and its purpose. 
"Uniqueness is the essential good of man that is given to him to unfold."25 
It is given, but only partly developed, and what remains to be developed 
exists as the potential for creativity and individuation. Uniqueness is 
genetically underivable. It is designed or preformed by the creator, the 
"author" of uniqueness. But that a unique being is created does not mean 
that it is put into being for mere existence. For creation has a goal. 
Uniqueness "is entrusted to me for my execution, although everything that 
affects me participates in this execution."26 Actualization of one's 
endowed uniqueness, then, is vitally conditioned by the world, but respon­
sible action toward this goal begins with the self.
What goal Is intended for one's creativity and individuation? The 
goal is a single one generalized to all people, the "humanly right" direc­
tion in service to the work of creation. Taking the right direction is, 
at the same time, personal and situational and therefore dependent upon 
free decision.
Basic to Hasidic beliefs was the Cabbalistic myth of the holy 
sparks and its implication for "service to the work of creation" by 
actualizing the potential within the self and the other. The "world- 
vessels" broke in the time before creation because they could not hold 
the creative overflow. Sparks fell into all beings and are imprisoned 
in them until repeatedly people use a thing in holiness, and thereby 
free the concealed sparks to re-unite with God as they yearn to do.27
25suber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 111.
^Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 141-42.
27l$uber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 32.
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It was not the Hasidic speculations indicated in this myth about the
world's origin which held lasting meaning for Buber, but rather the
underlying implication of the potential for human participation in
redemption. Through partnership with God in world redemption, indi-
vidual energy became the purpose and task of humanity. As said by
Buber in his old age, he had no views of the origin and the future of
the cosmos and within it of humanity.
I have never sought to philosophize about beginning or end 
or the like. I have in these matters nothing to establish 
other than my faith, and my faith in the meaningfulness of 
creation and in its completion as a goal seems to -me to 
exist beyond optimism and pessimism. . . .  I do not philos­
ophize more than I must.29
The human "admittance to power" which Buber took from the Hasidic
30teachings appealed to his nature and enlisted his deepest allegiance. 
Power as a necessary tool in becoming a unique person is emphasized by 
Buber, but he makes a careful distinction between power and the avidity 
for power. In a critique of Nietzsche's "will to power" concept, Buber 
cites the view of that philosopher that ascetic ideals give one a "bad 
conscience" toward power attainment and suppress the will to power, 
whereas good conscience to this will has fostered all "great humanity" 
and "great culture." Nietzsche defines the will to power as the striv­
ing for "increase in power," for a "maximal feeling of power," and as 
the "insatiable desire to display power, or to employ, to practice 
power," Buber argues that, from a psychological and historical point 
of view, real greatness cannot be understood as either an increase or
2®Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 77.
Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, p. 702.
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 77.
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or a display of power.33
The productive person is "involuntarily and composedly powerful," 
but not avid for power.
What he is avid for is the realization of what he has in mind, 
the incarnation of the spirit. Of course he needs power for 
this realization; for power . . . means simply the capacity to 
realize what one wants to realize; but the great man is not 
avid for this capacity . . . but for what he wishes to be cap­
able of. This is the point from where we can understand the 
responsibility in which the powerful man is placed, namely 
whether, and how far, he is really serving his goal; and also 
the point from where we can understand the seduction by power, 
leading him to be unfaithful to the goal and yield to power
alone.32
Buber goes on to say that people have a sick attitude toward 
their work who desire power instead of their real goal, and that cul­
ture is judged from the same standpoint. Power, then, is not to be 
isolated from responsibility and thought of as a possession. In oppo­
sition to Nietzsche, Buber concludes that the will to power "corrupts 
the history of the world,"33
Love is "responsibility of an I_ for a Thou. In this lies the 
likeness . . .  of all who love, from the smallest to the greatest."
The egoistic self lives only in monologue, a "world of mirrors and mir­
rorings," in which people enjoy their feelings. Love is for self
gratification. Such lovers love only their individual passion and
34enjoy their own effect, their excitement, and their power.
33suber, Between Man and Man: "What is Man?", pp. 148-51. 
32ibid., p. 151.
33ibid., p. 153.
3^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 29.
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Buber is more troubled by a kind of "leader” such as the demonic 
leader Napoleon whose mission requires him to know nothing but a connec­
tion with his particular cause, that is, "no longer to know any real 
relation with or present realisation of a Thou— to have everything about 
him become an It, serving his particular Cause. . . . Towards him every­
thing flames, but his fire is cold."^ According to Buber, the world is 
truly received by the person who turns to another human being: "Only 
the being whose otherness, accepted by my being, lives and faces me in 
the whole compression of existence, brings the radiance of eternity to 
me."* 36
Authenticity
The human power to participate in creation includes predomini- 
nantly the power to communicate authentically with other human beings. 
Buber compares living from being "what one really is" with living from 
an image of "what one wishes to seem." Being and seeming are usually 
combined in human existence, since few people function independent of 
the impression they make on others, and virtually no one exists who is 
entirely motivated by the desire to make an impression. By way of 
illustration, Buber describes a situation in which two people exchange 
glances: The first person, while wanting to be understood, is never­
theless unmoved by any thought of the effect his look will have on the 
other's perception of him, and so communication remains unimpaired by 
such anxiety. This is the spontaneous, unreserved look of someone 
engaged in direct, personal communication. The second person "makes
35fluber, I and Thou, pp. 67-68.
36Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 30.
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a look," since he is concerned with the image his glance produces in the 
other. A look is produced "which is meant to have, and often enough 
does have, the effect of a spontaneous utterance.” But this is not the 
same as the "genuine seeming" of a child, for example, who while imitat­
ing a heroic model learns the meaning of heroism; or the person who 
believes it important to try to perform a life role which gains authen­
ticity in the doing, however unspontaneously or imperfectly carried out.
In these situations the imitation, the part, and the mask are 
all genuine.
But where the semblance originates from the lie and is perme­
ated by it, the interhuman is threatened in its very existence.
It is not that someone utters a lie, falsifies some account.
The lie I mean does not take place in relation to particular 
facts, but in relation to existence itself, and it attacks 
interhuman existence as such. There are times when a man, to 
satisfy some stale conceit, forfeits the great chance of a 
true happening between I and Thou.3?
Yet true communication does not depend on two people saying every­
thing that occurs to them, but only on their letting "no seeming creep 
in" between them. It is not a matter of letting go, or total unreserve.
It is a matter of becoming transparent to the extent that the other can 
share in one's presence as one really is. Buber sees the common tendency 
to live from the impression one makes not as an aspect of one's "nature." 
It originates on the other side of mutuality itself, in people's depen­
dence upon one another. Making an image is seen as a step one person 
can take to receive the confirmation from another which is crucial to 
their communication. But here only the image, "the ghost of semblance," 
can be confirmed, not the reality.
^Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Elements of the Interhuman ," 
pp. 76-77.
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Still, the child, and even the adult encompassed in an "increas­
ingly tough layer" of semblance, is redeemable. Though at times with 
great personal risk and sacrifice, one can struggle to become authentic 
through "confidence in being.
Self Awareness: The Particular Way
The important confidence in one's own uniqueness is an idea which 
Buber expresses concretely in his interpretation of Hasidic teachings. 
Everything in the world is new, "God never does the same thing twice."
The great possibility of humankind lies precisely in the unlikeness of 
human beings. And everyone's task is the "actualization of his unique, 
unprecedented, and never-recurring potentialities, not the repetition of 
something that another . . . has already achieved." One is only to recog­
nize and learn from the contribution another makes, not duplicate it.
Rabbi Susya said, shortly before his death: "In the world to come I 
shall not be asked: 'Why were you not Moses?' I shall be asked: 'Why 
were you not Susya?'" Thus however small our achievements may be in 
comparison with others, "they have their real value in that we bring 
them about in our own way and by our own efforts.
Here is a principle which recognizes that people are "essentially 
unlike one another" and which therefore "does not aim at making them 
alike." Each person starts from his particular place in a way deter­
mined by his individual quality and inclination, and God is reached 
through this "multiple advance" of humankind. It is useless to envy 
other people, and it is misleading to study and imitate them in
Ibid., p. 78.
®®Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, pp. 110,139-41.
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disregard of one's own particularity, since that which is intended for 
the self is thereby precisely missed. At the moment someone seizes the 
"rung" of another person and abandons his own, neither person is actu­
alized.
Buber illustrates the principle of individual direction in a dis­
cussion of participation versus withdrawal from the world. Hasidism 
emphasizes participation, and it emphasizes rejoicing in the world by 
"hallowing" it with one's whole being. But it is peculiar to some 
people that only by asceticism at certain crucial moments of their 
lives can they gain freedom from their "enslavement to the world."
Still, one may withdraw from nature only to return to it.4®
How is the particular way known to the self? Through self knowl­
edge, through perceiving one’s own "essential quality" and perceiving 
that which moves the self’s inmost being. Of course, it often happens 
that the central inner wish is known only in the shape of direction­
less impulse. One naturally begins by rushing at objects which lie 
across one's path. It is necessary, therefore, that the power of even 
this impulse be diverted "from the casual to the essential" and "from 
the relative to the absolute."40 1 42 Everything depends on listening to 
the question: the conscience.4^ Thus Buber's unwavering trust is in 
the power of human beings to authenticate themselves through decision 
to follow the single direction of service, each one according to his 
particular way.
40Ibid., pp. 141-44.
41Ibid., pp. 140-42.
42Ibid., p. 134.
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Despite the fact of uniqueness, a person does not exist who is, 
in himself, whole and individuated. Ultimately the human being can 
become whole not in relation to himself but through relation with 
another self. This is not understood, however, as self-abnegation. 
According to a Hasidic saying, "Everyone mu3t have two pockets, so that 
he can reach into the one or the other, according to his needs. In his 
right pocket are to be the words, 'For my sake was the world created,' 
and in his left: 'I am dust and ashes'."^3 Buber emphasizes self com­
prehension, which requires solitude and reflection, but in keeping with 
the Hasidic world-affirming tradition he warns against not only self 
glorification, but also against incessant preoccupation with sin and 
self-reproach. Rabbi Eliezer says: "Do not keep worrying about what 
you have done wrong, but apply the soul power you are now wasting on 
self-reproach to such active relation to the world as you are destined 
for. You should not be occupied with yourself but with the world.
Awareness of the Other
To enter into relation, one must become genuinely aware of the 
other, not only the self, as independently unique. Buber contrasts 
becoming aware with objectification, the prevalent way of perceiving 
in our time. Awareness is identified with ideas of directness, pre­
sentness, and confirmation.
^^Martin Buber, Ten Rungs: Hasidic Sayings, trans. Olga Marx 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1947), p. 106.
^Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 163.
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Awareness vs. Objectification
To be aware of a thing or a being encountered means to experi­
ence it as a whole, and yet at the same time without reduction or 
abstraction, in all its concreteness. Awareness of a human being is 
similar but now a different element enters in. Here the person encoun­
tered is grasped on the basis of the spirit which belongs to human 
beings alone and determines what they are. This is vastly different 
from knowing someone as a separated object of contemplation or even 
observation. The key to understanding the difference, and central to 
Buber's entire philosophy, is his point that the wholeness and center 
of the person "do not let themselves be known to contemplation or 
observation," but are revealed only in spontaneous communication, when 
the other is "made present." Such awareness is uncommon. Today the 
objectifying or analytical, reductive, and deriving look is the domi­
nant way of perceiving.
This look is analytical, or rather pseudo analytical, since 
it treats the whole being as put together and therefore able 
to be taken apart— not only the so-called unconscious which 
is accessible to relative objectification, but also the psy­
chic stream itself, which can never, in fact, be grasped as 
an object. This look is a reductive one because it tries to 
contract the manifold person, who is nourished by the micro- 
cosmic richness of the possible, to some schematically sur- 
veyable and recurrent structures. And this look is a deriv­
ing one because it supposes it can grasp what a man has 
become, or even is becoming, in genetic formulae, and it 
thinks that even the dynamic central principle of the indi­
vidual in this becoming can be represented by a general con­
cept. An effort is being made today radically to destroy 
the mystery between man and man. The personal life, the 
ever near mystery, once the source of the stillest enthu­
siasms, is levelled down.
^Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Elements of the Interhuman,"
pp. 80-81.
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Buber’s grave assessment of the modern attitude is not, however, 
meant as an attack on the analytical method of the human sciences. The 
scientific method is useful when it advances the knowledge of a phe­
nomenon without impairing one's awareness of its uniqueness— an aware­
ness that transcends the valid analytical method. This method must 
therefore stay within its boundary. When transmitted from scientific 
study to "life," the boundary becomes ambiguous.^
"Observing" and "looking on" are two ways of objectifying. They 
are similarly oriented because their very purpose is to perceive what 
exists before them, and because what is seen is an object detached from 
the personal lives of the perceivers. The observer, Buber explains, 
carefully "notes" the object, "probes him and writes him up. That is, 
he is diligent to write up as many 'traits' as possible. He lies in 
wait for them, that none may escape him. The object consists of traits, 
and it is known what lies behind each of them." The onlooker, however, 
is not intent, ignores traits, "traits lead astray," and "gives his mem­
ory no tasks, he trusts its organic work which preserves what is worth 
preserving." But awareness involves the self in meeting:
It is a different matter when . . .  a man meets me about whom 
there is something, which I cannot grasp in any objective way 
at all, that "says something" to me. That does not mean, says 
to me what manner of man this is. . . . But it means, says 
something to me, addresses something to me, speaks something 
that enters my own life. It may be something about this man, 
for instance, that he needs me. But it can also be something 
about myself.^
Were an attempt made to describe him, that would be the end of 
the saying: 46
46Ibid., p. 81.
4?Buber, Between Kan and Man: "Dialogue," p. 9.
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This man is not my object; I have got to do with him. Perhaps 
I have got to accomplish something about him; but perhaps I 
have only to learn something, and it is only a matter of my 
"accepting". . . .  In each instance a word demanding an 
answer has happened to me. We may term this way of percep- 
tion becoming aware.
Directness
According to Buber, much of conversation is devoid of such aware­
ness. People today typically do not listen to one another, nor do they 
really speak directly to one another but only "speechify." This is the 
monologue of Chekhov's characters in The Cherry Orchard, where family 
members talk past each other to a "fictitious court of appeal," that is, 
the life of the other is perceived to consist of nothing but listening 
to the concerns of the self. Chekhov portrays only the deficient type 
of person who is "shut up in himself." Sartre, however, has raised 
such enclosure to a principle of human existence. One has to do only 
with oneself and one's own affairs; there is no direct mutuality, nor 
can there be. "This is perhaps the clearest example of the wretched 
fatalism of modern man, which regards degeneration as the unchangeable 
nature of [the human being] . . . and which brands every thought of a 
breakthrough as reactionary romanticism." Buber encourages anyone who 
understands the meaning of the loss of free giving between the I and 
Thou to practice directness, even if he were the only person who did 
so, and to persist until those around him "hear in his voice the voice 
of their own suppressed longing.
Directness means that each speaker becomes aware of the other as 
different from himself, in the unique way peculiar to him, and that each
A8Ibid., p. 10.
A^Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Elements of the Interhuman, p. 79.
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accepts the person thus seen so that the words go out to him as the one 
he is. In the course of conversation, the views of the speakers may be 
in strict opposition, but the other is accepted in his being out of which 
his conviction has grown, even when a stand must be taken against this 
very conviction. It now depends on the partner whether dialogue, or 
mutuality in speech, takes place. The address may indeed remain unan­
swered, but if the partner is given his authentic standing as a person 
"with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him and 
suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner."^
Making the Other Present
Buber also believes that awareness exists at different levels, 
and that the intensity of awareness corresponds to the intensity of the 
involvement of oneself in meeting with the other. "Making the other 
present" is to imagine the other's reality, his attitude and partici­
pation, and not as a detached content but as a living process in the 
person. "Inclusion," the full making present, does more: Now the self 
becomes more actively a participant in the meeting. An event occurs in 
which there is an experience, of pain for example, not as a general suf­
fering but as the pain specific to the other. This making present 
increases when two partners are involved in a common living situation 
and one experiences the pain he inflicts upon the other, revealing the 
"contradictoriness" of interpersonal life. At this point the other, a 
component of the independent world confronted, is no longer a component 
but becomes truly "a self for me" and "a self with me." When the other 
other knows he is so perceived, it becomes an "ontological" event which 50
50Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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brings about his inmost self becoming.
For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished., as 
people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, 
but in the relation between the one and the other . . . pre­
eminently in the mutuality of the making present— in the 
making present of another self and in the knowledge that 
one is made present in his own self by the other— together 
with the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and con­
firmation.
Confirmation
Buber defines confirmation in a dialogue with Carl Rogers.
Rogers emphasizes unconditional acceptance in a therapeutic relation­
ship, whereas Buber emphasizes confirmation which, although it accepts, 
may also help the other struggle against himself. Rogers says that 
full acceptance releases individual potentiality, "because . . . there 
is no longer any need for defensive barriers, so then what takes over 
are the forward moving processes of life itself." A relationship of 
warmth and safety, which allows the person his feelings and attitudes 
and to be what he is, will help him to realize what is "deepest in 
the individual, that is the very aspect that can be most trusted to 
be constructive or to tend toward socialization or toward the devel­
opment of better interpersonal relationships."’’^
Buber answers, "I would say every true existential relationship 
between two persons begins with acceptance" which makes the other person 
feel "that X take you just as you are." There is a basic trust, then, 
but what may be trusted stands in polar relation to what can be least 
trusted in the person. The positive pole through the influence of *
^Buber, Knowledge of Man; "Distance and Relation," p. 71.
^Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Dialogue Between Martin Buber and 
Carl Rogers," p. 180.
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another person can be strengthened, and "perhaps we can even strengthen 
the force of direction in him because this polarity is very often direc­
tionless . . . chaotic." So confirmation is acceptance of the whole 
potentiality which can evolve and answer the reality of life. It is a 
discovery and a legitimizing of the person with whom I have to do in 
real dialogue as "a being meant to become." This being meant to become 
is a concept for which simple, factual language has no word.33
Buber presupposes an innate capacity in people to confirm other
people in this way. In his view, however, this capacity lies fallow,
and that is what "constitutes the real weakness and questionableness of
the human race: actual humanity exists only when this capacity unfolds."
It is noted that an empty claim to confirmation, without devotion for
being and becoming, repeatedly mars the authentic relation between
people. Nevertheless, in human society people have always to some
extent confirmed one another in a practical way, not only in their
personal qualities but also their functions:
And a society may be termed human in the measure to which its 
members confirm one another. Apart from the tool and the 
weapon, what has enabled this creature . . .  to assert him­
self and to achieve lordship of the earth is this dynamic, 
adaptable, pluralistic form of association, which has been 
made possible by the factor of mutual individual completion 
of function and the corresponding factor of mutual individual 
recognition of function. Within the most closely bound clan 
there still exist free societies of fishers, free orders of 
barter, free associations of many kinds, which are built upon 
acknowledged differences in capacity and inclination. In the 
most rigid epochs of ancient kingdoms the family preserved its 
separate structure, in which, despite its authoritative qual­
ity, individuals affirmed one another in their manifold nature.
And everywhere the position of society is strengthened by this 53
53Ibid., pp. 180-82.
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balance of firmness and looseness. . . .  An animal never suc­
ceeds in unravelling its companions from the knot of their com­
mon life.54
Responsibility
For Buber responsibility is the readiness to enter into dialogue 
by responding to the address of a spoken or silent "word" out of the 
creation entrusted to us. Creation is not identified with anything 
esoteric or remote from human experience, but in the immediate Thou's 
encountered during the on-going course of daily life. One becomes 
responsible only as one is able, and "a creative glance towards a fel­
low creature can at times suffice for response."55 Responsibility is 
life related and it requires resolute decision.
Responsibility as Related to Life
Ronald Gregor Smith points to a quality of immediacy and con­
creteness in Buber's application of the "word." Smith says of respon­
sibility, the main point of the essay "Dialogue," that its significance 
is brought out more acutely in German than in English:
Wort. Antwort, antworten, verantworten. etc., are part of a 
closely interrelated situation in which speech and response, 
answering for and being responsible for, and so on, are more 
intimately connected than the English version can hope to 
show. If the reader will remember that "responsibility" car­
ries in itself the root sense of being "answerable," then the 
significance of the "word" in actual life will not be lost.
Buber's teaching about the "word" always carries a strict 
reference to "lived life," and is very far from being an 
abstraction, theological or other.56
54Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Distance and Relation," p. 67.
55Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 39.
^Ronald Gregor Smith, "Translator's Notes," in Between Man and 
Man, p. 206.
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Buber says, "The idea of responsibility is to be brought back 
from the province of specialized ethics, of an 'ought' that swings free 
in the air, into that of lived life."-^ This is not to suggest a 
denial of absolute values but only that each absolute, honesty for 
example, is realized in the concrete situation in which it is practiced, 
and that the uniqueness of every situation calls for a unique response.
So the mutuality of address and response takes place in actual meeting, 
in what Buber calls the between. This between does not exhibit a smooth 
continuity, but it is ever and again reconstituted in men's meeting with
COone another.
There is a continuity, however, in the sense of commitment to 
that which one answers. "A situation of which we have become aware is 
never finished with, but we subdue it into the substance of lived life. 
Only then, true to the moment, do we experience a life that is something 
other than a sum of moments." We respond to this moment, but at the 
same time we respond on its behalf, we answer for it.^®
Decision
While countless decisions are made in day-to-day living, deci­
sion as here applied is the exercise of one's "will to relate." Deci­
sion implies freedom and "turning to the other."
Buber attributes to m odem society a more oppressing belief 
than has ever before existed. Belief in the dogma of fate leaves no 
room for freedom. It fails to recognize the meaning of personal
57suber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 16.
5®Buber, Between Man and Man: What is Man?", p. 203.
•^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 17.
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responsibility assumed when one is no longer prone to merely "let things 
happen," but instead decides. The dogma of fate or determinism— "the 
unlimited world of causality"— belongs to the closed system of the It- 
world. The Thou world is not closed but frees one to enter into rela­
tion. This is not fate, Buber says, but human destiny. This dogma of 
fate "is always willing to allow you to fulfill its limitation with 
your life and to 'remain free' in your soul; but he who is turning 
looks on this freedom as the most ignominious bondage."^
Buber contrasts people who exercise the will to relate with 
those who exercise an arbitrary self will. The first are recognized 
in free persons who believe in the reality of the I and Thou. They 
believe in destiny and believe that destiny needs them. Destiny does 
not restrict them but "awaits" their decision, even though the conse­
quence may not correspond to what they decide. Those who will arbi­
trarily are in fact determined, since they see no alternative to the 
use and appropriation of things. They are concerned with their "my—  
my kind, my race, my creation, my g e n i u s . T h e  disposition to will 
freely and the disposition to will arbitrarily are combined in all 
people, but those who are defined by free will attain the fuller human 
existence.
Good is identified with decision to enter into mutuality and evil 
with the failure to so decide. The human being is neither radically good 
nor radically evil, but always good and evil mixed together as "two ser­
vants" who accomplish their service in collaboration. The "evil urge" is *6
^Buber, I and Thou, p. 57.
6lIbid., p. 64.
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described by Buber as passion, impulse, a whirling potentiality— "the 
ferment placed in the soul by God, without which the human dough does 
not rise."^2 it is positive in the sense that without it there would 
be no competition whatever, and no survival of humanity itself. One's 
task is not to eliminate the evil urge but to unite it with the good. 
This is accomplished by deciding in the direction of love and service. 
"Good is direction and what is done in it; that which is done in it is 
done with the whole soul, so that in fact all the vigor and passion 
with which evil might have been done is included in it."^3
Turning
The Jewish concept turning, Teshuvah, means that with a reversal 
of his whole being a person who had been lost in indecision, in the maze 
of selfishness, finds a way to the fulfillment of a particular task for 
which he has been destined by God. Turning requires a full acceptance 
of the present and the attitude which values that which is present.
This does not mean a mystical relinquishing of the self. What 
is given up is rather the false, self-asserting urge that causes people 
to place the possession of things above the uncertain world of relation 
"which has neither density nor duration and cannot be surveyed.
To what does one turn? To nothing extraordinary, and yet to a 
"world happening" in the form of an address of the existential moment, 
to "what happens to one, to what is to be seen and heard and felt by 
the 'attentive* person." Each moment with Its content is an address." 63
^Buber, Good and Evil, p. 94.
63Ibid., pp. 130-31.
^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 77-78.
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A dog has looked at you, you answer for its glance, a child has clutched 
your hand, you answer for its touch, and a host of men move about you, 
you answer for their need."®^
People throw up a defense to ward off the "signs" of address 
because they carry with them a risk. And so only by "sterilizing" the 
happening and removing the "seed" from it, can one take it as that 
"which does not refer to me." Modern civilization provides the ready 
means by which the turning can be evaded. The address can be ignored 
• by referring not to its meaning but how it is understood physically, 
biologically, and sociologically. Response to what is significant in 
the event seems to have no place in the logical world and denies an 
immediate and secure mastery of the situation. But for the attentive 
person, the relation to the Thou is direct, and thus nothing from the 
past is readily applicable, "no knowledge and no technique, no system 
and no program." Now one is confronted with concretion impossible to 
classify. "This speech has no alphabet, each of its sounds is a new 
creation and only to be grasped as such."
In the essential action of turning, one person steps forth and 
becomes a presence, giving the world its very form. The modern tendency 
to think of this turning to the other as sentimental and out of place in 
the bustling activity of life is judged by Buber to be false and "gro­
tesque." It reveals only that people let the condition of the time 
determine what is possible, instead of stipulating for themselves what 
form is to be given to human existence.^® *6
^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," pp. 16-17.
6^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 22.
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Knowledge, precept, and preparation are important to relation, 
but can never supersede the simple immediacy of turning. God is a 
"moment God," Buber claims, and above and below are bound inseparably 
to one another. Nothing about God is known, rather the address of 
God is experienced through the signs of creation. Buber suggests 
the following analogy:
When we really understand a poem, all we know of the poet is 
what we learn of him in the poem— no biographical wisdom is 
of value for the pure understanding of what is to be under­
stood: the I_ which approaches us is the subject of this 
single poem. But when we read other poems by the poet in 
the same true way their subjects combine in all their mul­
tiplicity, completing and confirming one another, to form 
the one polyphony of the person's existence.67
This is made clearer in Buber's account of an event which took 
place at a time when, Buber indicates, religious experience was for him 
the experience outside the context of life. After a morning of "reli­
gious enthusiasm," Buber was visited by a young man whom he treated as 
openly as all of the other visitors who came to him for advice. Soon 
after, Buber learned that the man had taken his life, had come to Buber 
in despair and for a decision. He realized he "omitted to guess the 
questions" which the man did not put, because Buber was not there in 
spirit. "What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a 
man? Surely a presence by means of which we are told that neverthe­
less there is meaning." Buber then experienced a "conversion," gave 
up the pseudo-religious, the separate and the ecstatic, for a religion 
of worldly claim and responsibility.
I do not know much more. . . . religion is . . . simply all 
that is lived in its possibility of dialogue. Here is space 67
67Ibid., p. 15.
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also for religion's highest forms. As when you pray you do 
not thereby remove yourself from this life of yours but in 
your praying refer your thought to it.88
The turning to the other in responsibility is not for Buber 
synonomous with solicitude nor with altruism, since they do not neces­
sarily set a person's life "in direct relation with the life of 
another," but may only imply one person's solicitous help in relation 
with the other's "lack and need of it."®^ The person who has access 
to the "otherness of the other" apart from solicitude will also find 
it in the solicitude practiced by him. But if someone does not have 
access without solicitude, "he may clothe the naked and feed the hungry 
all day and it will remain difficult for him to say a true Thou. If 
all were well clothed and well nourished, then the real ethical prob­
lem would become wholly visible for the first time.
Nor is responsibility the same as duty. "Duty and obligation 
are rendered only to the stranger; we are drawn to and full of love 
for the Intimate person." Responsible decision is calm and sponta­
neous, purposive and not empty; this action "is no longer imposed upon 
the world, it grows on it as if it were non-action.
Mutuality is two-sided; it means being chosen and choosing, being 
at once passive and active.^ But what if one's address to the other 68*72
68Ibid., pp. 13-14.
8^Buber, Between Man and Man: "What is Man?", p. 169.
7QBuber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, p. 723.
71fiuber, I and Thou, p. 109.
72Ibid., p. 11.
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is not reciprocated? Buber suggests that one begin with confidence in 
being itself, trusting that response is forthcoming so the "barriers of 
individual being are in fact breached," while remembering that a rela­
tionship cannot be forced— the Thou "is not found by seeking but meets 
me through grace." Accordingly, initiative rests with the self, yet 
only will, not control, is the self's responsibility. Buber says, 
then, "We have to be concerned, to be troubled, not about the other 
side but about our own side, not about grace but about will. Grace 
concerns us in so far as we go out to it and persist in its presence; 
but it is not our object."73
Again, Buber generalizes to all people the capacity for Thou 
responding. In this connection, Walter Blumenfeld poses the following 
question:
Is "the human being of Buber the real human being or a rare, 
if ever realized, ideal, the "authentic" and especially the 
mature, normal person? Buber's teaching can hardly be 
applied to the mentally ill, to small children, and to 
idiots. Is not his "man" potentially and in no case a 
universally prevalent being?
To this Buber answers that what is of concern to him "does not 
belong to an upper story of human nature . . . the I-Thou relation 
establishes itself, naturally as it were, in the small child as in 
the 'primitive*. . . .  As for the so-called idiots, I have many times 
perceived how the soul of such [a person] extends its arms— and thrusts 
into emptiness." By contrast, Buber indicates, he has known people who 
possess remarkable conceptualizing powers whose basic nature was to 
withhold themselves from others,
73Ibid., pp. 76-77.
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even if they let this one and that one cone near them. No, I 
mean no "spiritual elite," and yes, I mean man as man. Hin­
drances everywhere place themselves in the way, from without 
and from within; it is heart-will and grace in one that help 
us mature and awake men to overcome them and grant us meeting.
What is of importance? That the spirit execute in a 
spiritual manner the projects that nature lays before it. 74
Breakthrough
Although Buber stresses responsible decision, he is fully aware 
of the risk and the difficulty: "It is a cruelly hazardous enterprise, 
this becoming a whole, becoming a form, of crystallization of the soul."75
Buber insists that his concern is not for perfection but for a 
"breakthrough." The speech of dialogue takes many forms, and it is open 
to everyone in all places. Once Buber had a dispute with a Christian 
over the situation between Jews and Christians in which, owing to the 
"unreserve" and the "actuality" of the words between the men, the dis­
cussion ended in the kiss of brotherhood and the beginning of a friend­
ship.^ A breakthrough in Soviet-American relations is possible when 
one person here sees the standpoint of a person there in his mind's 
eye.7 7
It is not a question of "all or nothing." Dialogue is just the 
quantum satis, sufficient amount, of which this person at this hour is 
able to give and receive. The director of a huge technical organiza­
tion can practice the responsibility of dialogue at the point of
74Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogation, p. 36.
^Buber, Good and Evil, p. 129.
7^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," pp. 5-6.
77Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 79.
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comprehending an employee not as a "number with a human mask but as a 
person," and responding indirectly through mediation when necessary, 
but also directly whenever he is able. The workers toughens himself 
to get through his tasks and return to the personal world when his 
shift is over, yet no setting "is so abandoned by creation that a 
creative glance could not fly up from one working-place to another, 
from desk to desk," a sober and kindred look which communicates the 
"reality of creation which is happening— quantum satis."7** In this 
way creation is helped to unfold in the way it is intended.
7®Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," pp. 34-39.
>duced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV
MUTUALITY AMD EDUCATION
For Buber, education is a conscious and willed "selection by man 
of the effective world; it means to give decisive effective power to a 
selection of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the edu­
cator."*
In Buber's view, the words conscious and willed are especially 
relevant to modern education. Whereas education is consciously pro­
vided today, in former times apprentices lived with a master and learned 
from participating in his work. They also learned, without his or their 
noticing it, "the mystery of personal life," but nowadays such a thing 
is exceptional, it happens "only on the heights,"
Although the old form of educating is irretrievable, the loss is 
advantageous to society, because the way is now open to replace the 
incidental with a deliberate experiment toward equity and humaneness.
We can as little return to the state of affairs that existed 
before there were schools as to that which existed before, say, 
technical science. But we can and must enter into the com­
pleteness of education's growth to reality, into the perfect 
humanisation of its reality. Our way is composed of losses 
that secretly become gains. Education has lost the paradise 
of pure instinctiveness and now consciously serves at the 
plough for the bread of life. It has been transformed; only 
in this transformation has it become visible.2
*Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 89. 
^Ibid., p. 90.
86
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Yet Buber points to the former master as the model teacher, whose 
strength was marked by personal contact and non-interference. Even 
Socrates' decisive influence was not what he taught but through his 
life. "Contact is the primary word in education."3 In Buber's peda­
gogy, then, educating is a paradoxical composite of "willing" and "non­
doing", the teacher must do it "as though he did not."^
The genuine teacher wills to be a chooser of curriculum; the 
choice is a "gathering in" of the constructive forces of the world.
The teacher lives what is chosen and becomes educated by it. "The 
foreus of th.s world ^hlch child uusds for thu bol.ldi.og up of bis 
substance must be chosen by the educator and drawn into himself."^
In 1922 Buber said, "Education is opening up." Education is ready to 
serve without subservience to the political realm, "without fanaticism, 
prepared to wait and yet beginning— and reflecting on the mystery of 
how the starry sky, the forest, and everything unarbitrary educates 
in incomprehensible moments, the man already stands in his new work."®
The teacher wills to mediate those constructive forces not by 
enjoying or dominating children, for this "stifles the growth of their 
blessing." Rather, he meets pupils, accepts those he finds before him 
in all their diversity. "From this unerotic situation the greatness 
of the modern educator is to be seen."'
3guber, A Believing Humanism: "On Contact," p. 102.
^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," pp. 89-90.
5Ibid., p. 101.
®Buber, A Believing Humanism: "The Task," p. 100.
^Buber, Between Man and Han: "Education," p. 94.
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In this chapter, the exposition of Buber’s pedagogy along with 
his clarifying examples indicate there are I-Thou relationships which 
do not, by their nature, attain full mutuality. What does prevail in 
all I-Thou relationships is the mutuality of "being" and "action," 
that is, each being exists as a unique subject in its own right, and 
each in some sense responds to the address of otherness.
The rest of the chapter will focus on those elements of Buber's 
pedagogy which deal with goals, the nature of the child, character edu­
cation, community, and knowledge theory.
Goals
What goals determine the teacher's choice and mediation? Two 
priorities are discerned in Buber's writings: spontaneity of expres­
sion and the growth of character. Youthful spontaneity must not be 
suppressed, and the right opportunity must be provided for it to give 
what it can. The influence of character is the teacher's actual task. 
This influence is manifested at the point where the self-assertive, 
spontaneous child through the teacher's guidance becomes responsible 
for a Thou, while still retaining its selfhood and independence. The 
Thou is met in all things, subject matter and people, everything in 
nature is a potential Thou. Yet education is not a "purposeless 
streaming of all things." The teacher selects and guides.
Nature of the Child
In 1925 Buber addressed the Third International Conference on 
Education at Heidelberg. Here he discusses the content and method of
oduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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education, but only in relation to the nature of the child and its sig­
nificance for the teacher's work. He develops the connection between 
individual spontaneity and freedom on the one hand, and character 
(responsible participation) on the other. He expresses serious doubts 
concerning the topic of discussion, "The development of the creative 
powers of the child"— except for the last two words, the child, an 
undeniable reality. Buber questions the meaning of creativity, appar­
ently assuming the Conference organizers to equate it with aesthetic 
achievement. He rejects such a limited concept of creativity, and he 
rejects any notion that aesthetics should be the major goal of educa­
tion. Second, he opposes the view held by some progressive educators 
that education means only to let children "develop" spontaneously out 
of themselves and to preside over their development.
Consistent with his concept of the human being, Buber calls the 
"reality child" above all a phenomenon of uniqueness, both in his 
present manifestation and his potentiality. To an extent the child 
is already determined at birth. The child inherits a given disposi­
tion characteristic of all human beings, and is born into a given 
culture. But the fact of past life and culture must not obscure the 
other fact that in every hour as thousands of children are born, "the 
human race begins . . .  a creative event if ever there was one, new­
ness rising up, primal potential might." Buber could set no societal 
aim above that of education for the strengthening of the individual 
force of youth.
What greater care could we cherish or discuss than that 
this grace may not henceforth be squandered as before, 
that the might of newness may be preserved for renewal. . . .
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The deeds of the generations now approaching can illumine 
the grey face of the human world or plunge it into dark­
ness.®
He is clearly unselective of children in his judgment of unique 
potentiality for positive determination and educability: The part to 
be played in future history "by everyone alive today, by every adoles­
cent and child is immeasurable, and immeasurable is our part if we are 
educators." In another context he says:
It is an inadmissable simplification to assume that in all 
children the same general treasure is hidden. Despite all 
common traits, we are ultimately without exception unica. 
and the treasure that is hidden in each child is something 
irreducibly personal. However cruelly injuries of all kinds 
affect the child from his mother’s womb to school and beyond 
it, the primal fact of the positive determination of the per­
son is to me certain.®
Spontaneous Expression
People are a part of creation and are purposeful participants in 
the transformation of the world, but are not literally creative. The 
meaning of creation was originally "only the divine summons to the life 
hidden in non-being,” and later, metaphorically, the human genius for 
forming. The human "imaging of God is authenticated in action." Over 
the centuries the metaphor creative deteriorated, and in its lowest form 
was equated almost with literary ability. In designating one power of 
human expression, Buber chooses the term "instinct of origination."1® 
This instinct is not limited to a select few— it exists in all people 
and reaches its completion in art.
®Ibid., p. 84.
®Buber, A Believing Humanism: "Education," p. 98. 
l^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 84.
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This instinct is autonomous in that it does not derive from 
other instincts, such as the libido and the will to power. The tend­
ency in psychology to derive the multiform person from a single ele­
ment is really a generalization to all people of certain degenerate 
states in which a single instinct dominates the individual. That many 
such individuals exist in our times Buber attributes to "the inner 
loss of community and oppression." But the sick person does not repre­
sent what is essential to the nature of humankind.
What is natural to all children is to want to produce pictures, 
sounds, and ideas, to sake something that was not there before, to be a 
subject of the event of production. This wish is not a sublimation of 
some pathological wish. Nor is it an urge for purposeless activity: 
children want to "set up or destroy, handle or hit," hut never to "busy" 
themselves. Just witness the phenomenon of children engaged in the 
self-initiated construction of coarse, unrecognizable tools, and the 
astonishment shown at their own inventions. But even in destruction, 
the originative instinct begins to express itself and becomes dominant. 
Here Buber provides a telling example: A child tears up a sheet of
paper or some other object, but is soon preoccupied with the forms of 
the pieces, then tries, still by tearing, to produce definite forms. 
Despite the value of one’s product and the recognition it receives, 
the instinct cannot be identified with greed, "hecause it is not 
directed to ’having’ but only to doing. . . . Here is pure gesture 
which does not snatch the world to iself, but expresses itself to 
the world."^
^Ibid., p. 86.
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Such expression is a starting point from which the originators 
themselves are formed. Buber speaks of the person's growth into form 
so often imagined and lost, and the implications that has for the work 
of education. In putting something together children learn much that 
they can learn in no other way, its possibility, origin, and struc­
ture.*^ In I and Thou Buber writes that children must gain for them­
selves their own world by seeing, hearing, touching, and shaping it. 
"Creation reveals, in meeting, its essential nature as form. It does 
not spill itself into expectant senses, but rises up to meet the grasp­
ing senses."*^
The effort to establish relation is already seen in the infant. 
Even when there seems to be no desire for nourishment, tiny hands reach 
out to meet something indefinite and become lovingly aware of the com­
plete body of a toy animal. Searching glances settle on a red carpet 
pattern, and remain fixed there until "the soul of the red has opened 
itself." Unintelligible sounds later become conversation— "does it 
matter that it is perhaps with the simmering teakettle?" This expresses 
the child's "instinct for communion." It is the instinct to "make every­
thing into Thou, to give relation to the universe, the instinct which 
completes out of its own richness the living effective action when a 
mere copy or symbol of it is given in what is over against him.
A fine demonstration at the Heidelberg Conference was a perform­
ing choir of crippled children who, under the leadership of their
*^ibid., pp. 86-87.
**Buber, I and Thou, p. 26.
14Ibid., p. 27.
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teacher, were "released to a life of freely moving persons, rejoicing in 
their achievement." They exemplified what is "formable and forming" in 
children, knowing "how to shape sights and sounds in multiform patterns 
and also how to sing out their risen souls wildly and gloriously." But 
more, they showed how a "community of achievement" made known in glance 
and response, can be brought together. ^
Here, in the example of children set off from other children by 
virtue of a physical limitation, Buber introduces his view that the deci­
sive influence of learning is not limited to the release of an instinct; 
rather, it centers in the meeting of the educative forces with the 
released instinct.
Influence Toward the Thou
What becomes of the child’s expression depends on the influence 
of the teacher. In the example just mentioned, pupils are led to mutual 
relation with the content of learning and with their classmates through 
the mutual relation established with their teacher. The implications 
for peer relations will be considered later on. Meanwhile there is 
found a transition from the self's involvement with form as an object 
to knowledge of form as a Thou. The pupil answers the demand of a form 
to be perceived as a subject in its own right.
Another specific example helps to clarify this movement; at the 
same time, it describes what the teacher must do to help bring it about. 
The example, drawing instruction, contrasts the authoritarian method with 
the freer one. The former began with rules and current patterns which 
pupils followed "either in apathy or in despair"; while the latter
15suber, Between Man and Man; "Education," p. 8 6.
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encourages the individual expression of pupils who draw what they see 
before them or who draw what they remember having seen. Youthful spon­
taneity is suppressed by the compulsory practice, and the newer way 
stops short of educating. Buber adds to the child’s free experiment 
the teacher’s "delicate, almost imperceptible and yet important influ­
ence," that of criticism and guidance. The teacher individualizes:
The children encounter a scale of values that, however unaca­
demic it may be, is quite constant, a knowledge of good and 
evil that, however individualistic it may be, is quite 
unambiguous. The more unacademic this scale of values, and 
the more individualistic this knowledge, the more deeply do 
the children experience the encounter. In the former 
instance the preliminary declaration of what alone was 
right made for resignation or rebellion.16
Toward the Human Thou
The capacity for mutuality existing in all children, then, is 
realized in relation to the created form through guidance from the 
teacher. But mutuality is here limited since the created form, of 
course, can never respond with consciousness. Rather, "mutuality 
itself as the door to our existence" is realized in communication 
with other human beings. So the urge in the child is to transform 
the world and even to meet a Thou in what is transformed, yet Buber's 
acknowledgment of this urge is not the same as the pedagogical belief 
of radically "free" educators that education is only a "liberation of 
the powers."
While committed to aesthetic creativity in education, Buber 
points out that an individual achievement is nevertheless a "one­
sided event," painful and solitary, no matter how directly as being 16
16Ibid., pp. 38-89.
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"approached and claimed" by the art form, "as perceiving and receiving 
in . . . facing an idea which awaits embodiment." Even those artists 
of wide acclaim cannot know if their anonymous receivers appreciate 
their efforts. The teacher who leads the child to a community of 
achievement, a blend of the balanced curriculum and mutuality with 
other children, thereby educates the whole person of that child. Now 
there is shared participation in work and a partner who recognizes 
one's contribution. There is also someone to grasp one's hand "not 
as a 'creator' but as a fellow creature lost in the world . . . beyond 
the arts.
True community depends on the genuineness of its individual 
members. Education for community therefore implies character educa­
tion.
Character Education
"Education worthy of the name is essentially education of char­
acter," said Buber in 1939 in an address to the National Conference of 
Jewish Teachers of Palestine at Tel-Aviv. In this address Buber does 
not negate technical knowledge and functions, that which helps children 
find their way in the world. But his prior goal is the education of 
character, of which the technical is only a part. Character education 
fosters the growth of the self as a unified whole in relation to the 
surrounding world. Character Is the connection between the child's 
given personality and the sequence of his actions and attitudes. 17
17Ibid., p. 87.
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Buber immediately cautions teachers to recognize the real limitations to 
what they can do to influence character— teachers gain humility by admit 
ting they are only one of the multiple life forces affecting the charac­
ter of their pupils. But at the same time they gain a sense of respon­
sibility in knowing it is only they who will to educate and that they 
represent to their pupils a selection of what should be.
For the most part, children come to school with an expectation 
they will be taught subject matter, and they tend to accept their role 
as learners of the various subjects, "even if not overmuch." But char­
acter education is mere problematic £ it is not easxly taught directly, 
and it is not a course of instruction in ethics. The teacher is advised 
by Buber to bear in mind that children tend to resist such methods to 
educate their characters.
I try to explain to ray pupils that envy is despicable, and at 
once I see the resistance of those who are poorer than their 
comrades. I try to explain that it is wicked to bully the 
weak, and at once I see a suppressed smile on the lips of the 
strong. I try to explain that lying destroys life, and some­
thing frightful happens: the worst habitual liar of the class 
produces a brilliant essay on the destructive power of lying.
I have made the fatal mistake of giving instruction in ethics, 
and what I said is accepted as current coin of knowledge; 
nothing of it is transformed into character-building sub­
stance.*®
Another difficulty is that teachers are resisted precisely by 
children of independent character, especially those who seriously 
struggle with the question of good and evil. Such children "rebel 
when one dictates to them, as though it were some long established 
truth, what is good and what is bad; they rebel just because they 
have experienced over and over again how hard it is to find the right *
*®Buber, Between Man and Man: "The Education of Character,"
p. 105.
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way." Nor is teaching by subterfuge the way to educate character, for 
here even if the child does not catch on to the teacher's motive, the 
teacher himself suffers a loss of the directness which is his important 
strength.
How, then, does the teacher influence character? Access to 
pupils is through their confidence.Teachers are humanly fallible, 
they cannot be perfect, but they must be "really there" for their 
pupils and must participate responsibly in their lives. Teachers can­
not, however, be continually concerned for pupils either in thought or 
action. The important point is that when a teacher "has gathered the 
child into his life, then that subterranean dialogue, that steady 
potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures. 
Then there is reality between them, there is mutuality." The child, 
lying with half-closed eyes in face of the lonely night, feels guarded 
and secure in the knowledge that his mother addresses him in a dialogue 
which never ceases. Children develop trust in the truth of existence 
because a nurturing human being exists for them: "Trust in the world 
because this human being exists— that is the most inward achievement 
in education."^
Buber depicts a situation in which a newly employed teacher 
begins with an attitude of trust in his pupils. The class is in chaos, 
it is "like the mirror of mankind, so multiform, so full of contradic­
tions, so inaccessible." The pupils are noisy troublemakers, they stare 
at him impudently, and the teacher’s first impulse is to rely on 19
19Ibid., p. 106.
^^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 98.
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compulsion by giving orders. Instead he thinks, "I have not sought them 
out; I have been put here and have to accept them as they are— but not 
as they now are in this moment, no, as they really are, as they can 
become." He reads on a child's face, which is not beautiful or partic­
ularly intelligent, the question: "Who are you? Do you know something 
that concerns me? Do you bring me something?" The teacher then 
addresses the face with an ordinary question: "What did you talk about 
last in geography? The Dead Sea? Well, what about the Dead Sea?" But 
the question is stated in a way that provokes a spontaneous answer 
filled with meaning, an account of the child's impression of the awe­
some Dead Sea during a visit to its shores, and the class becomes 
attentive.2*
Confidence is not won by laborious effort to win it. The alive- 
ness of the teacher radiates out to children, affecting them most deeply, 
when no thought is given to affecting them. Ultimately, it is not the 
educational intention but the meeting between teacher and child which 
is productive. Pupils sense that the teacher is trustable, does not 
want to "make a business" out of them, but takes part in their lives 
and accepts them before wanting to influence them. At this point of 
trust in the educator as a person, children learn to ask. The respon­
sibility of the teacher is not to dictate a code of ethics but to 
answer what is right and wrong in a particular situation. "A soul 
suffering from the contradictions of the world of human society, and 
of its own physical existence, approaches me with a question. By 
trying to answer it to the best of my knowledge and conscience I 21
112-13.
21Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," pp.
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help it to become a character that actively overcomes the contradic­
tions."
Given this attitude of teachers coward their pupils, the will 
to participate in their lives and the establishment of mutual trust, 
all communication can now become a medium for the education of char­
acter: "Lessons and games, a conversation about quarrels in the class 
or about the problems of a world war."22
Conflict
In an atmosphere of trust it is possible to engage pupils in 
open discussion, and out of this, sooner or later, conflict is bound 
to arise. Although the teacher must state his values forthrightly, 
he cannot count on total agreement, and must realize that conflicts 
are also educational if they take place in a wholesome atmosphere.
A class discussion concerning Jewish acts of reprisal against 
Arabs brought from a pupil the idea, It is a question of the profit 
of my people, past present, and future. The teacher asked, "But what 
was it that made those past generations of the Exile live? What made 
them outlive and overcome all their trials? Wasn't it that the cry 
'Thou shalt not' never faded from their hearts and ears?" The pupil 
cried out, "But what have we achieved that way. . . .  Do you call that 
life? We want to live!" Conflict of this kind seems to reach an 
impasse, since it involves more than opposition between two genera­
tions; it is one between a generation of faith in truth superior to 
man and a generation influenced by relativistic values. Buber 
believes, however, that conflict is the teacher's critical test. 2
22Ibid., p. 107.
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"But if he is the victor he has to help the vanquished to endure defeat 
and if he cannot conquer the self-willed soul that faces him (for vic­
tories over souls are not so easily won), then he has to find a word of 
love which alone can help to overcome so difficult a situation."23
Buber recalls that a friend, a master of conversation, once 
argued with another friend equally skilled "but given more to objective 
fairness than to the play of the intellect." For the first man the 
discussion became a "duel" of words, he "did not speak with his usual 
composure and strength, but he scintillated, he fought, he triumphed. 
The dialogue was destroyed."2^ The purpose of discussion for Buber is 
clearly not a monological talking past the other, an impersonal exer­
cise in dialectics. Communication is never a contest of wills.
The educator is not to rely on compulsion or propaganda. Com­
pulsion means "humiliation";its opposite is not unconditional freedom, 
but dialogue.23 Propaganda means "depersonalization" and "sublimated 
violence," but the very world of the educator is comprised of individ­
ual persons. The teacher depicted by Buber is patient, sees "every 
personal life as engaged in . . .  a process of actualization, and he 
knows from his own experience that the forces making for actualization 
are all the time involved in a microcosmic struggle with counter­
forces." The teacher does not wish to impose himself because he 
believes the actualizing forces to be "what is right established in 
a single and uniquely personal way," and is committed to help the
23ibid., pp. 108-109.
2^Buber, Knowledge of Man; "Elements of the Interhuman," pp.
87-88.
23Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," pp. 91-92.
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right to develop in that special form of the independent person. The
propagandist relies on special pressures, feverish and nervous. He
"does not really believe even in his own cause, for he does not trust
it to attain its effect of its own power without his special methods,
26whose symbols are the loudspeaker and the television advertisement."
In true dialogue, the teacher responds to the occasion, at times quite 
directly, and other times with a simple suggestion, or an analogy 
stated "without spinning it out and tying together the threads"— the 
pupil has the task of working over what has been said and supplying 
the missing parts.27
Teachers who face a conflict in values with their pupils, then, 
cannot rely on the imposition of their attitudes in order to overcome 
the difficulty. According to Buber, the denial of the absolute reflects 
a sickness with which the human race has been afflicted. Today "we are 
standing on the ruins of the edifice whose tower was raised by Kant."
It is self deceptive to believe that the disease can be cured by 
formulae which assert that "nothing is really as the sick person imag­
ines," to call out, "Look! the eternal values I"2**
Image of Character
Kerschensteiner's definition of character is "voluntary obedi­
ence to the maxims" and Dewey's the "interpenetration of good habits."
2^Buber, Knowledge of Han: "Elements of the Interhuman," p. 83.
27Martin Buber, Tales of the Basidim (New York: The Commentary 
Classics, 1958), p. 16.
28Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," pp. 110-
111.
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In Buber's conception, the teacher should indeed want for each child an 
acceptance of genuine norms and the formation of good habits. Discip­
line and order must be introduced, law has to be established, and the 
teacher can only hope that the law will be internalized in his pupils. 
But the teacher's real goal is what Buber calls "the great character" 
who responds to the challenge of what is unique in every situation, for 
whom such response means more than mere habitual obedience to fixed 
maxims, "since what is untypical in each situation remains unnoticed 
and unanswered." A great character is "one who by his actions and 
attitudes satisfies the claim of situations out of a deep readiness 
to respond with his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his 
actions and attitudes expresses at the same time the unity of his 
being in its willingness to accept responsibility."29 From this his 
active life and even the diversity of challenging situations become 
unified for him.
Although the teacher cannot hope for every pupil the becoming 
of a great character, insight into the "structure of the great charac­
ter" provides an image to bring before pupils in their formative years.
Conscience
What is open to each child is the possibility to "elevate" his 
conscience. This is a task for which teachers can provide guidance by 
directing the child to the distorted relationship with his own self, 
and to thereby enter into a personal relationship with the absolute.30 2930
29Ibid., p. 114.
30Ibid., pp. 110-11.
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In Buber's essay "Guilt and Guilt Feelings" directed to the 
therapist, he opposes the modern assertion of psychologists that no 
real guilt exists, only guilt feeling and neurotic illness from viola­
tions of social convention. Freud wished to "relativize guilt feeling 
genetically," that is, to deny the ontic, existential guilt which is 
more than one's individual conception of it and the mere violation of 
social taboos. The human being is for Buber "the being who is capable 
of becoming guilty and is capable of illuminating his guilt" which 
exists consciously when he himself overcomes his resistance to it.
People can set at a distance not only their world, but also them­
selves, as detached objects whom they can approve as well as censure.
According to Buber, there exist both groundless, neurotic guilt 
and existential guilt. The latter occurs "when someone injures an order 
of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of 
his own existence and all common existence," such as "betrayal of a 
friend, or of his cause." Feeling the pain of guilt, the conscience 
responds in a threefold action of self-illumination, perseverance, and 
reconciliation. Buber suggests that a step towards illumination was 
taken by Joseph K in Kafka's Trial when he admitted to himself, "I 
always wanted to snatch at the world with twenty hands, and not for 
a very laudable motive, either." In the fullness of such self­
illumination, one identifies and differentiates the person one was 
and the person one is intended to become. The personal, "dynamic" 
conscience perseveres in this self-identity. Whereas the neurotic 
conscience persists monologically in self-torment, the higher con­
science takes the path of reconciliation by helping the injured
jduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
victim to overcome the consequences of one’s action against him. This 
happens naturally out of a new disposition to serve the world construc­
tively.^
The injured may be out of reach, yet "the wounds of the order-of- 
being can be healed in infinitely many other places chan those at which 
they were inflicted."32 This illustrates Buber's statement, the Thou 
"comes to bring you out; if it does not reach you, meet you, then it 
vanishes; but it comes back in another form. . . . Between you and it 
there is mutual giving: you say Thou to it and give yourself to it."32
The task of the teacher is not to remove the pain of a guilty 
conscience suffering from the loss of personal responsibility. In fact, 
the teacher, through meeting, ought even to awaken the pain by eliciting 
values which he can make credible in their application to a given situa­
tion and which lead to the "real attitude," For a "generation which 
honors the mystery in all its forms will no longer be deserted by 
eternity."* 3 *^ But the teacher can do no more than help the child gain 
the courage to distinguish for himself between those of his past and 
future actions, those which should be approved and those which should 
be disapproved. The private sphere of the child, that of the relation 
between the child and God, is not his legitimate affair.-*5
3*-Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," pp.
121 ff.
32Ibid., p. 136.
33Buber, I and Thou, pp. 32-33.
3*Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," p. 117.
33Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," p. 134.
Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," p. 115.
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The child must gradually learn to decide for himself with his 
whole being what he will and will not do, must choose "the constructive 
forces of the world," or else he becomes "sterile in soul." How can 
the child be educated to the many unrepeatable and unpredictable situa­
tions which confront him? Four points address this question: 3uber 
acknowledges that people experience how hard it is to find the right 
way. Both human faith and human conscience can err, and both must 
place themselves in the hands of grace.^ Second, the teacher "can 
show that even the great character is not born perfect, that the unity 
of his being has first to mature before expressing itself in the 
sequence of his actions and attitudes."37 Third, the teacher is to 
help the pupil to experience widely and in depth by which the pupil 
gains insight into the truth of authentic e x i s t e n c e . A n d  finally, 
one always strives to draw the right "line of demarcation."
Simon asserts that Buber, often falsely labeled a "doctrinaire 
ideologist," clearly reveals in his line of demarcation concept an 
attitude of realism. This line is drawn time and again between the 
absolute command and its relative answerability, for which no fixed 
rule can guide one since each situation is unique. Simon states 
another dilemma related to the question of choice: How can "a modi­
cum of coordination between ethical and civic education . . .  be 
reached in the unredeemed world?" Buber's answer is that you cannot 
remain guiltless, but be resolved "never to do more wrong that you
3&Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," p. 105.
37Ibid., p. 116.
3®Buber, Pointing the Way: "Education and the World View,"
p. 104.
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must in order to live." Two examples from politics are considered, the 
first concerning revolution and the second governmental control: 
Revolutions cannot take place without violence. Buber does not dis­
approve of revolutions without exception, but he insists that those 
who think them necessary make a prior resolution "to go so far and no 
farther." The insurgents must include not only their own right of 
self preservation, but also the right of others. As to the need for 
centralized government, Buber assumes that "there necessarily never 
will be freedom so long as man is such as he is, and for that time 
there will always be a state, wkxch means compulsion. What xs demanded 
is this: from day to day there should be no more state than is indis­
pensable, and not less freedom than is admissable."39
C o m m u n ity
"Vital dissociation is the sickness of the peoples of our age," 
writes Buber. It exists alike in social groups characterized by indi­
vidualism and collectivism. Whereas individualism sees the human being 
only in relation to himself, collectivism sees only society. Community, 
the third alternative, is the "overcoming of otherness in living unity.
The type of individualism common to Western cultures tends "to 
understand the individual self . . .  as the self simply and as the abso­
lute. Despite all stress on the interest in the 'outer world* . . . 
what unmistably rules here is the tendency toward the primacy of the
3®Simon, "Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, p. 574.
^^Buber, Pointing the Way: "Education and the World View,"
p. 10 2.
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individual existence and toward its self-glorification."^ Collectivism 
glorifies the group, and it denies selfhood. It is identified with the 
"totalitarian countries" and with "the parties and the party-like groups 
in the so-called democracies." Passive allegiance to the collective and 
its values results from a fear in people of being left to depend on them­
selves "in this age of confusion."^”
The reader is referred to Buber's Paths in Utopia for his inten­
sive study of community, his religious socialism. Out of Buber's study 
of community, he concludes that the values underlying communal life, if 
they are to be transmitted, will first have to be reawakened in the new 
generations. The problem of regenerating man's spirit and redirecting 
human history is mainly a task of education.^ Community, as such, need 
not be "founded." In the family, school, office, or factory, wherever 
historical destiny brings a group of people together in a common fold, 
there is room for its growth.^ Moreover, an increase of the world's 
"community content" occurs through every comradely gesture in the 
gigantic apartment house and in the rationalized and bureaucratic 
institution.
Buber defines community in the most general sense as a connec­
tion of people,
who are so joined in their life with something apportioned to 
them in common or something which they have apportioned to
^Buber, Knowledge of Man: "What is Common to All," p. 97.
42guber, Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," p. 115.
^Ephraim Fischoff, "Introduction," in Paths in Utopia, by Martin 
Buber, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. xi.
^Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 135.
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themselves in common that they are, just thereby, joined with 
one another in their life. The first and second unity are 
not meant as continually actual, but as of such a nature that 
no essential hindrance stands in the way of its transition 
from time to time from a vital latency to an actuality.
Buber has been interpreted to mean that the immediacy of rela­
tion is founded upon the fact of community. Buber corrected this inter­
pretation: "Rather, in my view, it is the other way round: the commu­
nity is founded upon the immediacy of relation." To bring about a true 
transformation of society, human relations must undergo a c h a n g e . I n  
order to understand Buber's particular concept of community, one must 
know that he views as its core an atmosphere of mutuality between its 
members, and that such mutuality is made possible by their common, 
immediate relation to a "living Center." This is a spiritual Center, 
that which transcends immediate egoistic concerns. "It is not the 
periphery, the community, that comes first, but the radii, the common 
quality of relation with the Center. This alone guarantees the authen­
tic existence of c o m m u n i t y . F o r  Buber, even for those who believe 
themselves to be godless, the Center resides in a faith in that which 
is suprapersonal: There is meaning in creation, "there Is purpose to 
the human race, one we have not made up ourselves, or agreed to among 
ourselves.
Mutuality between community members rests not on a state of 
constant togetherness, but on a quality of openness. Number and *46
^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 20.
46Ibid., p. 68.
4?Buber, I and Thou, p. 115.
4®Martin Buber, Israel and the World (New York: Schocken Books, 
1948), p. 186.
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space are critical factors. Buber calls the Kibbutz of six or seven
hundred people a "social monster,"
Any place which threatens to become as large as this should 
be organized on the basis of smaller groups, interlocking 
with one another. Then the individual can feel a part of 
his group, within which he can discuss his problems without 
feeling lost in the efficient, smoothly run collective.
It is important also that enough space exists around a person so 
that his individuality may remain intact. If the density does not allow 
a community member "to look at his comrade, to have some perspective, he 
will not be able to acquire any relation to him. And then the fact that 
they follow the same cause will not be enough to avert a poverty of 
bonds."^®
Still, size and space are not the primary determinants of commu­
nity:
The question is rather one of openness. A real community need 
not consist of people who are perpetually together; but it 
must consist of people who, precisely because they are com­
rades, have mutual access to one another and are ready for one 
another. A real community is one which in every point of its 
being possesses, potentially at least, the whole character of 
community.*’®
Buber states an additional component: the thing in common, a 
shared cause and task around which communal relations take place. The 
living community thrives "where people have the real things of their 
common life in common; where they can experience, discuss and admin­
ister them together. . . To this end it is understood that each
each member can contribute, something uniquely important. Wherever 51
^®Hodes, Martin Buber, p. 199. 
^®Buber, Paths in Dtopia, p. 145.
51Ibid., p. 15.
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genuine human society has developed, it has always been on the basis of 
mutual "functional autonomy, mutual recognition, and mutual responsibil­
ity. . . . The individual human being, despite all the difficulties and 
conflicts, felt himself at home at once in the clan, felt himself 
approved and affirmed in his functional independence and responsibility."'52
Responsibility in communal life implies a hard, existential real­
ity, never a mere sentiment:
[Community is] a living form that wants to be shaped in the 
daily stuff of this earth. Community should not be made into 
a principle; it, too, should always satisfy a situation rather 
than an abstraction. The realization of community, like the 
realization of any idea, cannot occur once and for all time; 
always it must be the moment’s answer to the moment's ques­
tion, and nothing more. . . . Community is never a mere atti­
tude of mind, and if it is feeling it is an inner disposition 
that is felt. Community is the inner disposition or constitu­
tion of a life in common, which knows and embraces in itself 
hard "calculation," adverse "chance," the sudden access of 
"anxiety." It is community of tribulation and only because 
of that community of spirit; community of toil and only 
because of that community of salvation.53
Responsibility implies free decision. Community members must 
decide for themselves what they will and will not do; they must also 
have a say in the determination of the community to which they will 
belong.
Finally, the community so based has a committed leader who helps 
its members "hallow life" and from just this starting point to live as 
brothers and sisters with one another. ^
52Ibid., p. 131.
53ibid., p. 134.
S^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 68.
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Peer Relations and Mainstreaming
The regeneration of community is mainly the task of education, 
but there can be no learning apart from the doing. Buber warns against 
the severance of learning and deed, against "cutting off the propagation 
of values" from action, since one thereby fails to reflect on one’s pur­
pose, thus one's act may become the "very caricature" of what one set 
out to do. On the other hand, "It is bad to have teaching without the 
deed, worse when the teaching is one of action.
In an educational setting, therefore, the teaching and learning 
of communal values are inseparable from the living of the same values in 
that setting. Buber's pedagogy implies that education for community 
aims at both the near and the remote of one's world, at both present 
and future in its effect. The atmosphere of community evident among 
the performing choir of children cited earlier in this chapter was, 
for Buber, more important even than the integrity of their music which 
moved him so deeply. The description of his own class in a Polish 
school conveys a melancholic memory of the lack of real community:
The language of instruction and of social intercourse was 
Polish, but the atmosphere was that, now appearing almost 
unhistorical to us, which prevailed or seemed to prevail 
among the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire: mutual 
tolerance without mutual understanding. The pupils were 
for the largest part Poles, in addition to which there was 
a small Jewish minority. . . . Personally the pupils got 
on well with one another; but the two groups as such knew 
almost nothing about each other.56
55guber, Israel and the World, p. 14l.
S^Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of 
Martin Buber, p. 8 .
/
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In his old age, Buber was visited increasingly by young people 
who came to him for counsel. One such group was from Kibbutz Afikim. 
Pinchas, a teacher, brought up the fact that many immigrant children 
came to the kibbutz from various places and widely different back­
grounds, and some were from "problem1' homes. The other children under­
stood that these newcomers "had to be absorbed into the life of the 
kibbutz, but, practically speaking, the established kibbutzniks were 
not ready for this. It was very difficult to get them to accept the 
immigrant children." Buber called this rejection a display of "collec­
tive egoism." He fully realised how difficult it is to combat such an 
attitude, and suggested no attempt to force relationships. Neither 
did he recommend that teachers try to ignore the situation (to acknowl­
edge merely the ubiquity of pecking orders, it always goes hard for 
some). Rather, his answer to Pinchas was "experiment." He recommended 
as a first approach the way of explanation:
The way of explanation means telling them that what they are 
doing is detrimental to their way of life. You must explain 
this both at formal gatherings of the young people and in 
private conversation. You can prepare the ground and atmos­
phere for the group meetings through these private talks.
But it needs a certain knowledge of psychology.
Later a solidarity of the Kibbutz in support of the immigrant 
group may have to be built up to stand against those who would exclude 
them. "But I don't propose that you should follow this path at once.
I am, generally speaking, for experiments— for trying. . . .  I have no 
rigid principles. . . .  I act according to the situation.""’®
^Hodes, Martin Buber, p. 197. 
58Ibid.
xJuced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
Model of Openness
The power of personal example is emphasized as a means of influ­
ence:
You cannot come along suddenly and say, Now let us invent some 
values! But if in your class at school there are some children 
from families of new immigrants, and you treat them in your 
everyday contact with them as it is prescribed in the admoni­
tion, "Love your neighbor as yourself," then that will be a 
value, something definite and worthwhile.
The teacher should not talk about it in this light. But 
if, for example, you would . . . act in this way, then cer­
tainly something will come out of it.59
Of all teacher qualities, the ultimate and critical one for Buber 
is the teacher’s commitment to his pupils. He examines very carefully 
the meaning of this commitment. Without question, many teachers exhaust 
themselves in the work of giving to children, but for 3uber the real issue 
is the nature of the giving and whether it is selective or broadly encom­
passing. More than anyone, the true teacher practices and exemplifies 
welthaftes Wirken, the love of being. One rightly chooses one's spouse 
and close friend, but "the modern educator finds his pupil there before 
him."^° For the lover of being, "Good people and evil, wise and foolish, 
beautiful and ugly, become successively real to him; that is, set free 
they step forth in their singleness and confront him as Thou."^
Every group of children is a heterogeneous group, and every 
teacher is allotted the heterogeneous, randomly assembled. They are 
a confusing mix, "like the presence of the created universe; the glance 
of the educator accepts and receives them all." The typical teacher 59*
59Ibid., pp. 124-25.
6®Buber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 94.
^Buber, I and Thou, p. 15.
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faces the uncooperative, the slow, the deformed— the different. "Either 
[the teacher] takes on himself the tragedy of the person, and offers an 
unblemished daily sacrifice, or the fire enters his work and consumes 
it."62 634 The egoist educator is moved by what Buber calls "inclination," 
seeks to enjoy and dominate people— to manipulate them. "Education, 
the peculiar essence bearing this name, excludes precisely this desire."63 
In this sense, the teacher becomes an objective ascetic, but he is a 
paradoxical ascetic who rejoices in the world, or a realm of it for 
which he accepts responsibility for his influence but not his inter­
ference.
If the teacher divides children hierarchically according to indi­
vidual competencies, he is to act not out of the motive to enjoy a 
select group, but rather out of concern for children as learners.
Still, the teacher is to proceed with great caution and constantly 
re-examine his decision. Buber states the following:
If this educator should ever believe that for the sake of edu­
cation he has to practice selection and arrangement, then he 
will be guided by another criterion than that of inclination, 
however legitimate this may be in its own sphere; he will be 
guided by the recognition of values which is in his glance as 
an educator. But even then his selection remains suspended, 
under constant correction by the special humility of the edu­
cator for whom the life and particular being of all his pupils 
is the decisive factor to which his "hierarchic" recognition 
is subordinated. For in the manifold variety of the children 
the variety of creation is placed before him.64
Teachers, like doctors, clergy, and other members of the helping 
professions, must be regulated by a special objectivity, the reliable
62fiuber, Between Man and Man: "Education," p. 9 4.
63Ibid.
64Ibid., p. 95.
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counterpoint of giving and withholding oneself, both intimacy and dis­
tance. Such objectivity is not a calculated stance, but arises from 
the living tact of the spiritual person.
If this structure and its resistance are not respected then 
a dilettantism will prevail which claims to be aristocratic, 
though in reality it is unsteady and feverish; to provide it 
with sacred names and attitudes will not help it past its 
inevitable consequence of disintegration.65
How can the attitude of selectivity be transformed to an atti­
tude of openness? How can the teacher love indiscriminately the being 
of children? This attitude is made possible, Buber says, through the 
dialogical experience of inclusion, or making the other present, by 
which a common event is lived through from the standpoint of the other 
without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of one’s own activity. 
Inclusion is the very core of the teacher's relation to his pupil, but 
it is a one-sided relation, because the pupil does not experience the 
educating of the educator.
The conscious will to influence children creates a great paradox 
for the teacher; if the teacher tries to exercise this influence only 
from his idea of the pupil and excludes the pupil's own reality, at just 
that point his will to influence is impaired by arbitrariness. Buber 
refers to the accounts of Pestalozzi's teaching method to illustrate 
how easily arbitrary self-will can be mixed with will in even the 
noblest of teachers. Hence, from time to time the teacher must expe­
rience his own action anew from the other side: "It Is not enough for 
him to imagine the child's individuality, nor to experience him 
directly as a spiritual person and then to acknowledge him. Only 65
65Ibid.
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when he catches himself ’from over there,' and feels how it affects one, 
how it affects this other human being, does he recognize the real limit," 
change arbitrariness to true will, and renew his legitimacy.^
The teacher who practices inclusion experiences at once the ten­
sion of being limited by otherness and being bound to the other:
He feels from "over there" the acceptance and the rejection of 
what is approaching (that is, approaching from himself, the 
educator)— of course often in a fugitive mood or an uncertain 
feeling; but this discloses the real need and absence of need 
in the soul. . . .  In learning from time to time what this 
human being needs and does not need at the moment, the educa­
tor is led to an ever deeper recognition of what the human 
being needs in order to grow.
The growth needs of both child and teacher are revealed by inclu­
sion.
The educator is led to the recognition of what he . . .  is 
able and what he is unable to give of what is needed— and 
what he can give now, and what not yet. So the responsibil­
ity for this realm of life allotted and entrusted to him 
. . . points him to that which seems impossible, and yet 
is somehow granted to us— to self education.67
Theory of Knowledge
In the school community the common purpose and task is learning. 
The reason for learning is to know the truth. The absolute or ultimate 
truth is a single one, says Buber, but human relation to truth is a 
human truth, and human beings have no other truth. This ultimate truth 
is given to the human being, therefore, only as it enters, "reflected as 
in a prism," into his true life relations, in his participation in 
being.68 This means, first, that perfection realization of truth is
66ibid., p. 100. 67lbid., p. 101.
^Buber, Pointing the Way: "Goethe's Concept of Humanity,"
p. 79.
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not given to us. Second, human truth is bound up with personal respon­
sibility; the existential person is able to transcend both collective 
and individual judgments rooted merely in egoistic and utilitarian 
motivations. In order to do this, the existentialist, the one who 
wills for the truth, brings his grasp of absolute values into his 
everyday relations and "finds the truth to be true only when he stands 
the test."^
All human knowing of an object is through relation to that 
object. There are two ways of relating and knowing: the existential 
or personal, and the conceptual.'*® The first is I-Theu knowing end 
the second is I-It knowing. I-Thou knowing perceives the whole, imag­
ines the reality of the object through immediate, personal meeting with 
it from which the learner derives meaning. The meeting is always exclu­
sive to the knower and the known. I-It knowing is the detached objecti­
fication of that which has been made present. It is concerned with 
attributes, comparisons, and classifications, which can act either to 
enrich or obstruct the meaning discovered in I-Thou knowledge.
I-Thou Knowing
Earlier in the chapter reference was made to Buber's account of 
a teacher's first meeting with his pupils. The process of knowing 
began with a problem, the mutual contradiction of teacher and pupils 
whose perspectives were diametrically opposed. The teacher set the 
pupils at a distance allowing them to exist as they were; he accepted 
the very situation as it was sent to him. In so doing, the possibility
^Buber, Between Man and Man: "Question to the Single One," pp.
81-82.
^®Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Han and His Image Works," p. 163.
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was open to him to begin to know the concrete existence and the poten­
tiality of each individual. Then the teacher began to know one pupil 
directly as a Thou when he perceived and responded to the pupil's ques­
tion and thereby entered into dialogue, not to use but to meet him. 
Another example of I-Thou knowing is Buber's description of a drawing 
class (also cited earlier). The pupil perceived the trusted teacher's 
valuation of his freely produced sketch, experienced more fully the 
presence or active quality of the form, "was drawn to reverence for 
it," and responded to its possibility, to what it could actively 
b-coins through his ovn action* Hs Isamsd a selection of the con­
structive forces beyond the motivation of using or getting.
Ideas of reverence for the object and activity of the object 
(as opposed to detachment and passivity) are central to Buber's con­
cept of I-Thou knowing. For Buber, authentic art, science, philosophy, 
and all other authentic endeavors are indeed confirming and loving 
experiences. What one extracts and combines is only the passivity of 
things, but their activity reveals itself to the loving person who 
knows t h e m . in this connection, Buber refers to bibical Hebrew:
The decisive event for knowing is to embrace lovingly. It is "not 
that one looks at an object, but that one comes in touch with it."'
Alternation of I-Thou and I-It Knowing
"Every essential knowledge is in its origin contact with, an 
existing being and in its completion possession of an enduring con­
cept." This means that in lived life the two aspects of relation,
^Buber, Pointing the Way: "With a Monist," p. 29.
72guber, Good and Evil, p. 56.
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I-Thou and I-It, alternate with one another "cooperatively" in knowledge 
attainment. Applied to interhuman relation, one moment a person is over 
against another, sees him present, and relates to him exclusively as 
such. "In the other moment he sees everything else collected around him 
and from time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, and uses. 
Both these moments are included in the dynamic of lived life." Thinking 
has dialogical moments alongside of monological ones. The concept, or 
the It, of reason originates "ever anew from the fulguration of the Thou 
relationship that still affords no objective knowledge. Now the trans- 
position into the structured order of It takes place. . . .
In science a person and what he stands over against is only 
presence, the contact of the unique with the unique. What an "original" 
investigator "finds" he discovers precisely in these I-Thou contacts, 
for instance, when the intention of the author of a text shines forth 
to the genuine philologist. Certainly, the scientist must step back 
and detach himself from the concrete meeting "in order to gain general 
insights or even exact formulae, but at the beginning of the way he is 
ever again led by the genius of meetings until it can deliver him to 
the reliable spirit of objectification."^
Teachers necessarily carry with them a store of conceptual 
knowledge which bears upon the real meeting with their pupils. They 
also derive from the meeting new concepts influential of future personal 
contacts during the on-going teaching and learning process. Similarly, 
children prior and subsequent to contact with their art form, abstract
^-*Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin 
Buber, p. 692.
^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 40.
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certain general principles continually refined which bear upon this and 
other meetings with the Thou of their art.
The It of reason helps the human being to know with greater pre­
cision, to "get to the bottom," by setting right an error in his sense 
perception. But, in Buber's view, reason "cannot replace the smallest 
perception of something particular and unique with its gigantic struc­
ture of general concepts, cannot by means of it contend in the grasping 
of what here and now confronts me."* 7"*
Sharing of Knowledge
In the mode of group life between people in mutual communication,
the unique person attains what Buber calls the "We." We show one another
what exists, describe for one another, and each, supplementing the other,
helps him to have a "world-shape, a world."
Speech {spoken or silent] in its ontological sense was at all 
times present wherever men regarded one another in the mutual­
ity of I and Thou; wherever one showed the other something in 
the world In such a way that from then on he began really to 
perceive it; wherever one gave another a sign in such a way 
that he could recognize the designated situation as he had 
not been able to before; wherever one communicated to the 
other his own experience in such a way that it penetrated 
the other's circle of experience and supplemented it as from 
within, so that from now on his perceptions were set within 
a world as they had not been before. All this flowing ever 
again into a great stream of reciprocal sharing of knowledge—  
thus came to be and thus is the living We . . . which, where 
it fulfills itself, embraces the dead who once took part in 
it through what they have handed down to posterity.7°
7^Buber, "Responsa," Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 53-54.
7^Buber, Knowledge of Han; "What is Common to All," p. 106.
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CHAPTER V
MUTUALITY AND EDUCATIONAL MAINSTREAMING
In the beginning of this study it was posited that the needs of 
handicapped pupils are best satisfied in the setting where an atmosphere 
of mutuality already exists, that mutuality is a necessary condition of 
true mainstreaming. The purpose now is to see why it is a condition by 
applying Martin Buber’s particular concept of mutuality. An attempt 
will be made to do this in the following pages, which summarize and 
develop several Buberian ideas of mutuality related to the child as 
participant, the teacher as participant, peer relations, and ethics 
and knowledge.
The "teacher" referred to is in all cases the one into whose 
class the handicapped child is mainstreamed. In team teaching which 
combines, say, a regular and a special education teacher, the two, 
like parents, share responsibility for a heterogeneous group of chil­
dren ever dividing the merging according to individual involvements 
and needs. Each teacher has something unique to contribute, yet the 
roles of each so overlap that no major obstacle stands in the way of 
the pupil’o contact with other pupils and with the main thrust of the 
teaching and learning endeavor.
121
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The Child as Participant in the Mainstream Class
1. Mainstreaming depends upon the teacher's valuation of what 
children can become. Mutuality implies that each child in a learning 
community is valued as a potentially active participant of that commu­
nity. This requires a wholistic view of uniqueness.
Buber's educational convictions derive not from a fixed norma­
tive content or educational strategy, but from his anthropology which 
asks, What does it mean to be a unique person? Two aspects are treated. 
First, he recognizes humanity as unique among the categories in nature, 
and second, he recognizes the fact of uniqueness within the human cate­
gory.
What is unique to the human category is the distinctive way in 
which its members relate to their world: they are given a spiritual 
power which struggles to comprehend and give order to the world through 
bodily participation in it. Spirit is not to Buber an ethereal or 
ghost-like quality. It is manifested by people in the earthly, every­
day communication of mutuality and dialogue, as much as can be realized 
in the little bit of territory to which they owe their attention. This 
power conquers the confusing disorder and gives form to things in pic­
ture, sound, and idea. Through human association it gives form to com­
munity.^ It is concluded that mainstreaming, as any educational endeavor, 
requires that teachers proceed from the realization that all people with­
out exception, all children, are endowed with a strong and active
^Buber, Between Man and Man: "What is Man?", pp. 197-98.
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spiritual force: each wants to participate in the becoming of things 
and wants to become whole by way of the mutual giving and receiving 
between the I and the Thou. Each child regardless of functional limi­
tation is positively determined and defined in this way.
The single goal of participation is reached in multiple ways 
according to the uniqueness of individuals. On perceiving a given 
child, the teacher recognizes its distance or "oppositeness" as a 
self with a separate identity, and this sets the stage for relation 
to the child as either a Thou or an It. I-Thou synthesizes, sees the 
child In Its wholeness as Irreducible to attributes. If is true tha*. 
within this wholeness there are qualities that limit and qualities 
that free one's participation. For example, the child may enter the 
classroom as highly dependent, recalcitrant, deaf, or slow to read, 
and such limitation is a real phenomenon not to be ignored, but dealt 
with. It is seen, however, as an aspect of the child's entire being 
whose nature it is to strive for unified growth in the way particular 
to it.
I-Thou is the opposite of the radical I-It knowing which con­
sistently defines people by their limitations. I-Thou knowing imagines 
the other's wholeness as being and becoming. I-It knowing reduces the 
other to an object— pulls out from it a single attribute, categorizes, 
compares, and assigns a fixed label generalized to the whole. The 
labeled part may not refer to an impairment at all. Sex, age, height, 
and skin color are examples of such attributes, just as are intellec­
tual giftedness, nationality, and religious affiliation.
Gordon Allport's wholistic view of uniqueness corresponds with 
Buber's. Allport notes that people think naturally with the aid of
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categories. A label "cuts slices, abstracts from a concrete reality 
some one feature only with respect to this one feature. The very act 
of classifying forces us to overlook all other features, many of which 
might offer a sounder basis than the rubric we select." Some labels 
are exceedingly salient and powerful. Labels which refer to some 
highly visible feature are of this type, for example, black, Oriental, 
as are labels which point to an outstanding incapacity— feebleminded, 
cripple, blind person. They are labels of primary potency. "These 
labels act like shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discrim­
inations which we might otherwise perceive." Even though the blind­
ness of one person and the darkness of pigmentation of another "may 
be defining attributes for some purposes, they are irrelevant and 
'noisy' for others." Only one’s proper name can refer to the whole 
of one's nature. "Thus each label we use, especially those of primary 
potency, distracts our attention from concrete reality. The living, 
breathing, complex individual— the ultimate unit of human nature— is 
lost to sight."
This partial way of perceiving, belonging to the sphere of the 
I-It, shuts out the ineffable Thou in its complexity and unity, and its 
power to participate in the world.
2. Mainstreaming presupposes the teacher's understanding of the 
meaning of prejudice and its effects.
When the I-It perception is fixed and enduring, it becomes a con­
cept which may take the form of prejudice. Prejudice is an inflexible
^Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Double­
day Anchor Books, 1958), pp. 175-76.
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attitudinal favorableness or unfavorableness which accompanies a prior 
and unsupported value judgment. Allport identifies gross overgeneral­
ization and denigration as the two basic ingredients of negative prej-
3udice. His investigation suggests that prejudice at times stems from
conformity to folkways, but that ouch of it is also fashioned and sus-
tained by self-gratifying considerations. In either case, the reality
of the unique other is unknown, relation is partial and instrumental.
The other is merely observed as an object, which in turn sets the stage
for the possibility of control and exploitation, Wolfensberger points
out that many societies have condoned the destruction of people viewed
only in terms of a weakness, inadequacy, or handicap. As a more humane
alternative to destruction, the different person can be segregated from
the mainstream of society and placed at its periphery:
We have numerous examples of this: we segregate the Indian in 
reservations, and the Negro in the ghetto; the aged are con­
gregated in special homes, ostensibly for their own good, and 
these homes are often located at the periphery of, or remote 
from, population centers; the emotionally disturbed and the 
retarded are commonly placed in institutions far in the 
countryside; and we have (or have had) "dying rooms" in our 
hospitals to save us the unpleasantness of ultimate deviancy.
However, the I-It perception may be only a transitory occurrence. 
Allport notes a natural fear In infants of the strange. It takes several 
minutes, perhaps several hours, for Infants to "warm up" to the stranger. 
They may show initial fear if the stranger wears eye-glasses, or if the
3Ibid., p. 32.
^Ibid., p. 12.
3Wolf Wolfensberger, Normalization: The Principles of Normaliza­
tion in Human Services (Toronto: National Institute on Mental Retarda­
tion, 1972), p. 24.
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stranger's expressive movements are unfamiliar.^ Even handicapped 
people have acknowledged, in common with other adults, at least momen­
tary distraction and anxiety at times on sudden first encounter with 
persons with noticeable handicaps. Such temporary reaction to the 
unexpected and the different does not constitute prejudice.
The separation of human groups is often the result of what 
Allport calls an "automatic cohesion," which also has nothing to do 
with prejudice. That human groups tend to stay apart is at times 
explained by the principles of ease, least effort, congeniality, or 
pride in one's culture. Ke points out, however, that once this sepa­
ration exists the ground is laid for all sorts of psychological elab­
oration. "People who stay apart have few channels of communication. 
They easily exaggerate the difference between groups, and readily mis­
understand the grounds for it. And, perhaps most important of all, 
the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of Interest, as well 
as many imaginary conflicts."^ The lack of communication even among 
people who exist together in space is for both Allport and Buber a 
primary concern, and it is central to the problem of mainstreaming.
The literature contains extensive documentation of the ways in 
which exaggerated difference takes the form of false role generaliza­
tion. Wolfensberger's historical review describes certain roles thrust 
on people, roles which show a remarkable transcendence of time, place 
and culture, and most of which reflect clear-cut prejudice. His 
description of these roles include those of the person as subhuman
^Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, p. 286.
^Ibid., p. 18.
iduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12?
organism (e.g., animal, vegetable, changeling), as menace, as unspeak­
able object of dread, as object of ridicule, as diseased organism, as 
object of pity, as eternal child, and as holy innocent.
Some corollaries of the subhuman conceptualization are" attri­
tion of animal-like qualities or even skills; belittling of the learn­
ing capacity; abrogation of a sense of esthetics; need for extraordinary 
controls . . . abrogation of human emotions, sensibilities, shame. . . .
Buber has noted that solicitude does not necessarily set a per­
son’s life in direct relation with the life of another, but may only 
imply one person’s solicitous help in relation with the other's lack 
and need of it. In a similar vein, Wolfensberger writes that the object 
of pity attitude is usually benevolent, but it may be devoid of respect. 
The "sour humanists," for example, might even look upon the recipient of 
services as entitled to basic assistance and sustenance but not as 
entitled to the "luxuries, frills, or extras" which others enjoy. The 
holy innocent generalization is well disposed, yet it Implies a reverse 
form of dehumanization by elevating a human being almost above the human 
level. Wolfensberger acknowledges the reality of certain child-like 
traits which may exist in retarded persons without implying that such 
persons are either holy in an exclusive sense or eternal children.
The segregative effects of the generalizations Wolfensberger 
describes are more or less apparent. One of the least obvious and 
clear-cut is the impression of the handicapped as diseased.
To Wolfensberger, "the disease model can be expressed in two 
variants, one of these embodying the best tradition of medical service
^Wolfensberger, Normalization, p. 18.
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to fellow humans, and the other one being concerned with health but not 
with human values. The latter can be likened to veterinary medicine, 
and is particularly apt to be encountered in residential institutions."® 
He notes, too, that there often exists a pessimistic preoccupation with 
the issue of curability versus incurability. When this preoccupation 
occurs in education it constitutes a major deterrent to mainstreaming.
3. The view of the child as defective leads naturally to an 
exaggerated effort to remediate.
Literature indicates the mainstreaming trend in its present stage 
is largely a one-sided effort to change the handicapped through remedial 
instruction. There is less evidence suggesting a substantial coinciding 
effort to make the structure of the regular class conducive to their 
inclusion.
Education obviously implies for the pupil a continuing process of 
change, but in the relation of I-lt, the self may try to change the 
essential state of the other, to deprive it of its distance and inde­
pendence. In this connection, Aimd Labreghre, adviser of the French 
Ministry of Education, hypothesizes a universal trend toward a focus 
on defect and on remediation of the handicapped (the pupil is above all 
defective, sick, deficient), which occurs with the advent of the right 
to equality of educational opportunity. Labregfere suggests this to be 
a historical stage tending to follow the stage of compulsory education 
and preceding the stage of true integration (mainstreaming). Education 
is competitive and selective. The competition is based on a norm which 9
9Ibid., p. 23.
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the pupil is supposed to reach by means of "vigorous action on his 
defect." Such an approach implies that equality of opportunity requires 
inequality in the measures taken for the benefit of those disadvantaged 
by their handicap. It contains "the seeds of an unlimited notion of 
handicap." Moreover, "based on comparison with a norm which is after 
all variable, it encourages for the purpose of effectively applying 
large-scale remedial measures, the setting apart of the handicapped."
The "segregative aspects, both direct and indirect," are thus sug­
gested.*^
A related factor in segregation is the misuse of assessments.
In order to identify the nature of the deficiency to be remedied, spe­
cial education theorists tend to recommend the use of scientifically 
validated tests and systematic observations conducted by classroom 
teachers and by specialists. They suggest also the use of information 
available in pupil files which contain educational-medical histories, 
and they recommend direct communication between teacher and special­
ists about the child. Some information so derived helps in important 
ways to provide for the child's education and general well being, and 
some is clearly crucial— evidence of hearing or visual loss, for exam­
ple, resulting in corrective medical prescription or modification of 
teaching to accommodate the difficulty. Task analysis tailored to 
individual ability can provide a structure by which retarded persons 
are helped to acquire important life skills.
*®Aime Labregere, "Conclusions," in Case Studies in Special 
Education: Cuba, Japan, Kenya, Sweden, by Unesco (Paris: Unesco 
Press, 1974), pp. 175-76.
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Buber would endorse scientific assessments whenever they open
the world more fully to children. Yet he would never equate them with
real knowing, since they lack immediacy and see the person not as a
whole, but in selected parts and functions. Exclusive reliance on
this method corresponds precisely to his idea of objectification.
Scientific method, in fact, is man’s most highly perfected 
development of the I-It, or subject-object, way of knowing.
Its methods of abstracting from the concrete actuality and 
of largely negating the inevitable difference between 
observers reduce the I in so far as possible to the abstract 
knowing subject and the It in so far as possible to the pas­
sive and abstract object of thought. Just for these reasons 
scientific method is not qualified to discover the wholeness 
of mar..**
Buber would also want communication between colleagues on behalf 
of children, but he would ask if anyone is communicating with, not only 
about, the pupil in question.
For Buber, real knowing means becoming aware of the signs of 
address in a living relationship. Peter Schrag and Diane Dvoky censure 
the "proliferating of categories" assigned to children in the schools; 
the system may define all sorts of things and may attach all sorts of 
names, yet too often the issue is conformity, not "a child's silent 
a g o n y . N i c h o l a s  Hobbs asserts that intervention "should be focused 
on reducing disturbance within the system as a whole, not just on doing 
something to the child.
^Friedman, "Introductory Essay," in Knowledge of Man, pp. 19-20.
^Peter Schrag and Diane Dvoky, The Myth of the Hyperactive Child 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 24, 117.
^Nicholas Hobbs, The Futures of Children (San Francisco: Jossey- 
Bass, 1975), p. 236.
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Education does require the recognition of functional handicaps 
and interventions which help children to overcome those handicaps.
Thus Annie Sullivan's "remediation" of Helen Keller was effective and 
legitimate. In Conrad Aiken’s Silent Snow, Secret Snow, Paul's pro­
gressive withdrawing behavior was a summons to the serious attention 
of adults before his breakdown occurred.^
Buber would endorse only those interventions which help the 
child's becoming as a person, never the imposition of narrowly fixed 
norms. According to Buber, there is not and never has been a fixed 
educational norm, only norms of different eras and societies to which 
education has complied. He attributes to modern culture a dissolution 
of spirituality and a "pantechnical mania," with its emphasis on mate­
rial welfare and the instant mastery of every situation,^ an emphasis 
particularly unsuited to the handicapped and mainstreaming. Robert 
Heiny notes a focus in special education on "code breaking" associated 
with the mechanics of reading.^ In reaction to the technical, a few 
educators choose the arts as the logical alternative, but this too can 
be rigidly applied— children viewed as uncreative in the arts, if the 
defect model were operative, would like their slow-reading counterparts 
become the focus of undue analysis and remediation. 10
■^Conrad Aiken, "Silent Snow, Secret Snow," In Two and Twenty:
A Collection of Short Stories, by Ralph H. Singleton (Hew York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1962), pp. 170-90.
15Buber, Between Man and Man: "Dialogue," p. 39.
■^Robert w. Heiny, "Renaissance or Retreat for Special Educa­
tors: Issues to Explore before 1984," Journal of Special Education
10 (Winter 1976): 420.
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Whatever the norm may be, if it dominates the child’s will to 
take part authentically, remediation assumes an exaggerated importance. 
It is taken alone, for its own sake, instead of both an end and a means 
to participation. This in turn creates a conception of the child as 
powerless appendage ever remediated through supplementary activity, not 
a genuine member of the group in mutual relation with teacher and peers. 
Mainstreaming means relation which encourages the whole child’s shared 
participation in the life of the school. The view of the child as 
defective relates primarily to some handicapping feature whether real 
ozr net, it thereby obstructs perticipstiou. £bi& very life of
the school is rooted in the reality of its pupils whose human need is 
to be educated in and for community. As Buber writes, education is to 
engage children "in fruitful intercourse with the world." The conven­
tional education "sets factory-made human goods, all stamped alike," 
in place of the free sons and daughters of a free nation.*
The Teacher as Participant in the Mainstream Class
1. Genuine mainstreaming requires that teachers recognize their 
own power to participate responsibly in the lives of children. Teacher 
participation is characterized by a confirming attitude, the root of 
mutual trust and confidence between teacher and pupil.
Of the professions, Buber holds teaching in high esteem. In 
fact, he calls the effective teacher "a representative of the true God."
^Martin Buber, Israel and the World: "On National Education" 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1948), p. 155.
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The notable quality of genuine teachers, he believes, is their capacity 
to love pupils in a way that is ascetic, since their love and nurturance 
are given freely to the more problematic, as well as to children who are 
mentally and physically able, to those who cooperate and in general 
create no special difficulty for the teacher. An attitude of mutuality 
which includes the presence of the other is meant, not only a feeling. 
This attitude resists Che strictly normative and the competitive in 
favor of what is uniquely possible to the individual. The teacher 
"must really mean him as the definite person he is in his potential­
ity and his actuality.
It does not follow from Buber's idea of the teacher as ascetic 
that a given teacher's ability to educate extends to every child, 
regardless of the child's nature and regardless of the availability 
of resources, but it means that each pupil met in the course of edu­
cating is approached by the teacher as a unique Thou in full equality 
with his classmates. What matters is an attitude of wanting to be 
accessible to pupils. The immediate inclination of the teacher ia not 
to remove the different child, nor to describe and relate primarily to 
some handicapping feature. The genuine teacher is disposed to confirm 
and educate, rather than cater to a select group who are enjoyed in 
the manner of "dilettantism."
The insecurity felt by young newcomers to school is pronounced 
in a good many handicapped children. Their feelings derive from a past 
filled with I-It relationships; they have been treated as objects of 
pity and ridicule, as holy innocents, as diseased, and so on. If
^•®Buber, I and Thou, p. 132.
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Buber's humanistic philosophy is applied, handicapped children in main­
stream education experience neither rejection nor grudging tolerance, 
not even pity, but an openness to their presence and a confirmation of 
their being. Out of that, a mutual confidence and trust grows between 
teacher and child— the presupposition of educating and mainstreaming. 
Mutuality is a presupposition— much depends on the teacher's awakening 
the I-Thou relationship in the pupil, too, who means and confirms the 
teacher as this unique person. *
2. The teacher participates also through becoming involved with 
curriculum. In mainstreaming the choice and the mediation of curriculum 
rests predominantly with the teacher.
Buber places tremendous responsibility on teachers who are 
charged with the task of choosing and mediating the constructive forces 
of the world which children need for their education. Auxiliary help 
and advice from other professional workers are in no way negated, are 
crucial to renewing and strengthening the work of the teacher, but the 
fundamental responsibility for pupils does not rest with them. Nor 
does the scientifically designed program prove adequate without the 
critical evaluation by the teacher of what it holds for the individual 
child's striving for participation. The teacher is also unique. 
Authentic educating is possible when suited to the character and con­
viction of the individual teacher. In Buber’s pedagogy, then, teachers 
are the primary active agents in the education of their pupils. Ulti­
mately, they find they must rely on their own resources.
19lbid.
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This point is of great significance for mainstreaming: One can 
choose and mediate for a wide diversity of learners first and foremost 
by knowing them, and one knows by means of the direct, on-going dialogue 
with children which teachers are in a position to initiate. Thus the 
chooser and mediator are one and the same. Second, teachers must dia­
logue directly with the Thou of content, must themselves become learners 
in order that they may educate. While the choosing and mediating task is 
difficult, teaching is made creative by it; the teaching profession 
thereby comes of age in fuller maturity.
3. The teacher's unselective participation in the lives of chil­
dren, confirming, choosing, and mediating for them, is made possible by 
an inclusive dialogue.
In direct meeting, teachers turn to their pupils and patiently 
wait for a look, a question, a word of affirmation or rejection, and 
thereby experience the act of teaching from both sides, the pupils' as 
well as their own. The values to which teachers are committed are 
shared, not through good selling technique or psychological manipula­
tion; values are communicated openly, yet they are conditioned by the 
pupil's particular standpoint.
Awareness of the other side discloses to teachers what effects 
their actions have on the individual child with whom communication seems 
very difficult, reveals the educational needs of both teacher and child. 
Although the use of scientific assessments at times conveys special 
needs, this method can never replace, only supplement, what teachers 
learn from cumulative contacts in the dynamic situation of teaching and 
learning. In this context there is possibility for an ever deepening
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awareness of the unique, many faceted, and unified personality of the 
child.
Only confirmation and trust can be mutual between teacher and 
pupil, Buber believes; in the teacher-pupil relation, experiencing the 
other side cannot be mutual. If the pupil were to become aware of the 
other side, the educative situation would be destroyed, or it would 
change into friendship. This point seems to contradict Buber's prin­
ciple of personal example. At times pupils probably do experience some 
of the educative event from the teacher's standpoint as well as their 
own— the teacher's selection of the effective and the motives and feel­
ings which determine the selection, as well as the effects their actions 
have on teachers. When this happens, does it necessarily follow that 
the educative relation ends or changes into friendship? It is clear, 
however, that pupils cannot really reciprocate the teacher's level of 
awareness and responsible involvement in their person and life, cud 
that the teacher is not sent there to expect that of them, nor to win 
their friendship. Here the counterpoint of intimacy and distance, sub­
jectivity and objectivity, applies.
Education, like the relation between therapist and patient, Is 
possible only to the person who lives in confrontation with the other, 
and yet is detached.20 This objective attitude helps the meeting, even 
with those children disposed to rebel against their teacher and peers, 
or to withdraw from relating to them in any way.
20Ibid., p. 133.
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Peer Relations and Mainstreaming
1. The goal of mainstreaming is education for character and 
community.
Handicapped pupils in ordinary class attendance often find them­
selves isolated from their class peers and the real activity of the 
school. It is readily concluded that such isolation is harmful to the 
learning and personhood of all pupils, not alone the handicapped. This 
is supported by Buber's concept of community built on the mutual I-Thou 
relation.
The primary goal of education, the growth of character, is iden­
tical to the goal of mainstreaming. Genuine education of character is 
education for community. Since education is a merger of learning and 
doing, communal ideals are learned both in reflecting about them and in 
the here and now of one's active life. Therefore a major educational 
task is to create an atmosphere of mutuality between members of the 
mainstream class, to foster in pupils an awareness of their peers and 
an attitude of responsibility toward them.
2. Mainstreaming exposes children to lives different from their 
own, but it also guides them to an awareness of their peers as persons 
through direct relation which involves the selves intersubjectively.
If a child never really confronts a handicapped peer enrolled in 
the same class because the educational structure sets them apart, both 
children are thereby disadvantaged— that is, the school insulates them 
from participation in the differentiated world as it exists around them.
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Most important, a potential friendship is denied them. The ethos of 
mainstreaming is the right of handicapped persons, once all the demands 
which provide them the medical treatment and education required by their
condition have been met, to experience to the extent of their capacities
21the fullness of education to which all citizens are entitled. It is
also the right of all children not to be educated in environments made
sterile of difference through the rigid division of groups. As Buber
says, the teacher is to guide children into genuine contact with the
reality accessible to them, by which both the I and the Thou establish
22their personality reality.
Children need to perceive and confirm one another as the persons 
they are by means of genuine meetings. A relation is complete when the 
partner knows he is confirmed, and "when this knowledge induces the 
process of his inmost self becoming."22 This is the process which takes 
place in a disabled child who is seen as a whole person and no longer 
reduced in the mind of his peer to his impairment and the wheelchair in 
which he sits. The child is accepted simply for his presence: "Secretly 
and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can 
come to him only from one human person to a n o t h e r . A t  the same time, 
the image of the subhuman or object of pity is replaced by an image of 
what is possible, the possibility to be a friend and to achieve in common 
with all people, yet in a way which is somehow particular to that child.
^•Labregfere, "Conclusions," in Case Studies, p. 177.
22Buber, I and Thou, p. 63; "Responsa," in Philosophical Inter­
rogations , p. 63.
22Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Distance and Relation," p. 71.
24Ibid.
educed with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
Seeing the other as a whole person with potentiality is not to 
deny the existence of a handicap or to apply a euphemism. "There is 
nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in order to see, 
and no knowledge that I would have to forget." Inclusion or experienc­
ing the other side, the full development of awareness, brings a realiza­
tion "from over there" how it is at this moment to suffer a disability—  
perhaps it is being immobile while others move freely, or being unable 
for some reason to communicate oneself— and the stigma which might 
accompany it. Buber Insists that a person experiences the other side 
in this way through direct relation which involves the selves inter- 
subjectively, when one does not remain an untouched observer of what 
addresses one.
By being there with one’s whole being in response to the "claim 
of the everyday" there grows in one's "thought and recollection the 
knowledge of human wholeness."25 26 Buber's own understanding reached a 
high point during the First World War when he imagined the wounds and 
the killing. "I was compelled . . .  to live it. Things which went on 
just at this moment. . . . "  In 1919 Buber's friend Gustav Landauer was 
killed by anti-revolutionary soldiers in a barbaric way, and again, "I 
was compelled to imagine just this killing, but not in an optical way 
alone . . . just with my body."
3. The child's involvement in relation, the source of character 
development, also educates to responsibility.
25Buber, Between Man and Man: "What is Man?", pp. 124-126.
26Buber, Knowledge of Man: "Dialogue Between Martin Buber and 
Carl Rogers," p. 168.
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Here the child confronts himself with the question, What does my 
partner's special quality or experience imply for me? The response to 
this question expresses the child's true creativity, a creativity never 
limited to the poet and the painter, nor to the intellectually gifted. 
According to Buber, all people are endowed with the creative power which 
has "scattered itself." Furthermore, the Thou of one's creative 
response can be met in anything, animate or inanimate, which addresses 
one. "The Baal-Shem teaches that no encounter with a being or a thing 
in the course of our life lacks a hidden significance."27
But community, the creative "sharing in an undertaking and enter­
ing into mutuality" with the human Thou is of greatest importance to the 
child. Community educates, and it provides a deep sense of belonging. 
Contact with nature and with books and machines, however much they con­
tribute, can never replace the mutuality of giving form and being formed 
which take place in direct relation with another human being. The feral 
child deprived of human association and brought up by the wolves, Buber 
points out, has a human body and a human brain, but it is not fully 
human. It lacks that distance from other selves necessary for its 
entering into mutual relation with a Thou and becoming an I.
Buber's view calls into question the validity of those forms of 
education in which children are brought together in space, yet remain 
spiritually isolated from one another. Buber would question any practice 
which obstructs mutual giving between children, and even one which fails 
to promote it. An education aimed only at individual achievement prepares
27Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 173.
2®Friedman, Life of Dialogue, p. 164.
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"a new human solitariness which would be the most painful of all." 
Participation in the learning community fulfills a real present need, 
and it prepares for participation in the broader community.
To a small boy just brought to a mainstream class from special 
placement, a musical recorder was a weapon for striking other class 
members who could play that instrument. Children reacted with fear, 
there were retaliations, until one of them, led by her teacher, answered 
the boy's secret wish to learn the recorder. This girl's response— her 
opposition and reconciliation, help and encouragement, her "being 
there"— was the first in a series of relationships which engaged the 
newcomer in mutually rewarding interaction and collaboration with his 
peers, and provided him an enduring sense of identity with the learn­
ing community to which he belonged. Urie Bronfenbrenner writes, "The 
most needed innovation in the American classroom is the involvement of 
pupils in responsible tasks on behalf of others. Opportunities for 
experimentation are l e g i o n . B u b e r  would endorse such involvement, 
not as a duty but as an expression of the child's Thou saying or a 
real turning to the address of the other. Without this turning, a 
person may fulfill many "moral duties," may in addition meet the 
intellectual challenges of poetry and calculus and the theories of 
ethics and democracy, yet still suffer an educational impoverishment.
4. Handicapped pupils are to be viewed not only as recipients 
of help, they are potential contributors.
2%rie Bronf enbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 157.
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The handicapped clearly contribute because they embody and exem­
plify the nobility of the human spirit in the face of a difficult 
obstacle to be overcome. But it must be particularly stressed that each 
can offer personal insights and talents which want expression and have 
nothing to do with disability, although insights are often deepened by 
it. In one school a cerebral palsied girl, severely restricted physi­
cally but skilled in language, helped her teacher who cultivated in 
pupils their written expression of the many things they wanted to tell. 
In the same school a disturbed boy became a proficient reader to younger 
children in their kindergarten. And a boy with Down’s Syndrome told his 
friend, an outstanding scholastic achiever, that it is wrong to steal 
from lockers. Endless possibilities become apparent once the equality 
of children is discovered— that is, each is of unique value, and the 
purpose of education is to "unearth” the "treasure" of possibility, to 
help pupils authenticate and individuate themselves by becoming what 
each can become.^
In the true mainstream community, children are needed, feel 
needed, take responsibility. Although a given class member may be 
highly dependent in a number of ways requiring something in excess of 
the usual, the goal is the same as for all others: a gradual shift 
of responsibility from teacher to child according to his individual 
capacity. The mainstream community corresponds with Buber's concept 
of community, which is formed on the basis of growing personal inde­
pendence with each person a vehicle of a different function, and
^®Buber, Between Han and Han: "Education," p. 84.
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mutual responsibility and collaboration on that basis.
The teacher is given the task of influencing this growth of 
independence, does not relieve class members of doing what they have 
grown strong enough to do for themselves. But over and over the 
teacher takes the child by the hand and guides him until he is able 
to venture on alone. ‘
Ethics, Knowledge, and Mainstreaming
The opening of education to mutual peer relations stands in con­
trast with the modern emphasis on individualized instruction in the 
mastery of discrete skills. In the former, pupils experience more 
widely and in greater depth and thereby face the challenge of indi­
vidual decision.
The ethical implication is that the child, with guidance from 
his teacher, confronts his own potentiality and decides as an authentic 
person what is intrinsically good and what is bad in the problematic of 
the unexpected, the ever changing situation, regardless of whether it 
is immediately useful to himself and his group. A growing awareness of 
what he is meant to be helps him to make the decision independently.
That which Is intended for the individual is personal, "not however In 
the sense of a free unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a real­
ization of the right ia Infinitely personal shapes."^ This means that
3^ -Buber, Paths in Utopia, pp. 130, 131.
3^Buber, Tales of the Hasidim, p. 5.
3%uber, Good and Evil, p. 142.
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the normative truth of human existence is included in the present, con­
crete expression of individual responsibility. Thus group nurturance 
and loyalty are normative to human existence but defined in action if 
one’s friends are seen tormenting some new member of that group, say 
a retarded child, and the question of how to be nurturing and loyal 
has to be decided personally within a living context.
In order to decide and act, the child must be taught to make 
value judgments based on an interpretation of the facts and their 
interrelatedness. Buber's epistemology suggests that the teacher, as 
intermediary of experience, would foster in pupils an openness and a 
faithfulness to the facts in order to supplant prejudice with an ade­
quate value judgment. That a retarded person is given the capacities 
shared by everyone (love, joy, suffering, achievement) is a fact to be 
learned. Ultimately, this openness links to a receptive, confirming 
attitude to the world and a valid "world view."
The facts are there; it is a question of whether I strive to 
grasp them as faithfully as I can. Hy world view can help 
me in this if it keeps my love for this "world" so awake and 
strong that I do not grow tired of perceiving what is to be 
perceived.34
Buber emphasizes that perfect knowledge of the truth cannot be 
possessed. "What is the real situation? Is there a truth we can pos­
sess? Can we appropriate it? There certainly is none we can pick up 
and put in our pocket."33 What one can do is to "serve the truth, 
believe in it," and put a stop in one's own spirit to the "politization
3^Buber, Pointing the Way; "Education and the World View,"
p. 100.
33guber, Israel and the World; "The Prejudices of Youth,"
p. 46.
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of the truth and the utilitarizing of truth, and suitability."36 The 
approach is similar when one gives "distance" and "enters into relation" 
with the Thou of literature. By setting limits to one's bias and turn­
ing attentively to what is there to be perceived, the aspect of meaning 
derived supplements one's own knowledge.
The text has been interpreted countless times and in countless 
ways. I know that no interpretation including my own coincides 
with the original meaning of the text. I know that my interpret­
ing, like everyone else's is conditioned through my being. But 
if I attend as faithfully as I can to what it contains of word 
and texture, of sound and rhythmic structure, of open and hidden 
connections, my interpretation will not have beem made in vain.
. . .  I have found something. And If I show what I have found,
I guide him who lets himself be guided to the reality of the 
text. To him whom I teach I make visible the working forces 
of the text that I have experienced.37
The important truth to be learned by children in their "manifold 
togetherness" is the truth of human existence. In mutual dialogue, the 
pupil perceives not only the uniqueness of the other, but also the expe­
rience belonging to him as unique. Although this perception contains 
only as much as the reality the dialogue imparts, a concept of human 
wholeness in its complexity takes form out of that nucleus.38 "The 
work of education points to the real unity that is hidden behind the 
multiplicity of aspects. . . . Education unites the participating groups, 
through access to the educative forces and through common service to the 
facts, into the model of the great community." Such unity and community 
encourage independent valuing tested in life by which the content, reality 
and reliability of one's view can be decided as opposed to a groundless
3^Buber, Pointing the Way; "Education and the World View," p. 101
37Ibid.
3®Buber, Between Han and Man: "What is Man?", p. 125; Knowledge 
of Man: "Distance and Relation," p. 71.
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view. This resists thoughtless attachment and obedience to any "ficti­
tious conviction" of a group. Commitment to the view particular to a 
group, Buber points out, can mean "a genuine choice or an awkward 
groping, as in blind man's buff."3* So the experience of the many is 
not levelled down, but it is enriched by mutual openness to differing 
experience. In other words, this epistemology gives to individual 
pupils what they need for their own understanding and what they cannot 
give themselves.* 4®
Through relation children begin to sense their "finitude" and
their "need of completion." They gain the mutual comprehension of a
single truth from two contrasting points of view.
The question is not one of "tolerance," but of making present 
the roots of community and its ramifications, of so experienc­
ing and living in the trunk . . . that one also experiences, as 
truly as one's own, where and how the other boughs branch off 
and shoot up. It is not a question of a formal apparent under­
standing on a minimal basis, but of an awareness from the other 
side of the other's real relation to the truth. What is called 
for is not "neutrality" but solidarity, a living answering for 
one another— and mutuality, living reciprocity; not effacing 
the boundaries between the groups . . . but communal recogni­
tion of the common reality and communal testing of the common 
responsibility.41
^Buber, Pointing the Way: "Education and the World View,"
p. 103.
4®Ibid., p. 102.
41Ibid.
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Summary and Conclusions
1. Quality of education. A gradual modification of the pre­
vailing educational practices toward the leading out of individual 
potentiality, and the encouragement of mutual awareness and collabora­
tion between peers on that basis, will improve the quality of education 
for the student population as a whole.
2. Education as inclusive. Mutuality is required in main- 
streaming, not a conformity of handicapped children to the existing 
convention essentially untouched by their presence. Such conformity 
is in any case opposed by human variance. The mainstream teacher is, 
however, charged with the task of "influencing" the pupil to develop 
in his uniquely personal way. The line between influence and indoc­
trination, between education and arbitrary efforts to remediate the 
child is often difficult to draw— the teacher stands on a "narrow rocky 
ridge" where there is no sureness of knowledge. But Buber’s original 
concept "inclusion" contributes to the solution: The reality of the 
child's perception extends the teacher’s own perception and enables 
acceptance and confirmation. What can be known of the point of view of 
the child is revealed through personal contact and the strength and 
tenderness of personal relations, the very heart of Buber's method.
3. Education as conscious and willed. Owing to the long 
history of isolation and rejection of the handicapped, it is concluded 
that peer relations cannot be left to chance; they must be consciously 
influenced by the teacher. This is qualified by a recognition that
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the teacher is unable to force relations, and that influences outside 
of education also shape the attitudes of children. Given these limi­
tations, Buber's writings support the conclusion that teachers can 
create an atmosphere of mutuality conducive to wholesome peer rela­
tions. How can this be done? Primarily through personal contact, 
through dialogue, and through becoming a model of openness.
4. Community of achievement. The effective mainstream class 
is a "community of achievement" characterized by an atmosphere of 
mutuality. Children are educated in and for community.
3. Responsibility. Continual togetherness, either physically 
or in spirit, is not meant. The class diverges according to the spe­
cial needs, capacities, and involvements of individuals, and it merges 
in shared involvement. But the prevalence of mutual recognition and 
responsible help in the common pursuit of learning, which depends on 
this possibility of alternate separation and coming together, is the 
underlying bond that unites the class, and it is essential to main- 
streaming.
6. Integrative awareness. Mutual recognition and responsible 
service is the base of Buber's epistemology. Applied to mainstreaming, 
handicapped children and those around them learn to see the relativity
of human attributes and the wholeness of the self and the partner encoun­
tered. Ultimately this openness links to a receptiving, loving attitude 
toward humanity, an integrative perception of the world, and an inde­
pendent "world view."
7. Uniqueness. The central question is now repeated, How can 
mainstreaming be humanized? The answer again points to mutuality on
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a necessary condition, but with an emphasis which follows from this 
research of Buber's philosophy and from what has been discussed through­
out: The focal point of human learning is the truth of human existence 
— what does it mean to be a unique person? An important way of arriving 
at this truth is through the pluralistic relations of the learning com­
munity, where children are given mutual access to one another and educa­
ted to "character," to becoming unique persons capable of independent, 
responsible decision, and whose decisions are influenced by existential 
values.
(F)or true human decision, that is, decision taken by the 
unified soul there is only One direction. This means that 
to whatever end the current decision is reached, in the reality 
of existence all the so diverse decisions are merely varia­
tions on a single one, which is continually made afresh in 
a single direction. . . .  My uniqueness, this unrepeatable 
form of being here, not analysable into any elements and not 
compoundable out of any, I experience as a designed or pre­
formed one, entrusted to me for execution, although every­
thing that affects me participates in this execution. That 
a unique human being is created does not mean that it is put 
into being for a mere existence, but for the fulfilment of a 
being-intention. . . .  In decision, taking the direction 
thus means: taking the direction toward the point of being 
at which, executing for my part the design which I am, I 
encounter the divine mystery of my created uniqueness, the 
mystery waiting for me.
Every ethos . . .  is revelation of human service to the 
goal of creation, in which service man authenticates himself 
. . .  as far as he is able, quantum satis. . , ,^2
^Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 142-43.
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